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I. INTRODUCTION
This article is a labor of love. The authors have devoted approxi-
mately ten years to defending the institution of forced heirship in writing
and in testimony before legislative committees. We feel that the portion
of a decedent's estate reserved for descendants is of such importance
to the citizens of this state that it is worthy of our passion and zeal.
It will be obvious to the reader that each author favors retention of
the legitime for descendants regardless of their age. However, the con-
tents of the article focus on the specific provisions of Louisiana Acts
No. 788 (1989).
The Act redefines descendants who are forced heirs as children under
the age of twenty-three or those who are interdicted or subject to
interdiction. For purposes of claiming the legitime, representation in the
descending line is limited to descendants of a predeceased child who
would have been under the age of twenty-three at the moment of the
deceased's death. In an effort to afford protection to other descendants
from unjust or inadvertent disinherison by a parent, the Act also repealed
the prohibition against evidence of captation or undue influence. The
result of the repeal is to permit such evidence in a will contest.
In analyzing the provisions of the Act, the authors' first subject
the new definition of forced heirship to constitutional scrutiny under
both the United States and Louisiana Constitutions. After exploring the
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purpose of redefining forced heirs as children under twenty-three years
of age and children who are mentally or physically incapacitated, the
authors examine the effect of the purpose on the Louisiana constitutional
prohibition against abolishing forced heirship. More particularly, the
meaning of "forced heirship" is examined in the context of that pro-
hibition. The authors then analyze the legislation creating the new cat-
egory of forced heirs twenty-two years or younger under the equal
protection clauses of both the federal and state constitutions. Arguably,
the legislation discriminates arbitrarily against those children twenty-
three years of age and older.
The remainder of the article concentrates upon the language of the
statutory provisions contained in Act 788. Part II examines in detail
the new definition of forced heirs-a child under age twenty-three and
a child who is interdicted or subject to being interdicted. Related to
the new definition is another provision modifying the rules of repre-
sentation in the descending line; and, not surprisingly, the modification
applies only to a claim of an heir's forced portion. Foreseeable problems
created by the new categories of forced heirs include 1) a larger forced
share than intestate share, as in Succession of Greenlaw and 2) the
effect on collation when some children are forced heirs and others not.
Special sections of the Act pertaining to its effective date and retroactivity
are also the subject of the authors' commentary.
In an effort to afford some protection to otherwise vulnerable de-
scendants, the legislature in Act 788 also repealed Louisiana Civil Code
article 1492 prohibiting evidence of hatred, anger, suggestion, or cap-
tation. The authors explore the meaning of those terms, the effect such
evidence may have on a last will and testament, and the social costs
of the repeal of the prohibition. Although not a part of the revision
of forced heirship contained in Act 788, the legislature also amended
the Civil Code article regulating proof of reconciliation between a parent
and the disinherited forced heir. As the authors explain, the latter
amendment reflects the same legislative attitude toward the forced portion
as that reflected in Act 788.
Ultimately, the article uses the Act as an example of piecemeal,
hasty, and ill-conceived code revision. The project of ongoing revision
of the Louisiana Civil Code has been entrusted by the Legislature to
the Louisiana State Law Institute. The authors suggest attention to the
relationship between the Legislature and the Law Institute on the issue
of Code revision. It is hoped that Louisiana private law, principally
embodied in the Civil Code, will continue to serve as a model for other
jurisdictions and as a statement of principles worthy of respect by future
generations of Louisiana citizens.
II. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 1989 LOUISIANA ACTS No. 788
A threshold question in the analysis of 1989 Louisiana Acts No.
788 is its constitutional vulnerability, specifically with regard to two
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provisions of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974-article XII, section
5, which protects against the abolition of forced heirship, and article
I, section 3, which guarantees equal protection without regard to age.
Constitutionality Under Louisiana Constitution Article XII, Section 5
Article XII, section 5 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 provides:
No law shall abolish forced heirship. The determination of forced
heirs, the amount of the forced portion, and the grounds for
disinherison shall be provided by law. Trusts may be authorized
by law, and a forced portion may be placed in trust.
Act 788 must be analyzed in light of that provision. Has the Act merely
redetermined the forced heirs, as its proponents claim; or has it, in
redefining forced heirs, abolished the very concept it is allegedly re-
structuring? Answering that question entails an analysis of the meaning
of the constitutional provision, as well as an analysis of the effect of
the new Act.
The Louisiana Constitution of 1921 also contained a protection for
forced heirship, but was more succinct in stating:
No law shall be passed abolishing forced heirship; but the le-
gitime may be placed in trust to the extent authorized by the
Legislature. '
The 1921 version did not contain the language authorizing the legislature
to determine the members of the class of forced heirs, the amount they
would take, and the grounds for disinheritance. 2
The question becomes whether the revised language in the 1974
version so watered down the concept as to make the protection inef-
fective. Such appears to be the position taken by those who do not
find Act 788 objectionable in light of article XII, section 5. This position
is supported by the analysis presented by Professor Lee Hargrave, con-
stitutional scholar and Coordinator of Legal Research for the Louisiana
Constitutional Convention of 1973. In his article analyzing the various
provisions of the 1974 constitution, he notes that the 1974 provision
gave the legislature the right to determine the forced heirs and the
amount of the forced portion, concluding, "There is not much else to
determine." 3 Yet, indeed, there is much more to be determined regarding
1. La. Const. of 1921, art. 4, § 16 (superceded 1974).
2. See IX Records of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973: Convention
Transcripts 3073 (1977) [hereinafter IX Convention Transcripts], in which Delegate Ford
Stinson, representing the Committee on Bill of Rights and Elections, acknowledged:
This makes very little change from the present [1921] provisions of the con-
stitution, except it provides more that the legislature can set up what the forced
portion shall be, what percentages as it is at the present time in the Civil Code.
3. Hargrave, "Statutory" and "Hortatory" Provisions of the Louisiana Constitution
of 1974, 43 La. L. Rev. 647, 658 (1983) [hereinafter Hargrave, Statutory].
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the validity of the Act-specifically, whether the power to redetermine
forced heirs and the amount reserved for them no longer falls within
the ambit of determining rules within the framework of the concept of
forced heirship, but instead effectively allows the legislature to redefine
forced heirship to the point of abolishing the concept. 4
In determining at what point the renovation of forced heirship
amounts to its destruction and replacement by a different structure, we
may contemplate the old English concept of primogeniture.5 Could the
Louisiana legislature, consistent with article XII, section 5, designate the
eldest son to be the only forced heir and the amount of the forced
portion to be one hundred percent? Presumably, all would recognize
this charade as primogeniture, the very antithesis of forced heirship.
Thus, at some point agreement could be reached that forced heirship
could be redefined out of existence. The difficulty is in determining that
point.6
Intended Effect of the 1974 Revision of Article XII, Section 5
It is submitted that the constitutional provision allowing the legis-
lature to determine the forced heirs, the amount of the forced portion,
and the grounds of disinheritance is not an invitation to destroy the
concept, but a grant of flexibility within the confines of the institution
of forced heirship. As to determining the forced heirs, the new provision
4. For example, Professor Hargrave, in his analysis of the constitutional debate,
quotes Delegate Max Tobias as stating, "As I presently read Louisiana Constitution and
statutes, the legislature could very simply say that each child is a forced heir to the extent
of one dollar." IX Convention Transcripts, supra note 2, at 3075. Yet, Hargrave does
not note that Delegate Stinson, in introducing the proposal starts by attempting to explain
forced heirship, stating, "For someone that may not know what forced heirship is, that
is, that your children cannot be, as in Texas, for example, be left a dollar or five dollars;
they have a forced portion depending on the number of children." Id. at 3073.
5. Black defines primogeniture as "[t]he superior or exclusive right possessed by the
eldest son, and particularly, his right to succeed to the estate of his ancestor, in right
of his seniority by birth, to the exclusion of younger sons." Black's Law Dictionary 1072
(5th ed. 1979).
6. Proponents of the new Act 788 frequently refer to the case of Succession of
Earhart, 220 La. 817, 825, 57 So. 2d 695, 697 (1952), which, in upholding a trust,
recognized that the constitutional provision of 1921 "[did] not prohibit the legislature
from regulating or restricting the rights of forced heirs." Yet, when the regulation eclipses
the very concept regulated, it is submitted that the situation is more analogous to the
analysis in Succession of Burgess, 359 So. 2d 1006 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 360
So. 2d 1178 (1978), in which the court declared "enough already." In Burgess, the court
stated that a trust provision would be unenforceable if it could be shown that there would
be no income from the trust property to satisfy the legitime. By selecting non-income
producing property as the subject of the trust, the testatrix was effectively attempting to
circumvent the protection afforded to the forced heir of receiving net income from the
legitime in trust annually.
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was a cue in 1974 that the often criticized concept of ascendant forced
heirship 7 be rejected. Consequently, legislation in 19798 and 19819 ef-
fectively abolished ascendant forced heirship, first as to community
property and then generally. As to determining the amounts of the
forced portion, the new provision indicated that portions could be re-
duced as they were in 1981 when the forced portion was reduced to
one-fourth for one child and one-half for two or more.' 0 Finally, as to
determining the grounds for disinherison, it opened the door for reform
in expanding the causes" and shifting the burden of proving the cause.12
The new constitutional provision also paved the way for strengthening
the position of the surviving spouse by expanding the property that can
be subject to the survivor's usufruct, 3 and by allowing the surviving
spouse usufructuary, as full owner of an undivided interest, to demand
partition of the property. 4
7. See Nathan, An Assault on the Citadel: A Rejection of Forced Heirship, 52 Tul.
L. Rev. 5, 16 (1977) in which he refers to ascendant forced heirship as "archaic and
outmoded." Compare with Professor Pascal's memorandum in which he states: "It could
be argued that the deletion of parents of forced heirs so altered the institution as to
amount to its partial abolition in violation of the Louisiana Constitution." Unpublished
memorandum entitled "On Forced Heirship: The Unconstitutionality of Senate Bill 264
(Mr. Nelson, et al) to 'Amend' the Laws on Forced Heirship," prepared by Professor
Robert Pascal, Professor of Law Emeritus, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State
University, for the House Civil Law and Procedure Committee meeting of June 13, 1989,
at 6.
8. 1979 La. Acts No. 702, § 1 repealed ascendant forced heirship as to community
property.
9. 1981 La. Acts No. 442, § 1 repealed La. Civ. Code art. 1494 (1870) in its
entirety, thus completely discarding the concept of ascendant forced heirship.
10. La. Civ. Code art. 1493 (1870) provided for a disposable portion of two-thirds
if the decedent left one child, one-half if he left two children, and one-third if he left
three or more. These portions were reduced by the amendment of Article 1493 by 1981
La. Acts No. 884, § 1.
11. Conviction of a felony was added as a cause by 1983 La. Acts No. 566, § 1,
and failure to communicate without just cause for two years after attaining majority was
added by 1985 La. Acts No. 456. As to disinherison by ascendants other than parents,
the ability to disinherit for acts committed against the ascendants or against the parents
of the child being disinherited was added by 1985 La. Acts No. 456.
12. La. Civ. Code art. 1624 was amended by 1985 La. Acts. No. 456, shifting to
the forced heir the burden of proving that the cause for disinheritance did not exist.
13. 1975 La. Acts No. 680, § I allowed the usufruct to be confirmed by testament
for life or any other period. 1979 La. Acts No. 678, § I allowed the usufruct to be
granted by testament over separate property forming a part of the legitime. Restrictions
of the sanctioned usufruct only as to issue of the marriage were removed by 1981 La.
Acts No. 919. The latter was clarified further by 1982 La. Acts No. 445.
14. La. Civ. Code art. 543, as amended by 1983 La. Acts No. 535, which permitted
a person having a share in full ownership of property held in indivision to demand
partition in kind or by licitation, now allows for the possibility of the surviving spouse
in community to bring such an action against the children who share in naked ownership.
1990]
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Yet, the 1974 provision did not permit the legislature to alter the
very essence of the institution. Although, as Professor Hargrave points
out, one would prefer to find a greater debate in the constitutional
transcripts," one cannot ignore the reference to the preservation of family
ties. 16
Indeed, it is this preservation of family ties, and more specifically
family ownership of property without regard to the age of the children,
that is the essence of forced heirship.' 7 Going to the very roots of forced
heirship in Roman law, one notes that the concept was intended to
insure that the family, "the natural recipients of the testator's bounty,"
not be ignored in the process of property distribution.' Similarly, in
drafting the forced heirship provisions of the French Civil Code, the
redactors emphasized the duty to leave a certain portion of one's pat-
rimony to one's children, as this was viewed as "part of the responsibility
assumed when children are brought into the world."' 9 Thus, the concept
was a "sanction of the moral obligation" stemming from the "natural
duties" flowing between ascendants and descendants as well as a response
to the social interest based on the idea that "the family is the basic
social group." ' 20 In responding to the social interest, forced heirship was
conceived to protect the family against extravagant liberalities to strangers
and to alleviate disharmony among the children by limiting the inequality
that a parent might impose.
2
'
Similarity of Act 788 to a Support Provision
Forced heirship recognizes that special link between parent and child
that exists without regard to the age of the child. It is not bound to
15. Hargrave, Statutory, supra note 3, at 659, states, "An examination of the con-
vention transcript reveals an amazing lack of discussion of the underlying policy issues
related to the institution of forced heirship."
16. See the statement of Delegate Stinson in IX Convention Transcripts, supra note
2, at 3076, in which he states:
Now, the reason is why should we have forced portions? I'm old-fashion[ed]
enough to believe that children should still help in the family and they help
while they are children in accumulating some of the property that their parents
have. If you don't have forced heirship as in certain states you can leave them
a dollar or five dollars, and say "That's all you're worth to me." The basis
of our government and I believe all good government is our family group. I
feel that a government, or a state, or a country is only as strong as the family
ties.
17. See Pascal, supra note 7.
18. M. Radin, Handbook of Roman Law, § 153, at 416 (1927).
19. J. Dawson, Gifts and Promises: Continental and American Law Compared 47
(1980).
20. 3 M. Planiol, Treatise on the Civil Law No. 3049, at 490 (lth ed. La. St. L.
Inst. trans. 1959).
21. H. Souleau, Les Successions, Collection U Serie Droit Prive § 477 (A. Colin ed.
1982).
[Vol. 50
1990] FORCED HEIRSHIP
the notion of support. Indeed, Planiol points out that, although support
of family is a complementary concept, forced heirship is specifically
distinct therefrom 22 and co-exists with other codal provisions for support,
such as the basic child support provisions for minors23 and the alimentary
duties, regardless of age, flowing between ascendants and descendants. 24
Act 788, as passed, provides that the status of forced heir be limited
to children under twenty-three years of age and those over twenty-three
who are interdicted or subject to interdiction. The restriction appears
related to some idea of a need to support these vulnerable classes of
heirs. This conclusion has been articulated by the legislators introducing
the legislation, 25 and can also be discerned by analyzing the original Bill
265, which was later amended and blossomed into Act 788. The original
bill provided for a maximum forced portion of one-fourth if the decedent
died survived by one child under twenty-three, and a maximum portion
of one-half if survived by two or more children under twenty-three.
However, the actual amount of the estate going to any child was not
a fixed portion, but would depend on "the amount necessary for the
support, lodging, maintenance and education of each forced heir of the
decedent, according to his station in life, until such forced heir attains
the age of twenty-three. ' ' 26 Ironically, the provision was strikingly similar
22. See 3 M. Planiol, supra note 20, at 490, in which he notes:
The law has consecrated two specific obligations based on this blood tie: the
alimentary obligation and the reserved portion. Under the first obligation, re-
latives in direct line must support each other during their lives, if necessary;
under the second obligation, they must in their death leave a substantial portion
of their estate to the survivors. The two obligations do not follow one from
the other. They do not have the same importance or scope, the alimentary
claim being attributed to more persons than the reserved portion.
23. La. Civ. Code arts. 227, 230.
24. La. Civ. Code art. 229.
25. When asked at the Civil Law and Procedure Committee Hearing on June 5,
1989, what factors were used to arrive at the age of twenty-three, Senator Sidney Nelson
replied:
The factors that we used was another compromise. There was an amendment
offered on the floor of the Senate to try to raise it to an age where a child
would get through law school or medical school. The Senate said, "No, that's
unreasonable. The parents put a child through high school and through four
years of college and that's-if they want to support them further-fine.
When reminded by the party questioning him, "But we're not talking about support as
I understand the bill. We're talking about limitations on forced heirship, right?", Senator
Nelson replied,
What we're talking about is how you determine what would be a fair amount
to give the children, a right to claim against the parent's estate. . . . Well, of
course, as opponents observed, my preference would be to repeal it outright,
but it seems that twenty-three is a fair age under this concept. We debated in
the Senate and chose not to go beyond twenty-three.
26. Senate Bill 264 as originally proposed.
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to the now obsolete consolation prize available to illegitimate children,
who were previously classified as irregular heirs and thus ineligible for
forced heirship status.27 Presumably aware of its resemblance to main-
tenance, the proponents attempted to distinguish it by providing that
the amount needed would be determined at the decedent's death and
not be altered if the heir experiences a change of circumstances. 8
Support Provisions in Other Jurisdictions
The analogy may also be drawn to other civilian jurisdictions that
have repealed forced heirship, but have instead a concept of "alimentos,"
which reserves a portion of a decedent's estate for certain persons who
were dependant on the decedent. 29 For instance, the Mexican Civil Code,
from which forced heirship was repealed in 1884,30 lists as potential
claimants of alimentos: 1) Male descendants under the age of twenty-
one, or over the age of twenty-one if incapacitated and unable to work;
2) unmarried daughters, regardless of age, who live honorably; 3) the
surviving spouse with the restriction that the surviving husband shows
an inability to work or the surviving wife shows that she lives an
honorable life; 4) ascendants; 5) concubines with whom a male decedent
had lived for five years immediately preceding his death or with whom
he had children, provided that she was the sole concubine, remain
unmarried, and observe good conduct; and 6) brothers, sisters, and other
collaterals within the fourth degree who are incapacitated, under the
age of eighteen, and have no property to provide for their needs." In
Mexico, the amount given to such claimants is reduced to the actual
amount needed for support32 and is further determined under the regular
rules pertaining to alimony, except that the right to receive such support
cannot be waived or compromised.33
27. La. Civ. Code arts. 240-243 (1870). See particularly the second paragraph of
Article 243 which states: "The debt of alimony ceases likewise to be due from the estate
of the father or mother of the illegitimate child whenever either of them has provided
during his or her life a sufficient maintenance for his or her illegitimate child, or have
made to him donations or other advantages which may be sufficient for that purpose."
28. If this is indeed not a bill for maintenance, then the state's justification for
limiting the "forced heirs" to those under twenty-three, interdicted or subject to interdiction
becomes highly suspect in terms of equal protection.
29. See Costa Rica art. 595, Mexico art. 1368, and Salvador I. tit. 17, art. 338 (cited
in J. Dawson, supra note 19, at 233).
30. See Introduction to the Civil Code for the Federal District and Territories of
Mexico, translated by Otto Schoenrch, 1950, which relates the thorough revision of the
civil code promulgated on March 31, 1884, and taking effect on June 1, 1884.
31. Civil Code of Mexico art. 1368.
32. Id. art. 1370.
33. Id. art. 1372.
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In examining Act 788, one may also note the similarity to main-
tenance provisions in common law jurisdictions, such as Great Britain's
Inheritance (Family Provision) Act of 197511 and New Zealand's Family
Protection Act of 1955. These, along with the maintenance provisions
of the states of Maine" and Massachusetts,3 6 were cited years ago by
Professor Gerald LeVan, not as forms of forced heirship, but rather
as "alternatives."" 37 In cautioning against the adoption of such provisions
without adequate deliberation, he warned:
Given the choice between forced heirship and family mainte-
nance, which is preferable? To settle for family maintenance is
to place in our courts the power to vary estate plans, even
where the estate plan is intestacy. Given Louisianians proclivity
to litigate, the legions of lawyers added annually to the pro-
fession, and the almost inevitable wounds that result from in-
trafamily squabbles over family property, the legislature must
weigh carefully such a dramatic alternative to forced heirship."
Likelihood of Violation of Article XII, Section 5
The same sentiment prevailed in the debates over Bill 26419 in
legislative committees, resulting in the amendment of the bill to provide
not for a case-by-case determination of need, but rather for a fixed
portion for all those under the age of twenty-three.40 The addition of
interdicts and those subject to interdiction to the list of forced heirs in
the revised version of Bill 264 reaffirms the link to a presumed need
for support or maintenance.
If the selection of forced heirs in Act 788 was indeed motivated by
a presumed need for support, then the concept is alimentary, not one
of forced heirship. 4' Even the scant transcripts of the 1974 Constitutional
Convention indicate that the delegates contemplated that forced heirs
34. For a discussion of the British act, see Samuels, Inheritance (Provision for Family
and Dependents) Act 1975, 39 Mod. L. Rev. 183 (1976).
35. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 801 (1981).
36. Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 196, § 2 (Law. Co-op. 1981).
37. LeVan, Alternatives to Forced Heirship, 52 Tul. L. Rev. 29, 38 (1977).
38. Id. at 48.
39. Senate Bill 264 later matured into Act 788.
40. This change was accepted by way of compromise by the proponents of the bill
despite the previous statement by Senator Nelson that he thought a set amount given
regardless of need only to those under twenty-three would be "inequitable." Hearings of
Civil Law and Procedure Committee, June 5, 1989.
41. See 3 M. Planiol, supra note 20, at 490.
1990]
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not be limited to minors or those under the age of twenty-three.4 2 Thus,
the reformation of this institution to an alimentary protection is a
redefinition antithetical to the essence of forced heirship and not con-
templated by the delegates of the constitutional convention who at-
tempted to protect that revered legal concept.
Constitutionality Under the Equal Protection Clause
Age Discrimination
If the purpose of the new forced heirship law is not to provide
alimony, then the twenty-two year age cutoff is arbitrary, capricious,
and unreasonable because there would then be no rationale behind the
age discrimination (except the purpose of limiting the effects of forced
heirship). The equal protection provision of the Louisiana Constitution
of 1974, article I, section 3,43 would then be violated on the basis of
age discrimination because the cutoff is not justified by a legitimate
state purpose."
State constitutions cannot be interpreted to afford less protection
than the federal Constitution because such an interpretation would violate
the federal supremacy clause.45 However, they can certainly be construed
to afford greater protection. Of course, historically the state constitutions
preceded the United States Constitution and served as models for the
federal Bill of Rights, which served as a protection for the people against
the new central government. Determining whether the particular state
42. The references to decedents "much older than we are [or] of advancing years"
contemplate decedents with children older than twenty-three. IX Convention Transcripts,
supra note 2, at 3076. Forced heirship has never been restricted to minor children. See
Samuel, Shaw, and Spaht, Successions and Donations, Developments in the Law, 1983-
1984, 45 La. L. Rev. 575, 599 (1984) (What Has Become of Forced Heirship?).
43. La. Const. art. I, § 3 provides:
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws. No law shall
discriminate against a person because of race or religious ideas, beliefs, or
affiliations. No law shall arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably discriminate
against a person because of birth, age, sex, culture, physical condition, or
political ideas or affiliations. Slavery and involuntary servitude are prohibited,
except in the latter case as punishment for crime.
44. On the other hand, even if one could stretch the meaning of forced heirship into
mere alimony, Act 788 would still arguably be unconstitutional under the state equal
protection provision as an unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious discrimination on the
basis of age. Allowing a child of twenty-two to demand a forced portion, while denying
that opportunity to a twenty-three year old sibling, without regard to actual need, is
arbitrarily inequitable. Note the comments of the bill's author, Senator Sydney Nelson,
who acknowledged the inequities of such a distinction in the Civil Law and Procedure
Committee Hearing on June 5, 1989.
45. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
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constitutional provision affords greater protection than the similar federal
provision involves a comparative analysis of the wording of the state
and the federal provisions, and a consideration of the intention of the
drafters of the state constitution as evidenced by the legislative history.
When the federal Bill of Rights, as applicable to the states through
the fourteenth amendment, was interpreted very liberally, during the
Warren Court years, for instance, there was little need to construe state
constitutions differently from the federal. A state constitution could not
be construed as providing less protection, and it could hardly provide
more. But during the later years of the Burger Court, and today, with
the Supreme Court becoming more conservative with regard to expanding
constitutional protections, there is an incentive for a state court to
interpret its constitutional provisions to provide more protection than
the federal constitution.16
Federal Equal Protection Analysis
In resolving cases involving the fourteenth amendment equal pro-
tection clause, the Supreme Court of the United States has developed
a three-tiered analysis, consisting of: 1) strict scrutiny of legislation
involving fundamental rights or suspect classes; 2) intermediate scrutiny
primarily reserved for cases involving discrimination based on gender or
illegitimacy; and 3) minimum scrutiny or a rational basis for other
economic and social legislation. 47 Before article I, section 3 of the
Louisiana Constitution came into existence in 1974, equal protection by
the state courts was afforded solely by the fourteenth amendment.
41
Thus, the federal jurisprudence interpreting the fourteenth amendment
was applicable to the state equal protection provision. And even after
the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 became effective, Louisiana courts
continued to rely on federal jurisprudence interpreting the fourteenth
amendment .49
46. Comment, State v. Reeves: Interpreting Louisiana's Constitutional Right to Pri-
vacy, 44 La. L. Rev. 183 (1983); Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bills
of Rights, 9 U. Balt. L. Rev. 379 (1980); Kay, State Constitutional Law, 25 Trial 67
(1989).
47. Perhaps a fourth level has been recognized. For instance, in a case involving the
handicapped, the Court applied the minimum rationality standard but invalidated the law
in question. The Court failed to afford the legislative judgment the special deference
normally involved in minimum rationality. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,
Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 1055 S. Ct. 3249 (1985). See also, Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 102
S. Ct. 2382 (1982).
48. Chabert v. Louisiana High School Athletic Ass'n, 323 So. 2d 774 (La. 1975);
Southland Corp. v. Collector of Revenue for La., 321 So. 2d 501 (La. 1975).
49. Lovell v. Lovell, 378 So. 2d 418 (La. 1979); Desselle v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,
482 So. 2d 1009 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986).
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Louisiana Equal Protection Analysis
Yet the Louisiana equal protection provision does not track the
wording of the fourteenth amendment. The third section of the first
article of the Louisiana Constitution classifies individuals into three
different categories: 1) classifications based on race or religious beliefs
are completely prohibited; 2) classifications based on birth, age, sex,
culture, physical condition, or political ideas or affiliations are prohibited
unless the proponent of the classification demonstrates by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that the classification is not unreasonable, ar-
bitrary, or capricious; and 3) classifications on any other basis are
prohibited only when a member of the class demonstrates that the
classification does not properly further any appropriate state interest,
i.e., that it is unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious.50 "The disjunctive
'or' is used, in the second classification, indicating a more rigorous
scrutiny than if the conjunctive 'and' had been used." 5' Professor Har-
grave says that "[tihe background of the provision indicates that a
grudging application of the guarantee is not warranted. Rather, an
expansive application, independent of, and, in some instances, beyond
the federal standard is suggested."
5 2
Jurisprudential Interpretation of Article I, Section 3
The case of Sibley v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State
University" represents a watershed in equal protection guarantees in the
State of Louisiana. Before Sibley, Louisiana courts had adopted the
"federal levels of scrutiny" analysis in interpreting the state constitution.
Indeed in many cases the state courts did not even mention the Louisiana
Constitution, but relied exclusively on the fourteenth amendment either
to uphold or strike down state legislation.
4
In Sibley, the Louisiana Supreme Court expressly held that the three-
level system of federal equal protection analysis is inappropriate in
interpreting the equal protection provision of the Louisiana Constitution
of 1974." After severely criticizing the federal approach, the Sibley court
wrote:
50. La. Const. art. I, § 3; Sibley v. Board of Supervisors of La. State Univ., 477
So. 2d 1094, 1107-08 (La. 1985).
51. Hargrave, The Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 35
La. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1974) (emphasis added).
52. Id. at 9.
53. 477 So. 2d 1094 (La. 1985).
54. Rudolph v. Massachusetts Bay Ins. Co., 472 So. 2d 901 (La. 1985); Southland
Corp. v. Collector Revenue for La., 321 So. 2d 501 (La. 1975).
55. La. Const. art. I, § 3.
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We conclude that the federal jurisprudence should not be used
as a model for the interpretation or application of that part of
the Louisiana Declaration of Rights dealing with individual dig-
nity which is at issue in this case. The federal three level system
is in disarray and has failed to provide a theoretically sound
framework for constitutional adjudication. Also ... the state
constitution calls for more than minimal scrutiny of certain types
of classifications, and assigns the state the burden of showing
that such legislation is not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. 6
The court continued by stressing that article I, section 3 was intended
to provide greater protection than the fourteenth amendment: "With
the adoption of those guarantees Louisiana moved from a position of
having no equal protection clause to that of having three provisions
going beyond the decisional law construing the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." ' 57 The court replaced the federal system with a much simpler
one. Under Sibley, when a law that discriminates on the basis of the
specific classes mentioned in article I, section 3, except race or religious
affiliation, is attacked, the proponent of the legislation must bear the
burden of showing that the law does not arbitrarily, capriciously, or
unreasonably discriminate by demonstrating that the classification "sub-
stantially furthers an appropriate state purpose." '58
56. 477 So. 2d at 1107. See also Parker v. Cappel, 500 So. 2d 771 (La. 1987); Crier
v. Whitecloud, 496 So. 2d 305 (La. 1986); State v. Barberousse, 480 So. 2d 273 (La.
1985); LaMark v. NME Hosp., Inc., 542 So. 2d 753 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied,
551 So. 2d 1334 (1989); Bridley v. Alton Oschner Med. Found. Hosp., 532 So. 2d 905
(La. App. 5th Cir. 1988); Allen v. Burrow, 505 So. 2d 880 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ
denied, 507 So. 2d 229 (1987); Stuart v. City of Morgan City, 504 So. 2d 934 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1987); McLean v. Hunter, 486 So. 2d 816 (La. App. 1st Cir.), rev'd on other
grounds, 495 So. 2d 1298 (1986), writ denied, 513 So. 2d 1206 (1987); Harlan v. Frazier,
635 F. Supp. 718 (W.D. La. 1986), aff'd, 811 F.2d 601 (5th Cir. 1987).
57. 477 So. 2d at 1108; see also Hargrave, supra note 51, at 6; Bridley v. Alton
Ochsner Med. Found. Hosp., 532 So. 2d 905 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1988); Cooper v. Sams,
532 So. 2d 380 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 533 So. 2d 382 (1988).
58. 477 So. 2d 1094, 1108 (La. 1985); VI Records of the Louisiana Constitutional
Convention of 1973: Convention Transcripts 1016-18 (1977) [hereinafter VI Convention
Transcripts]; LaMark v. NME Hosp., Inc., 542 So. 2d 753 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ
denied, 551 So. 2d 1334 (1989). It has been said of the Sibley analysis: "The approach
is to focus on the specific merits of the individual case which necessarily entails a balancing
or comparative evaluation of governmental and individual interests." Allen, 505 So. 2d
at 887. The Allen case concerned those relations of a deceased not included under Louisiana
Civil Code article 2315 as. having standing to bring a survival action. The court held that
this is a classification unenumerated in article I, section 3 and thus that the plaintiffs
bore the burden to show that the classification did not suitably further any appropriate
state interest. The appropriate state interest was to limit the number of beneficiaries of
a survival action with a benefit to judicial efficiency and economy. The classification
reasonably furthered that end. The survivors allowed to bring the action are those most
affected by the loss, and thus the limitation to these classes reflects a reasonably appropriate
limitation.
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Actually, the Sibley court established the appropriate analysis that
should have been employed when the 1974 Louisiana Constitution became
effective. The 1973 Constitutional Convention proceedings are replete
with references to the failure of federal jurisprudence interpreting the
fourteenth amendment to provide adequate protection to certain classes.
Delegates to the 1973 Convention enumerated those classes that needed
express inclusion in article I, section 3 to ensure their protection. 9 Upon
a party's challenge of a discriminatory law, the state would now bear
the burden 60 of establishing that the classification is a means substantially
59. Succession of Clivens, 426 So. 2d 585 (La. 1982). As another commentator has
observed:
In Sibley v. Board of Supervisors, the Louisiana Supreme Court recognized that
the thrust of the state constitution's equal protection article was to provide
greater protection against arbitrary discrimination to groups which the federal
courts had failed to protect, and that the "tier" model of federal review of
equal protection challenges was inappropriate as a guide to deciding such chal-
lenges under the state constitution. Instead, the Sibley court announced a very
different standard of review under the state constitution's equal protection
article ....
Devlin, Louisiana Constitutional Law, Developments in the Law, 1986-1987, 48 La. L.
Rev. 335, 361-62 (1987). Devlin argues that selective enforcement of public gambling
statutes would seem to contravene equal protection under the Louisiana Constitution as
interpreted in Sibley. Both wagering on a public golf course on the outcome of the golf
game and wagering somewhere else on the outcome of a card or dice game constitute
public gambling. Why is the former tolerated and the latter prosecuted? "[Ilt seems that
if a defendant were to mount a challenge to the selective enforcement of the public
gambling laws on these grounds, the state would have to come forward [under the Sibley
approach] with a greater showing of need for the distinction than has thus far been
articulated." Id. at 363. See State v. Griffin, 495 So. 2d 1306 (La. 1986). Although
selective enforcement of criminal statutes might not violate federal equal protection, Bowers
v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986), for instance, because not directed
against a traditional suspect class, under Sibley this does not foreclose the issue of Louisiana
equal protection. Devlin, at 361.
60. As a spokesman for the Declaration of Rights Committee stated:
Mr. Roy: We feel that we have to enumerate these various rights because we
think that our citizens are entitled to have our court protect them in the future.
It's been too many times that even the Supreme Court of the United States
has dodged the issue with respect to equal protection. We want to make sure
that our justices can clearly understand that when you're going to discriminate,
when the state will discriminate against a person for any one of these categories,
then the state must show a reasonable basis for it.
VI Convention Transcripts, supra note 58, at 1017. Article 1, section 3, as it came from
the Declaration of Rights Committee of the 1973 Constitutional Convention, prohibited
discrimination based on sex, age, birth, race, social origin, political or religious ideas.
The Constitutional Convention, after defeating an effort to reduce the article's protection
to that of the fourteenth amendment, id. at 1022-30, banned discrimination based on race
and religious belief completely, and then added the requirement that discrimination on
the basis of the other enumerated categories was forbidden only if the state could not
show that the discrimination was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. Id. at 1016-
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related to a legitimate purpose. 6'
As further indication that the Louisiana provision affords greater
protection in this area, the proceedings of the 1973 Constitutional Con-
vention reflect that an effort to conform the protection under article I,
section 3 to that afforded by the fourteenth amendment was defeated. 62
Although the article was amended by the convention, the final provision
retained the original concept of enumerating specifically protected classes
18. This last requirement was added in response to fears that no classifications based on
the enumerated grounds would be allowed under the original committee. Id. at 1016-29.
It was felt, however, that the enumeration did serve a useful purpose.
"Mr. Roy: You may inquire, does there exist a need for specifically setting forth these
classes as we have done? We believe there is, for two main reasons. First, the federal
courts have failed to apply the Fourteenth Amendment to all of these classes. Thus,
millions have been, are now, and will continue to be denied equal protection of our
laws." Id. at 1016.
"Mr. Roy: We feel that we have to enumerate these various rights because we think
that our citizens are entitled to have our court protect them in the future. It's been too
many times that even the Supreme Court of the United States has dodged the issue with
respect to equal protection. We want to make sure that our justices can clearly understand
that when you're going to discriminate, when the state will discriminate against a person
for any one of these categories, then the state must show a reasonable basis for it. We
consider that even for the physical condition. Why should there be a law that prevents
a physically handicapped person who's a computer genius from working for the State of
Louisiana because he's crippled and can't walk? That's the reason why we consider those
categories, we don't want the courts to be confused anymore." Id. at 1017.
In the constitutional convention, Mr. Roy used as an example of unconstitutionality a
law that provided that people fifty or older cannot work.
"Mr. Roy: We merely say this ... , that every citizen is entitled to be discriminated
against, on a reasonable basis. Age is not a reasonable basis unless the legislature or the
state shows that it is a fair consideration. Suppose, fifteen years from now, the legislature
says no person may work for the state who is fifty years of age or older. I think that
we should have some protection so that the courts may look into it and decide whether
that is reasonable or not." Id. at 1017.
"Mr. Roy: Now, we specifically list categories that we feel very strongly about, that
need to be given some addressing to. We have not excluded that a person, other than
one of these, may be denied the equal protection of the laws in the first sentence." Id.
Roy argued that the specifically listed classes must receive more protection than those
that fall under the lower federal standard of equal protection. In other words, a stricter
state standard applies to specifically-enumerated classes and the normal federal standard
applies to the rest.
"Mr. Roy: That doesn't limit it to those [enumerated classes]. It just says, 'for these
in particular,' if you discriminate, you've got to show a reasonable basis for the dis-
crimination." Id,
61. Sibley, 477 So. 2d at 1108. VI Convention Transcripts, supra note 58, at 1017.
In determining whether a classification is reasonable or not, the courts should be guided
by the constitutional convention's purpose in expanding the equal protection guarantee
beyond that of the federal Constitution and pre-existing Louisiana law. Comment, supra
note 46, at 196-97, n.55; Hargrave, supra note 51, at 21.
62. Id. at 1022-30.
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and placing the burden to prove the reasonableness of the discrimination
on the state.
As one commentator has said of article I, section 3:
The equal protection guarantee that emerged is a broad one and
was intended to be so. Surely the breadth of the provision will
produce far-reaching changes in the state, perhaps more than
with any other provision of the constitution [of 19741.63
For the most part, however, until the Sibley case was decided in
1985, these changes were not forthcoming. In some equal protection
cases decided after Sibley, the state constitutional guarantee is not even
mentioned or cited. 4 One case held that the "two standards [state and
federal] are quite similar. ' '65 The recent case of Williams v. Kushner,66
however, involved, like Sibley, the question of the constitutionality of
the limitation imposed on medical malpractice recovery. The Louisiana
Supreme Court refused to decide the equal protection issue because the
plaintiff had already settled with the health care provider and the ques-
tion was regarded as moot. However, the court indicated that Sibley
would have been applicable had the question not been moot.67 Chief
Justice Dixon, dissenting, argued that the constitutional question was
properly before the court and went on to apply the Sibley analysis. 61
As Chief Justice Dixon put it:
Such classification violates Article I, Section 3 unless the statute's
proponents ... have demonstrated, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that since it substantially furthers an appropriate state
purpose, the discrimination is not arbitrary, capricious, or un-
reasonable. 69
The court of. appeal in Williams 0 had expressly held that Sibley
applied and that the test under the Louisiana Constitution was more
63. Hargrave, supra note 51, at 6.
64. In Succession of Davis, 509 So. 2d 838 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 513
So. 2d 821 (1987), the court held La. Civ. Code art. 209, which sets strict time limits
on filiation actions, to be constitutional under the fourteenth amendment, relying on Reed
v. Campbell, 476 U.S. 852, 106 S. Ct. 2234 (1986). La. Const. art. I, § 3 was neither
mentioned nor cited.
. 65. Miller v. State Civil Serv. Comm'n, 540 So. 2d 482, 486 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1989).
66. 549 So. 2d 294 (La. 1989).
67. 549 So. 2d at 296.
68. Id. at 304 (dissenting opinion).
69. Id. at 305 (emphasis added).
70. 524 So. 2d 191 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988), aff'd, 549 So. 2d 294 (1989).
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"meaningful" than that under the federal constitution," suggesting that
a form of mid-level scrutiny should be applied to such classifications.
The court of appeal added that the proponents of the challenged
legislation must prove that it is not unconstitutional.7 2
As indicated by the above discussion, if the purpose of the enu-
meration in article I, section 3 was to specifically protect these rights,
and if the protection afforded by the state equal protection provision
was intended to have more bite than that afforded by the fourteenth
amendment, 73 then apparently, under Sibley, the Louisiana standard of
scrutiny for the listed classes is roughly equivalent to intermediate scru-
tiny on the federal level. 74 Assuming that this is true, then it is suggested
71. We agree ... that the Sibley standard is appropriate .... Sibley expressly
rejected the traditional three-tier scrutiny of federal equal protection analysis in
favor of a more meaningful test which reflects the intent of the drafters of the
Louisiana Constitution of 1974.
Id. at 193 (emphasis added).
72. In addition to this new interpretation of the appropriate standard for Louis-
iana equal protection analysis, Sibley also announced a departure from the
longstanding rule that legislation is presumed constitutional with the opponent
carrying the burden of proving that a statute violates the constitution.
Id. at 194 (emphasis added). See also State v. Barberousse, 480 So. 2d 273 (La. 1985).
73. Crier v. Whitecloud, 496 So. 2d 305 (La. 1986); Bridley v. Alton Ochsner Med.
Found. Hosp., 532 So. 2d 905 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1988); Cooper v. Sams, 532 So. 2d
380 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 533 So. 2d 382 (1988); McLean v. Hunter, 486 So.
2d 816 (La. App. 1st Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 495 So. 2d 1298 (1986), writ denied,
513 So. 2d 1206 (1987).
74. One commentator has said:
Two areas in which the Louisiana Constitutional Convention expanded the
individual guarantees of the United States Constitution are: (1) the right to
equal protection and (2) the right to privacy.
Messina, Corporal Punishment v. Classroom Discipline: A Case of Mistaken Identity, 34
Loy. L. Rev. 35, 99 (1988). And further:
Thus, [after quoting from Sibley] in contrast to the use of a "rationality" test
for age discrimination under the federal standard, the Louisiana Constitution
elevates a legislative "age" classification to a form of middle-tier scrutiny.
Id. at 100.
Succession of Brown, 388 So. 2d 1151 (La. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 998, 101 S.
Ct. 1703 (1981), had suggested the same thing in holding that then La. Civ. Code art.
919 violated both federal and state equal protection.
The United States Supreme Court has held that the minimal rationality test applies to
age discrimination under the fourteenth amendment. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 99
S. Ct. 939 (1979) (mandatory retirement for foreign service employees at age sixty).
Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 95 S. Ct. 2562 (1976) (mandatory
retirement for police at age fifty); L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 1588-1601 (2d
ed. 1988) (deals with wealth classification).
In LaMark v. NME Hosp., Inc., 542 So. 2d 753 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 551
So. 2d 1334 (1989), the court clearly stated the difference in the standard required for
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that a twenty-three year old child has been unlawfully discriminated
against by the new law in favor of that child's twenty-two year old
sibling. This is true if intermediate scrutiny applies to the enumerated
classes, which seems to be the case since the court stated in Sibley,
"the state constitution calls for more than minimal scrutiny of certain
types of classifications, and assigns the state the burden of showing that
such legislation is not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable." '75 Here the
court refers to those classifications specifically enumerated in article I,
section 3, other than race and religion, which are simply prohibited.7 6
"More than" minimal scrutiny is at least intermediate scrutiny.
In Crier v. Whitecloud,7 7 the Louisiana Supreme Court, relying on
Sibley, expressly held that a classification not involving the specifically
enumerated categories in article I, section 3 is to be judged on the basis
of minimal scrutiny. "A remand to the district court to afford plaintiff
the opportunity to present evidence to carry her burden would serve no
useful purpose because of the minimal level of scrutiny involved." 78
This was expressly stated to be because the classification involved was
not one enumerated in article I, section 3.79 Thus, it may be legitimately
inferred that, had the classification been one based on a category ex-
pressly enumerated in article I, section 3, it would have received higher
scrutiny-intermediate scrutiny-because the court expressly referred to
the level utilized as "minimal," a federal category. 0 According to the
enumerated classes and non enumerated classes under Art. I, § 3.
[T]he statute does not classify individuals . . . on the basis of birth, age, sex,
culture, physical condition, or political ideas or affiliations, which would shift
the burden to the . . . [state] to show the classification substantially furthers a
legitimate state interest.
Id. at 755 (citing Sibley) (emphasis added).
Since application of the statute creates some other classification, it is incumbent
on the party challenging the statute to show that the legislation does not suitably
further any appropriate state interest.
Id. (citing Sibley) (emphasis added).
With an enumerated classification, the test is "substantially" and "legitimate." With
a non-enumerated classification, the test is "suitably" and "any appropriate." This, along
with the switch in the burden of proof, is the difference between intermediate scrutiny
and minimal scrutiny.
75. 477 So. 2d 1094, 1107 (La. 1985) (emphasis added).
76. See also McLean v. Hunter, 486 So. 2d 816 (La. App. 1st Cir.), rev'd on other
grounds, 495 So. 2d 1298 (1986), writ denied, 513 So. 2d 1206 (1987).
77. 496 So. 2d 305 (La. 1986).
78. Id. at 311.
79. Id.
80. See also State v. Barberousse, 480 So. 2d 273 (La. 1985); Latona v. Department
of State Civil Serv., 492 So. 2d 27 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 496 So. 2d 1043
(1986); McLean, 486 So. 2d at 816.
In his Crier dissent, 496 So. 2d 305, 313 (La. 1986), Justice Dennis said the following
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concurrence of Justice Lemmon in Crier,"' "this case is not as compelling
[as Sibley] because of the lower level of scrutiny and the more apparent
reasonableness." 82
Comparison of the Louisiana Equal Protection Provision to Its
Federal Counterpart
It is suggested that the federal three-tier equal protection analytical
scheme has been constitutionally built into the state equal protection
and dignity clause, article I, section 3, by the state Constitutional Con-
vention. This is the meaning of the following oft-quoted statement from
Sibley:
Article I, Section 3 commands the courts to decline enforcement
of a legislative classification of individuals in three different
situations: (1) When the law classifies individuals by race or
religious beliefs, it shall be repudiated completely [strict scrutiny];
(2) When the statute classifies persons on the basis of birth,
age, sex, culture, physical condition, or political ideas or affil-
iations, its enforcement shall be refused unless the state or other
advocate of the classification shows that the classification has
a reasonable basis [intermediate scrutiny]; (3) When the law
classifies individuals on any other basis, it shall be rejected
whenever a member of a disadvantaged class shows that it does
not suitably further any appropriate state interest [minimal scru-
tiny]."a
Strict scrutiny applies to a classification by race or religion in both
the federal and state context. Actually, with regard to those two clas-
concerning the scrutiny required for the enumerated categories:
Close scrutiny is required when a statute classifies persons for treatment different
from others because of a difference in their physical condition and the burden
is on the party who seeks to uphold the classification.
It is submitted that, within the context of his entire dissent, this means intermediate
scrutiny or higher than intermediate scrutiny.
81. 496 So. 2d at 311.
82. Id. at 313.
83. 477 So. 2d 1094, 1107-08 (La. 1985). See also Parker v. Cappel, 500 So. 2d 771
(La. 1987); Crier v. Whitecloud, 496 So. 2d 305 (La. 1986); Miller v. State Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 540 So. 2d 482 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1989); LaMark v. NME Hosp., Inc., 542
So. 2d 753 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 551 So. 2d 1334 (1989); Accountants' Ass'n
of La. v. State, 533 So. 2d 1251 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988), writ denied, 538 So. 2d 593,
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 60 (1989); Airline Car Rental v. Shreveport Airport Auth., 667
F. Supp. 303 (W.D. La. 1987); Stuart v. City of Morgan City, 504 So. 2d 934 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1987); Allen v. Burrow, 505 So. 2d 880 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 507
So. 2d 229 (1987); Harlan v. Frazier, 635 F. Supp. 718 (W.D. La. 1986), aff'd, 811 F.2d
601 (5th Cir. 1987).
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sifications, the state provision offers more protection than the federal
because under article I, section 3 such classifications are simply invalid.
No scrutiny is required once it is determined that the classification is
based on one of these grounds. Nevertheless, the highest level of scrutiny
in both the state and federal schemes reach very similar results because
under federal strict scrutiny, the discrimination is usually found to be
invalid. A form of intermediate scrutiny applies to the other enumerated
classes in article I, section 3 under the Sibley interpretation. Here the
burden to show that the classification is not unreasonable, capricious,
or arbitrary is placed on the proponent of the classification, and the
standard utilized is a substantial furthering of a reasonable, legitimate
state purpose. For classifications other than those expressly enumerated,
a form of minimal scrutiny is utilized and the burden is placed on the
challengers of the classification to show that it is unreasonable or does
not further an appropriate state purpose."4
84. 477 So. 2d at 1108. Justice Dennis, dissenting in the Crier case, regarded even
the lowest level of scrutiny under La. Const. art. I, § 3 to be higher than federal minimal
scrutiny. He cited Sibley for the proposition.
I cannot subscribe to the majority's precipitate assumption that our state con-
stitution offers no more protection of equal laws at the general level than the
Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause as currently interpreted. In
Sibley ... this court recognized for the first time that Article I, Section 3 of
the 1974 Louisiana Constitution raises the threshold of equal protection and
rejected the federal three level standard. In place of the minimal level of federal
protection, under which judicial scrutiny is in reality non-existent, our consti-
tution establishes its own minimal standard: when a law classifies individuals
on any basis, it shall be rejected whenever a member of a disadvantaged class
shows that it does not suitably further any appropriate state interest. [citing
Sibley] ... This safeguard goes beyond the federal decisional law construing
the Fourteenth Amendment, which this court previously adhered to, and provides
a new and more protective standard even at the minimal level.
496 So. 2d at 313 (dissenting opinion) (emphasis added).
In State v. Bradley, 360 So. 2d 858 (La. 1978), a pre-Sibley case, the Louisiana Supreme
Court considered an equal protection challenge to a state law providing that D.W.I. arrest
records may not be expunged even though other types of arrest records may be. Both
the state and federal constitution were relied upon. The court held that both equal
protection guarantees were violated. The court, in reaching its conclusion, said, "that in
the present case, there being no 'suspect classification' nor 'fundamental right' involved,
the proper constitutional analysis to be applied is whether the classification created by
the legislature bears a rational relation to a legitimate State interest." Id. at 861. This,
of course, is an application of the minimal scrutiny standard and is arguably unchanged
by Sibley because D.W.I. drivers are not an enumerated class in La. Const. art. I, § 3,
and such discrimination is presumed constitutional under both the state and federal
constitutions even after Sibley. But see Justice Dennis' dissent in Crier. See also Bridley
v. Alton Ochsner Med. Found. Hosp., 532 So. 2d 905 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1988); Latona
v. Department of State Civil Serv. Comm'n, 492 So. 2d 27 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ
denied, 496 So. 2d 1043 (1986).
State v. Petrovich, 396 So. 2d 1318 (La. 1981), indulged, under both the state and
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In federal equal protection jurisprudence construing the fourteenth
amendment, the Supreme Court has held that with intermediate scrutiny
the proponent bears the burden of proof, 5 just as Sibley and the
Constitutional Convention records indicate is the case with the enu-
merated classifications, other than race and religion, under the Louisiana
Constitution. This is further evidence that, although Sibley held that
Louisiana does not recognize the three-tiered approach to equal protec-
tion analysis,8 6 the federal tier most like the Sibley standard is the
intermediate tier, and clearly Act 788, with its blatant age discrimination,
would not pass constitutional muster if subjected to such scrutiny.8 7 It
may be suggested that, if age discrimination under the fourteenth amend-
ment were subject to intermediate scrutiny, such discrimination, as found
in the new forced heirship law, would be found to violate federal equal
protection. It is only because age classifications under the fourteenth
amendment, unlike the state equal protection provision, are subject to
mere minimal scrutiny8 that such discrimination could possibly pass
muster on the federal level.8 9
federal constitutions, a presumption of constitutionality and placed the burden on those
challenging the statute on equal protection grounds. Since no class expressly mentioned
in La. Const. art. I, § 3 was involved in the case this may be consistent with Sibley.
But DeFrancis v. City of Bossier, 322 So. 2d 333 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1975), writ denied,
325 So. 2d 611, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 820, 97 S. Ct. 68 (1976), which dealt with
classifications based on sex, also held in favor of the presumption of constitutionality
and placed the burden on the challenger of the statute. However, the facts of the case
apparently arose before the effective date of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974.
Louisiana courts have given deference to the legislative branch in cases dealing with
economic and social welfare legislation and the preservation of the. state's fiscal resources.
In such cases, only a clear violation of the state or federal constitution would suffice to
strike the legislation. Parker v. Cappel, 500 So. 2d 771 (La. 1987); Bazley v. Tortorich,
397 So. 2d 475 (La. 1981); Vita v. United Gen. Ins. Co., 469 So. 2d 433 (La. App. 3d
Cir.), writ denied, 478 So. 2d 900 (1985); Airline Car Rental v. Shreveport Airport Auth.,
667 F. Supp. 303 (W.D. La. 1987).
85. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 102 S. Ct. 3331 (1982)
(dealing with gender discrimination).
86. 477 So. 2d at 1105-07.
87. For examples of intermediate scrutiny on the federal level, see Pickett v. Brown,
462 U.S. 1, 103 S. Ct. 2199 (1983); Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 102 S. Ct. 1549
(1982); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 97 S. Ct. 1459 (1977).
88. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 99 S. Ct. 939 (1979); Massachusetts Bd. of
Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 96 S. Ct. 2562 (1976).
89. 440 U.S. 93, 99 S. Ct. 939 (1979); 427 U.S. 307, 96 S. Ct. 2562 (1976). But in
Harlan v. Frazier, 635 F. Supp. 718 (W.D. La. 1986), the federal court sitting in a
diversity case said the following about the fourteenth amendment equal protection analysis
and age discrimination:
It is beyond doubt that no fundamental right, as interpreted by the United
States Supreme Court, is subject to violation in this case. Alternatively, where
the classification is based upon gender, legitimacy or, perhaps, age, then the
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Illustration of the Effect of a Heightened Level of Scrutiny
The federal analysis of age discrimination is simply not as rigorous
as that mandated by the State of Louisiana in article I, section 3. The
elevation of age discrimination to the second tier of analysis dictates a
need for a substantial relationship between the regulatory scheme and
the state interests involved. The difference that an elevation in a degree
of scrutiny can make is strikingly illustrated in Succession of Brown,9°
which dealt with discrimination by birth. The same state statutory
provision 9l that was upheld by the earlier United States Supreme Court
decision of Labine v. Vincent92 was again challenged, only this time
successfully, in Brown. The Louisiana Supreme Court in Brown noted
that the Labine Court "used a test of 'minimal rationality' under the
old scheme of equal protection analysis." 93 Because discrimination by
birth had been elevated by the United State Supreme Court to the middle
level of analysis in the case of Matthew v. Lucas,94 decided after Labine,
the analysis required "a more critical examination of the statute." 95
Now gender and illegitimacy are middle tier cases on the federal level. 96
The standard suggested in Reed v. Reed 7 for middle tier scrutiny was
that "a classification 'must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest
upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation
to the object of the legislation.' ' 9
statute will survive equal protection scrutiny only if it is substantially related
to an important state interest.
635 F. Supp. at 724 (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S.
432, 1055 S. Ct. 3249 (1985)) (emphasis added).
90. 388 So. 2d 1151 (La. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 998, 101 S. Ct. 1703 (1981).
91. La. Civ. Code art. 919 (1870), which dealt with the succession rights of illegitimate
children to their intestate father, provided:
Natural children are called to the inheritance of their natural father, who has
duly acknowledged them, when he has left no descendants nor ascendants, nor
collateral relations, nor surviving wife, and to the exclusion only of the State.
In all other cases, they can only bring an action against their natural father or
his heirs for alimony, the amount of which shall be determined, as is directed
in the title: Of Father and Child.
92. 401 U.S. 532, 91 S. Ct. 1017 (1971).
93. 388 So. 2d at 1152.
94. 427 U.S. 495, 96 S. Ct. 2755 (1976).
95. 388 So. 2d at 1153.
96. Heckler v. Matthews, 465 U.S. 728, 104 S. Ct. 1387 (1984); Mississippi Univ.
for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 102 S. Ct. 3331 (1982); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190, 97 S. Ct. 451 (1976).
97. 404 U.S. 71, 92 S. Ct. 251 (1971).
98. Id. at 76, 92 S. Ct. at 254 (quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S.
412, 415, 40 S. Ct. 560, 561 (1920)).
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Likewise, the age discrimination involved in Act 788 must be an-
alyzed not in terms of the minimal scrutiny applied by the federal
standard, but rather in terms of the higher level of scrutiny as mandated
by article I, section 3 of the Louisiana Constitution. In Succession of
Grice,99 the Louisiana Supreme Court applied the "heightened scrutiny"
standard and found that Louisiana Civil Code article 209, requiring that
filiation actions against fathers be brought within nineteen years of birth
or one year from the natural father's death if such occurs within the
nineteen-year period, was constitutional under both the fourteenth
amendment and article I, section 3. "Such classifications [based on
illegitimate birth] are unconstitutional unless they are substantially related
to permissible state interests.''"1°
Justice Calogero dissented in Grice'0 regarding the conclusion, but
agreed with the majority that "the scrutiny given a provision which
does draw a classification based on birth is a heightened one."' 0 2 Justice
Calogero expressed his view, which is the court's view, that, because
birth is in the article I, section 3 enumeration, heightened scrutiny is
required. 103 And because age is also listed in the enumeration, heightened
scrutiny is required for it.
The Legislative Purpose for Act 788
To determine the validity of Act 788 under the equal protection
provision, the legislative purpose for the distinction between those below
age twenty-three and those twenty-three and older must be examined.
The age of twenty-three is simply an arbitrary cutoff unless it is related
to actual or potential need of support for younger, more vulnerable
heirs. To overcome this objection to the discrimination as being arbitrary,
the new law would have to simply abolish forced heirship as such because
under forced heirship support is not a factor.
It has been argued in another section of this paper' °4 that redefining
the nature of forced heirship with alimony or support as its purpose
would change the basic nature of the institution and would constitute
an "abolition" of forced heirship in violation of article XII, section 5.
The fact that the purpose violates another constitutional provision could
render the purpose impermissible. If, to avoid this prohibition, the
proponents of the new law argue that the age cutoff is not based on
alimony or support, but is simply an arbitrary cutoff point, they would
run smack against the horns of the article I, section 3 dilemma. The
99. Succession of Grice, 462 So. 2d 131, 133 (La. 1985).
100. Id. at 133.
101. Id. at 136 (dissenting opinion).
102. Id. at 137 (dissenting opinion).
103. Id.
104. See supra text accompanying notes 1-42.
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Act as written truly leaves its proponents between a constitutional rock
and a hard place.' °0
If the state purpose of the new forced heirship law is not support
of the needy child, then what could it be?'06 Perhaps the purpose is
freedom of testation (the "It's my property and I'll do what I damn-
105. No legitimate state purpose is served by singling out for disinherison those children
twenty-three years of age and older. State v. Petrovich, 396 So. 2d 1318 (La. 1981). This
age discrimination fails to substantially further a legitimate state purpose-even assuming
that a legitimate support rationale is behind the classification-because, even in this context,
a twenty-two year age cutoff is arbitrary in that there may well be those without need
below it. Under the equivalent of an intermediate level scrutiny, this simply will not pass
constitutional muster. Assuming arguendo that the purpose of the legislation is viewed as
permissible, the question becomes whether the particular classification is substantially
related to the accomplishment of this permissible state purpose. Does the classification
go beyond what is "necessary" to accomplish the goal? Are some children needlessly
included in the classification and are some unnecessarily excluded from it? Succession of
Grice, 462 So. 2d 131, 134 (La. 1985). Of course, this all depends on the nature of the
"permissible" purpose.
If the purpose of the new forced heirship law is to provide support for children in
need-and it is difficult to think of another purpose for the twenty-two year cutoff-the
classification includes younger children who are not in need and excludes older children
who are in need. A pre-set, statutory age discrimination that bestows a set percentage
on one child without regard to actual need, indeed, without even inquiring into his
circumstances, but bestows nothing on another child regardless of his circumstances and
need, surely is not an efficient way to ensure the support of needy heirs. The provision
unnecessarily includes some children and excludes others. If the discriminatory statutory
classification attempts to supply the support needs of children, then it must be more
closely directed to this purpose to survive intermediate scrutiny. A blanket age discrim-
ination unrelated to actual need certainly does not satisfy the substantial relation require-
ment. Thus, under the Sibley analysis, the new forced heirship law violates article I,
section 3 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 because it is an unreasonable discrimination
based on age, even assuming that support is a legitimate goal within the context of forced
heirship. This, of course, in no way implies that all classifications based on age are
invalid. For instance, a statute providing support for minor children would be valid
because the provision would be substantially related to the state purpose: support of
children under a certain age. The child's needs would dictate the amount contributed for
support. Contrast this with the new forced heirship law, which gives a percentage of the
estate to the child regardless of need and thus is not substantially related to support.
Other age classifications, such as driving age, drinking age, employment age, and retirement
age, would have to be considered in light of the purpose to be furthered by the classification
and the substantiality of the age to the purpose to be achieved under the requirements
of intermediate scrutiny.
106. That it is based on need is strongly indicated by the fact that the form in which
the new forced heirship bill passed the Senate and was presented to the House was
expressly couched in terms of need. Under the original bill, the child under twenty-three
could lose his "forced" share if others could establish that it was not necessary to his
maintenance and education. Or it could be "reduced" (what an irony!) if it exceeded
what was needed for his support on the date of the ancestor's death. The House committee,
recognizing the constitutional problems pregnant in such an explicit foundation in support
and alimony, amended the bill to the present version of Act 788.
[Vol. 50
FORCED HEIRSHIP
well please with it!" argument) and the right to freely dispose of property
that one owns. If this is the purpose, the new forced heirship law is
not related to it at all. Even assuming that this would be a permissible
state interest, the twenty-two year cutoff is simply unrelated in any
rational way to this goal. The abolition of forced heirship would certainly
be related to this purpose; but in Louisiana, article XII, section 5 of
the Constitution prohibits such action. 07 A discrimination between chil-
dren under twenty-three and those twenty-three and older is not related
in any way to freedom of testation.'0
In sum, the constitutional argument is straight-forward:
1) Sibley requires one unitary standard for state equal protection
of classifications based on sex, birth, age, etc.;'0 9
2) Sibley expressly holds that the state standard is stricter than
the federal standard;"10
3) Sibley also expressly holds that the state constitution calls
for "more than" minimal scrutiny for classifications based on
the enumerated categories in article I, section 3;"'1
4) The standard with age classification is minimal scrutiny on
the federal level,"12 but because of 2) and 3) above, must be
above minimal scrutiny on the state constitutional level;
5) In light of 1) through 4) above, it follows that something
akin to intermediate scrutiny is the Sibley standard for age
classifications under the Louisiana Constitution. Thus, the state
must defend the age classification as being substantially related
to the permissible state purpose;
6) Under Sibley, when classifications are based on age, the
burden is on the proponent to establish that the state purpose
is not arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious;" 3
7) If the classification in Act 788 does not constitute an im-
permissible discrimination in the equal protection analysis be-
cause it is based on support needs, then it violates article XII,
section 5 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 because it so
107. See supra text accompanying notes 1-42.
108. The only other state purpose that comes to mind is that of accomplishing a
violation of the Louisiana Constitution by changing the nature of forced heirship to such
a degree that it is really abolished and thus La. Const. art. XII, § 5 is violated. See text
accompanying supra notes 1-42. Of course, this is not a permissible state purpose.
109. 477 So. 2d 1094, 1107 (La. 1985); Devlin, supra note 59, at 361-62.
110. 477 So. 2d at 1108; Devlin, supra note 59, at 361-62.
111. 477 So. 2d at 1107.
112. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 99 S. Ct. 939 (1979); Massachusetts Bd. of
Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 96 S. Ct. 2562 (1976).
113. 477 So. 2d at 1107.
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modifies the institution of forced heirship that it is actually
abolished." 4
III. DEFINITION OF FORCED HEIRSHIP UNDER THE NEW LEGISLATION
The New Forced Heirship: Child Under Twenty-Three
The main thrust of Act 788 is its amendment of Louisiana Civil
Code article 1493, the article designating the forced heirs. Formerly all
of the decedent's children, including his more remote descendants by
roots, had been forced heirs. Under Act 788, unless a child is seriously
incapacitated, he is a forced heir only if he is under the age of twenty-
three when the decedent dies.
Efforts of the Courts and Legislature to Eliminate Distinctions
Among Heirs
In classifying children according to age, the legislature reversed a
trend it started in 1981 of removing from the law of inheritance any
distinction or discrimination between children. In that year, illegitimacy
was removed as a criterion excluding some children from heirship gen-
erally, as well as forced heirship."' From that time until the appearance
of Act 788, all children whose filiation was established to the decedent,
and their descendants by representation, were forced heirs. Additionally,
former Louisiana Civil Code article 916 (1870) made the existence of
the surviving spouse's "legal" usufruct depend upon whether the prop-
erty over which the usufruct would extend was inherited by children of
the decedent's marriage with the surviving spouse. That distinction be-
tween the children of the decedent's marriage with the surviving spouse
and the children of a previous marriage was also eliminated in 1981.
Present Louisiana Civil Code article 890 subjects all children of the
decedent, regardless of their marital origin, to the surviving spouse's
"legal" usufruct.'' 6
Purpose of Classification by Age
What prompted the legislature to adopt a classification of forced
heirs based on age after having so recently made these major changes
114. See supra text accompanying notes 1-42.
115. Compare La. Civ. Code art. 1493, as amended by 1981 La. Acts No. 884, § 1,
with La. Civ. Code art. 1493 (1870), and La. Civ. Code arts. 871-902, as amended by
1981 La. Acts No. 445, § 1 and 1981 La. Acts No. 919, § 1, with La. Civ. Code arts.
871-933 (1870).
116. The only distinction between children that remains in connection with the usufruct
of the surviving spouse has to do with the right of certain naked owners to demand
security from the usufructuary. La, Civ. Code art. 890.
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in favor of not discriminating between children in the law of inheritance?
One explanation is political. The age classification was the political tactic
formulated by those who sought to abolish forced heirship in spite of
the legislature's repeated refusal to approve a state constitutional amend-
ment abolishing the institution. One of the many objections voiced in
the legislature over the years to the abolition of forced heirship had
been that abolition would leave young children without a remedy for
an unjust disinherison, To satisfy this objection, the proponents of
abolition proposed to retain forced heirship for children under twenty-
three while abolishing it for other children. This approach also allowed
the abolitionists to avoid the two-thirds vote necessary for a constitutional
amendment by arguing that the proposal was a modification and not
an abolition of the institution of forced heirship. In other words, the
proponents of the age classification were simply trying to come as close
as was politically feasible to the total abolition of forced heirship.
Another explanation for the age classification involves the concept
of parental support. Although previously unknown to the Louisiana law
of inheritance, age is a familiar classification in the law of parent and
child. A child's minority subjects him to the authority of his parent,
and subjects the parent to the obligation to support the child. v17 As
originally proposed in the Senate, the bill that resulted in Act 788
blatantly borrowed the familiar legal concept of parental support and
injected it into the law of inheritance. Moreover, the bill introduced
support as a means of further limiting the forced heirship claim of the
children under twenty-three. It provided that the forced portion of a
child under twenty-three could not exceed the amount necessary for the
support, lodging, maintenance, and education of the child, according
to his situation in life, until the child attained the age of twenty-three.' 8
According to the Senate bill, the court was to determine on a case-by-
case basis the actual amount to which the child under twenty-three would
be entitled." 9 This proposal protected only the children that the decedent
would likely have been supporting at the time of his death, and only
insofar as they were in need of such support. The choice of age twenty-
three as opposed to another age, such as the age of majority, was made
by the proponents of Act 788 to cover most children until they finished
college.
The House Committee on Civil Law and Procedure, weary of the
litigation generated by judicial determination of need in the area of
alimony and child support, refused to inject the subjective element of
judicial discretion into the law of inheritance. The committee struck
117. La. Civ. Code arts. 214-245.
118. La. S. 264, 15th Reg. Sess., § 1 (1989).
119. Id.
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from the bill the part concerning the judicial determination of need.
The House Committee's intent was still to protect the children who are
most probably being supported by the decedent at the time of his death,
but by the objective means of a fixed share rather than a subjective
evaluation of need. The parent's support was in effect continued in the
form of a protected inheritance.
The New Forced Heirship: Interdicted or Subject to Interdiction
Although older than twenty-three, a descendant who "has been
interdicted" or who is "subject to being interdicted because of mental
incapacity or physical infirmity" is entitled to the benefits afforded by
forced heirship.'20 Presumably, creation of the class of interdicted heirs
reflects the policy that a descendant unable to support himself is entitled
to protection against unjust disinherison by a parent. The public is
served by exacting a sum from the deceased parent that can be used
for support of the descendant, relieving society of the ultimate burden
of his support. Ostensibly, both new classes of heirs based on age and
incapacity approximate by statutory rule the support provisions of other
jurisdictions that recognize a right to claim maintenance or support from
the decedent's estate.'
Interdiction, often used by heirs to protect against unwise dispositions
by an ancestor, 2 2 now affords a new protection to descendants. Rather
than interdict the ancestor, the heir over twenty-three years of age must
be interdicted or subject to interdiction for mental incapacity or physical
infirmity to qualify as a forced heir. For the heir, the good news is
that the language only requires that the descendant "has been inter-
dicted" without reference to any point in time. Thus, an heir over
twenty-two years old could have been interdicted, subsequently relieved
of the disabilities of interdiction by judgment, 23 and be a forced heir
regardless of when the decedent died. For the descendant heir who is
averse to a formal interdiction complete with notice of suit and recor-
dation of the judgment, 2 4 it is enough to be "subject to interdiction."
120. 1989 La. Acts No. 788.
121. See supra text at notes 29-38 for a discussion of maintenance statutes.
122. See, e.g., Marceaux v. Marceaux, 145 La. 345, 82 So. 365 (1919); Succession of
Cahn, 522 So. 2d 1160 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 523 So. 2d 1339 (1988).
123. La. Civ. Code art. 420:
Interdiction ends with the causes which gave rise to it. Nevertheless the person
interdicted can not resume the exercise of his rights, until after the definitive
judgment by which the repeal of the interdiction is pronounced.
See La. Code Civ. P. art. 4557.
See also Interdiction of Dobbins, 535 So. 2d 1079 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1988), writ denied,
536 So. 2d 1203 (1989).
124. La. Code Civ. P. art. 4552.
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Because the present tense of the verb is used to describe the heir subject
to interdiction, apparently the heir must be mentally or physically in-
capable at the time of the decedent's death.125
Formal Interdiction Procedure
To be interdicted, a person must be "subject to an habitual state
of imbecility, insanity or madness,' ' 26 or "owing to any infirmity . ..
incapable of taking care" of his person and administering his estate, 127
or "an inebriate or habitual drunkard."' 2 The meaning of imbecility,
insanity, or madness, taken from translations of Code Napoleon article
489, reflect "the one ground of interdiction, to wit, mental alienation,
consisting of absence of, or change in, the faculty of reasoning and
discerning, and which renders the person incapable of taking care of
himself and administering his affairs."' ' 29 Many of the cases involve a
person with senile dementia, resulting from arteriosclerosis. 13 0 In addition,
just as with commitment, 3 ' a person suffering from substance abuse of
any type may be incapable of caring for his person and administering
his estate.1
2
125. La. Civ. Code art. 934.
126. La. Civ. Code art. 389:
No person above the age of majority, who is subject to an habitual state of
imbecility, insanity or madness, shall be allowed to take care of his own person
and administer his estate, although such person shall, at times, appear to have
the possession of his reason.
127. La. Civ. Code art. 422:
Not only lunatics and idiots are liable to be interdicted, but likewise all persons
who, owing to any infirmity, are incapable of taking care of their persons and
administering their estates.
128. La. R.S. 9:1001-1004 (1965). See also La. R.S. 9:1021 (1965) which concerns
interdiction of veterans in government institutions; Francis v. Francis, 529 So. 2d 110
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1988) (such interdiction likened to limited interdiction).
129. Pons v. Pons, 137 La. 25, 48, 68 So. 201, 209 (1915).
130. See, e.g., id.; Succession of Cahn, 522 So. 2d 1160 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ
denied, 523 So. 2d 1339 (1988). In Andrus v. Andrus, 136 La. 824, 825, 67 So. 895,
895 (1915), the supreme court remarks:
The various authorities on medical jurisprudence define "senile dementia" as
one of the forms of insanity. It is characterized by a mental weakness and
inability to reason, a state of enfeeblement of the brain, which comes to those
whose other vital organs have served them to a very old age. It may be regarded
as a venerable form of insanity, but it is insanity nevertheless.
131. La. R.S. 28:1-213 (1989 and Supp. 1990), entitled the Mental Health Law. See
also In re L.M.S., 476 So. 2d 934 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1985).
132. La. R.S. 28:2(10) (1989):
"Gravely disabled" means the condition of a person who is unable to provide
for his own basic physical needs, such as essential food, clothing, medical care,
and shelter, as a result of serious mental illness or substance abuse and is unable
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Conveniently, a relation, such as a cooperative sibling or a spouse,
may petition for the interdiction.," Older jurisprudence precludes a
consideration of the motives of the person seeking the interdiction.3 4
The interdict may by power of attorney nominate a curator while com-
petent.' If he fails to do so, the spouse of a person interdicted has a
prior right to be appointed curator. 3 6 The interdiction proceeding is
tried summarily and by preference.' Generally, the petitioner must prove
that 1) the defendant is incapable of caring for his person, 2) the
defendant is incapable of administering his estate, and 3) the interdiction
is necessary.' Because interdiction has been considered such a harsh
remedy, some courts have imposed a standard of persuasion of clear
to survive safely in freedom or protect himself from serious harm; the term
also includes incapacitation by alcohol, which means the condition of a person
who, as a result of the use of alcohol, is unconscious or whose judgment is
otherwise so impaired that he is incapable of realizing and making a rational
decision with respect to his need for treatment.
133. La. Civ. Code art. 390 and La. Code Civ. P. art. 4543.
134. In re Corbin, 187 La. 968, 175 So. 636 (1937); Landry v. Landry, 171 La. 280,
130 So. 866 (1930). Contra Francke v. His Wife, 29 La. Ann. 302 (1877) (protect defendant
from hostile motive).
135. La. Code Civ. P. art. 4550:
... By power of attorney, a competent person may nominate the curator of
his person, of his property, or both, to serve should he be later interdicted.
The court shall appoint the person nominated upon his furnishing security and
taking an oath, as provided in Articles 4131, 4171, and 4554, unless he is
disqualified or, unless for some other reason, the court determines that the
appointment would not be for the best interest of the interdict. ...
136. Id.
... If the curator is not nominated by power of attorney, or if the nominee
is not appointed, the spouse of an interdicted person has the prior right to be
appointed curator.
If the interdict has no spouse or if the spouse does not apply for appointment
as curator within ten days after the judgment of interdiction, the court shall
appoint the applicant best qualified, personally, and by training and experience,
to serve as curator. Article 4069 governs the appointment of a separate curator
of the property and person.
See also La. Civ. Code arts. 404-406.
137. La. Code Civ. P. art. 4546.
138. In re Fabre, 371 So. 2d 1322 (La. 1979); Interdiction of Scurto, 188 La. 459,
177 So. 573 (1937); In re Corbin, 187 La. 968, 175 So. 636 (1937); Landry v. Landry,
171 La. 280, 130 So. 866 (1930); Francke v. His Wife, 29 La. Ann. 302 (1877); Interdiction
of White v. White, 463 So. 2d 53 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985); Interdiction of Adams, 209
So. 2d 363 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968); Doll v. Doll, 156 So. 2d 275 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1963).
But see Pons v. Pons, 137 La. 25, 68 So. 201 (1915), interpreting La. Civ. Code art.
389 as mandatory, thus not requiring proof of necessity. See also Hargrave, Persons, The
Work of the Appellate Courts for the 1967-1968 Term, 29 La. L. Rev. 171, 180 (1969).
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and conclusive proof.3 9 The proof offered may be written as well as
parol, and the judge may interrogate the defendant or order his ex-
amination by physicians. 40
Subject to Interdiction
Yet, it is not even necessary that a descendant heir has been in-
terdicted at some point in his life; it is sufficient that he is subject to
being interdicted at the time of the ascendant's death. If the statutory
provision only requires proof that a descendant is subject to interdiction,
it should not be necessary to prove "necessity" for the interdiction.
The fact that a descendant is not interdicted, although subject to in-
terdiction, suggests that others who could have instituted the proceedings
may have seen no necessity for the formal judgment, especially consid-
ering the expense; or they may have decided that they cannot prove
"necessity." Furthermore, the "clear and conclusive" standard of per-
suasion need not be applied if the result is not the harsh remedy of
interdiction with its accompanying deprivation of capacity and civil
rights.
Act 788 expresses the mental alienation or other cause for interdiction
as "subject to being interdicted because of mental incapacity or physical
infirmity." Mental incapacity suggests mental deficiencies of a somewhat
less serious nature than imbecility, insanity, or madness. A person with-
out mental capacity is defined in the Civil Code as a person "deprived
of reason.' ' 4' The expression, according to the official comments, in-
cludes "all of the varieties of derangement that have been acknowledged
by the Louisiana jurisprudence,"' 42 including habitual drunkenness, 43
drug sedation,'4 and senility. 45 Physical infirmity presumably is coex-
tensive with the meaning of "infirmity" for physical reasons under
Louisiana Civil Code article 422 and the jurisprudence interpreting it.
Potentially, a child who is a drug addict and homeless in a distant city,
.or a child with rheumatoid arthritis who is incapable of caring for his
person and administering his estate would be a descendant subject to
being interdicted.
139. Julius Cohen Jeweler, Inc. v. Succession of Jumonville, 506 So. 2d 535 (La.
App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 511 So. 2d 1155 (1987); Interdiction of White, 463 So. 2d
at 53; Adams, 209 So. 2d at 363; Doll, 156 So. 2d at 275.
140. La. Civ. Code art. 393; La. Code Civ. P. art. 4547. See Interdiction of Escat,
206 La. 207, 19 So. 2d 96 (1944); Interdiction of Haggerty, 519 So. 2d 868 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1988).
141. La. Civ. Code art. 1918.
142. Id., comment (b).
143. Interdiction of Gasquet, 136 La. 957, 68 So. 89 (1915).
144. Brumfield v. Paul, 145 So. 2d 46 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
145. Smith v. Blum, 143 So. 2d 419 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
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Limited Interdiction
Thus far, the operating assumption is that at least two of the three
elements 16-incapacity to care for one's person and administer one's
estate-must be proved to be a forced heir. However, under Louisiana
Civil Code article 389.1 it is possible to obtain a judgment of "limited
interdiction"'' 47 by proving either incapacity. A person who is incapable
because of mental retardation,' 48 mental disability, or other infirmity
under Articles 389 or 422 may be interdicted if he is incapable of caring
for his person or administering his estate. 49 At least one Louisiana case
has imposed an additional requirement of proof of necessity for the
limited interdiction.1 0 The benefit of a limited interdiction, especially
146. If there is a judgment of interdiction against the heir, all three elements have
been proved: incapacity to care for his person, incapacity to administer his estate, and
necessity. If the heir is simply subject to interdiction, at least the first two elements have
been proved. See supra text accompanying notes 140-41.
147. La. Civ. Code art. 389.1.
148. If the mentally retarded person is a child above the age of fifteen who possesses
less than two-thirds of the average mental ability of a normal person, he or she may be
placed under continuing tutorship or permanent tutorship "without formal or complete
interdiction." La. Civ. Code art. 354.
La. Civ. Code art. 362:
Persons subject to mental or physical illness or disability, whether of a temporary
or permanent nature of such a degree as to render them subject to interdiction,
under the provisions of Title IX hereof, remain subject to interdiction as provided
in Articles 389 to 426, inclusive, and such other laws as may relate thereto.
See generally La. Civ. Code arts. 354-362.
149. La. Civ. Code art. 389.1:
When a person is declared incapable by reason of mental retardation, mental
disability, or other infirmity under the provisions of Articles 389 or 422 of the
Louisiana Civil Code, of caring for his own person or of administering his
estate, a court of competent jurisdiction may appoint a limited curator to such
person or his estate. Pending appointment of a limited curator, the court shall
inquire into the specific abilities and disabilities of the incapacitated person and
such limited curator shall have only those powers necessary to provide for the
demonstrated needs of the incapacitated person. The powers, duties, responsi-
bilities, and any liabilities of the limited curator shall be specifically set forth
in a judgment of limited interdiction. ...
See Ryder, Other 1981 Acts of General Interest to the Bar, 29 La. B.J. 121 (1981).
An article of interest proposing a change in the law of interdiction to adopt limited
interdiction was Comment, Interdiction Reform: The Need For a Limited Interdiction
Article in the Louisiana Civil Code, 54 Tul. L. Rev. 164 (1979). See also Coon, The
Law of Interdiction: Time for Change, 27 La. B.J. 223 (1980).
150. Interdiction of Goldsmith, 456 So. 2d 198, 201 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984):
However, the new article clearly retains-and now encodes-the former juris-
prudential requirement that there be a showing of the necessity for the inter-
diction. By requiring that the rights of the limited interdict shall be infringed
in the least restrictive manner consistent with his incapacities, and that the
limited curator shall have only those powers necessary to provide for the "dem-
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for a descendant over twenty-two who desires to be a forced heir, is
that his rights "shall be infringed in the least restrictive manner consistent
with his incapacities." '1 5' Thus, the arthritic descendant who is only
incapable of caring for his person-the most likely scenario-can be
interdicted under Article 389.1, and the judgment need not deprive him
of the right to contract or any other right to administer his property.
Moreover, the arthritic descendant need not even have been interdicted
by judgment; it is sufficient that he be subject to full or limited inter-
diction.
The new category of forced heir extends protection to a descendant
who is incapable, including an adult child who is addicted to drugs or
alcohol and has not recovered from his addiction. The descendant who
is capable of caring for himself and administering his property, and in
many instances serving society as a productive member, is not protected
from his parent's simple disinherison. In fact, a descendant who is
incapable may be difficult to disinherit for just cause152 if his mental
condition excuses his action that would otherwise constitute grounds for
disinherison1 53 It seems incongruous to deny a benefit to the child who
lives a productive life contributing to society, yet at the same time extend
legal protection to children who have become a burden on society.
The Modified Representation Rule Redefines Child as a Descendant
of the First Degree
As originally proposed in the Senate, the bill that resulted in Act
788 also restricted forced heirship to descendants of the first degree,
onstrated needs" of the incapacitated person, the new article has unquestionably
installed into this type of interdiction the requirement that there be proof that
an actual necessity for the interdiction exists.
See also Interdiction of Badalamenti, 529 So. 2d 1376 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied,
534 So. 2d 444 (1988) (fifty-three year old stroke victim, no need for limited interdiction).
151. La. Civ. Code art. 389.1:
... A judgment of limited interdiction shall not operate to deprive the inca-
pacitated person of any civil right, the right to contract, or any right pertaining
to any license, permit, privilege, or benefit unless specifically set forth in the
judgment.
152. La. Civ. Code art. 1621.
153. Although there have been no such appellate court cases reported, the jurisprudence
interpreting La. Civ. Code art. 138 recognizes the defense of mental or physical condition
that excuses behavior which would otherwise constitute fault. See, e.g., Robichaux v.
Robichaux, 525 So. 2d 321 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1988); Asher v. Asher, 521 So. 2d 645
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1988); Credeur v. Lalonde, 511 So. 2d 65 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ
denied, 513 So. 2d 822 (1987); Morrison v. Morrison, 395 So. 2d 909 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1981); Courville v. Courville, 363 So. 2d 954 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ refused, 365 So.
2d 243 (La. 1978).
It is appropriate to resort to La. Civ. Code art. 138 by analogy when considering such
grounds for disinherison as "[i]f the child has been guilty, towards a parent, of cruelty,
... or grievous injury." La. Civ. Code art. 1621(2). Cf. La. Civ. Code art. 138(3).
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thus eliminating a grandchild's right to represent his predeceased parent
for the purpose of forced heirship. 5 4 The House Civil Law and Procedure
Committee's objection to the elimination of representation resulted in
an amendment to that part of the bill. As finally passed, Act 788
amends Louisiana Civil Code article 1493 to state: "Representation by
descendants shall be permitted provided the child they represent would
not have been twenty-three years of age on the date of the donor's
death. 11 5 5 Even as "softened" by the House committee, the Act dras-
tically changes the law of representation in the context of forced heirship.
The new rule under Act 788 permitting representation only if the
forced heir represented would not have attained the age of twenty-three
when the parent died is inconsistent with the legislative assumption that
young heirs would most likely be in need of support and hence deserved
protection from unjust disinherison. Under Article 1493 as amended by
Act 788, if a child of thirty predeceases the de cujus and leaves a child
who is three years old when the de cujus dies, the three-year-old grand-
child will have no protection from disinherison. Even if the three-year-
old grandchild had been orphaned by the death of the parent and thus
had been legally entitled to support from the grandparent while he
lived, 5 6 Act 788 does not protect him. The grandchild, no matter how
young and even if orphaned, cannot represent the predeceased parent
unless the parent would not have attained the age of twenty-three when
the de cujus dies. Nor is any exception made to allow a seriously
incapacitated grandchild to represent his predeceased parent when the
parent would have attained the age of twenty-three by the time the de
cujus died.
Former Louisiana Rule of Representation
In addition to leaving young descendants prey to an unjust disin-
herison contrary to the general intent of the Act, the new rule of
representation for forced heirship is also inconsistent with the general
theory of representation in Louisiana inheritance law. Under the general
rules of representation, the descendants who are the representatives of
their predeceased parent are the heirs of the de cujus; the predeceased
parent was never the heir. 5 7 It would follow that the new law should
154. La. S. 264, 15th Reg. Sess., § 1 (1989).
155. Read literally, this provision excludes representation only of a predeceased child
who would have been precisely twenty-three years old when the de cujus died. It would
not exclude representation of a child who would have been any other age. It is safe to
assume that this was an error in drafting and that the legislature meant "would not have
attained twenty-three years of age" instead of "would not have been twenty-three years
of age."
156. La. Civ. Code art. 229.
157. La. Civ. Code art. 953.
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be concerned with the ages of the representatives who are the heirs in
order to protect the young heirs from disinherison. But Act 788 is, on
the contrary, only concerned with the age of the predeceased child who
was never an heir.
Furthermore, until now Louisiana law did not make representation
depend on whether the predeceased child would have been an heir had
he survived the de cujus. For example, Louisiana allows representation
of a predeceased child who committed an act of unworthiness toward
the de cujus or who was disinherited by him. Article 901 of the Louisiana
Civil Code of 1870, which contained this rule, apparently adopted the
view of representation espoused by the early French commentators of
the Code Napoleon.' Although Article 901 was repealed in the 1981
revision of the intestate succession articles, the intent was not to change
this rule of representation, but only to streamline it. The drafters of
the revision felt that the result given by old Article 901 followed as
well from other rules in the Civil Code that make it impossible to have
a predeceased child declared unworthy or to disinherit him. 5 9 Thus in
the general law of representation, Louisiana does not visit the sin of
the predeceased parent on his child; however, as a result of Act 788,
when forced heirship is involved, the disqualifying age of the predeceased
parent will be visited upon his child. If the law of representation protects
the child from the consequences of his parent's deliberate act, should
it not, in the case of forced heirship, also protect the child from the
consequence of something the parent is powerless to prevent, his own
aging?
Inadequacy of the Twenty-Three Year Age Cutoff to Protect
Vulnerable Heirs
The new rule classifying forced heirs according to age and the harsh
rule limiting representation depending on the age classification of the
predeceased heir lead one to question whether any social purpose has
158. C. Lazarus, Succession and Donations, Cases and Reading Materials 21 (1975).
According to modern French commentators, French law, which has no counterpart to
Louisiana's old Article 901, would not allow representation of a predeceased child who
had committed an act of unworthiness or who was disinherited. 9 Aubry and Rau, 4
Droit Civil Francais No. 597, at 35 (6th ed. La. St. L. Inst. trans. 1971).
159. See La. Civ. Code art. 967, which requires legal action to be taken against the
heir to have him declared unworthy, thereby indicating that the heir must have survived
the de cujus in order to be declared unworthy. Concerning disinherison, Article 1624, as
it read before amendment in 1985, did not explicitly require a suit to be brought against
the forced heir himself to prove the grounds for disinherison, but such a requirement
was implied. In any event, In re Andrus, 221 La. 996, 60 So. 2d 899 (1952) held, based
on old Article 901, that when the forced heir predeceased the testator, the attempted
disinherison was ineffective.
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been accomplished by Act 788 other than to circuitously abolish forced
heirship. Does the new law truly protect those children most vulnerable
to an unjust disinherison, or is its reach arbitrary? One instance in
which a child is vulnerable is when he is in need. In such circumstances
it would be cruel to permit his parent to disinherit him without cause.
The assumption behind Act 788 seems to be that the children whom
the parent is most probably supporting at the time of his death are the
children most likely to be in need. Thus children under twenty-three
and seriously incapacitated children remain forced heirs; the parent's
support is transformed into a fixed share for these children. Children
who are most probably supporting themselves at the time of the parent's
death are assumed not to be needy and hence less vulnerable to dis-
inherison without cause.
By relating the heir's need to his ability to support himself, Act
788 rejects the notion that older children, though capable of supporting
themselves, can desperately need an inheritance because of the heavy
responsibility of supporting their own families. The old law made the
decedent an indirect participant in the welfare of his successive gener-
ations by mandating a patrimonial link from descendant to descendant
without regard to need or age. Now, as illustrated also by the repre-
sentation rule that fails to protect young grandchildren unless their parent
would not have attained the age of twenty-three when the decedent died,
the decedent's familial responsibility does not extend beyond one gen-
eration. In earlier times many people did not live to see their succeeding
generations, yet the law mandated a patrimonial connection between the
decedent and the descendants unknown to him. Curiously, today, when
many people actually live to see their grandchildren and even great-
grandchildren, and when the law recognizes that grandparents have a
legally enforceable right in some circumstances to participate personally
in the grandchild's life,160 the legislature has cancelled the decedent's
duty to contribute part of his patrimony, directly or indirectly, to his
posterity once his own children are over twenty-three.
Furthermore, the use of the date of death as the "cutoff" for
determining which heirs are vulnerable and which are not appears ar-
bitrary when need is the underlying theory of protection. 6 By focusing
on support at the time of death as the justification for protection from
disinherison, the new law turns a blind eye to the fact that an older
child who was self-sufficient when the parent died may later suffer illness
160. 1972 La. Acts No. 4, § 1, enacting the precursor of La. R.S. 9:572 (Supp. 1990)
concerning the grandparent's right to visitation.
161. When all children, regardless of age or condition, received protection from dis-
inherison, it made sense to determine who the forced heirs were and what their shares
were as of the date of death. La. Civ. Code arts. 1498, 1505.
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or accident and become unable to support himself. While this tragedy
may befall anyone, not just a person whose parents could have left him
property, it seems a shame that scarce state resources might have to be
spent to support this person when his parent could well have provided
for him. The new law recognizes that an incapacitated child has needs
that entitle him to protection from disinherison without cause. If the
child's illness or accident is serious enough and occurs the day before
the decedent died, the child might qualify as a forced heir under the
new law; but if it occurs the day after the decedent dies, the child over
twenty-three has no protection, even though the testator may have
disinherited him on the assumption, true at the time, that the child was
able to support himself.
Finally, the new law fails to recognize a second sense in which a
child may be vulnerable to disinherison. There may be circumstances
beyond the child's control that cause the parent to be less inclined
voluntarily to recognize the needs of his older children or their descen-
dants. Divorce and remarriage strain the normal bond between the parent
and the children of his first marriage. This is especially true when the
children have lived with the divorced spouse with whom the decedent
was not on friendly terms. The decedent may sincerely think his second
family needs everything of which he dies possessed, but his perception
may be colored by the attenuation of his relationship to the children
of his first marriage. He simply may not know his older children as
well as he knows his new family at the time of his death, or he may
be antagonistic to them as a result of the divorce. In this situation, the
older children are more vulnerable to unjust disinherison because the
parent is less likely to be sensitive to their need at the time of his
death.
The New Disposable Portion
The legislature did not discuss changing the amount of the disposable
portion and corresponding legitime during the debate over the new forced
heirship concept. It was assumed that these amounts would stay the
same as they were after the 1981 amendment to Article 1493: one forced
heir, three-fourths disposable; two or more forced heirs, one-half dis-
posable. Unfortunately that is not the way Article 1493 as amended by
Act 788 literally reads:
Donations inter vivos and mortis causa can not exceed three-
fourths of the property of the disposer, if he leaves, at his
decease, one child under the age of twenty-three or one child
who has been interdicted or who is subject to being interdicted
because of mental incapacity or physical infirmity; and one-half,
if he leaves two or more children under the age of twenty-three
or two or more children who have been interdicted or who are
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subject to being interdicted because of mental incapacity or
physical infirmity.
The Act does not say what happens if the parent leaves one child under
the age of twenty-three and one seriously handicapped child. There
would then be two forced heirs, so presumably the legislature intended
the disposable portion to be one-half. However, a literal reading of the
Act would make the disposable portion three-fourths because there are
not two children under twenty-three or two children seriously incapac-
itated, only one of each. Surely this is not the result the legislature
intended.
Application of Prior Jurisprudence to Address the Problem of
Inconsistent Shares of the Succession
Worse yet, under the new version of Article 1493, it is possible
again to have the kind of problem that arose in Succession of Green-
law.162 Greenlaw, involving ascendant forced heirship, was the Louisiana
Supreme Court's sixth attempt to resolve what was perceived to be a
conflict in the Civil Code between the size of a parent's forced share
and the size of the parent's ab intestato share. The court determined
that whenever the forced share was greater than the ab intestato share,
the parent would receive only the ab intestato share. Subsequently the
legislature tried to resolve the issue by amending Article 1494 to codify
Greenlaw. When parental forced heirship was legislatively abolished in
1981 the Greenlaw problem disappeared, so it was thought, mercifully
sparing future generations of law professors and students the study of
that complicated situation.
Now Greenlaw haunts us again because under Act 788 an heir's
forced share can be different from his ab intestato share. For example,
assume that a decedent has five children, one of whom is under twenty-
three when the decedent dies. The forced share of the child under twenty-
three is one-fourth under Act 788, but his ab intestato share would be
one-fifth since he would share equally ab intestato with his four brothers
and sisters. 61 Suppose that the decedent, who has made no inter vivos
gifts, makes to a stranger a particular legacy of cash that does not
exceed the disposable portion and leaves the rest of his property un-
disposed of by will. Does the child under twenty-three get one-fourth
162. 148 La. 255, 86 So. 786 (1920). See Comment, The Legitime of a Surviving
Parent When Any Brothers or Sisters Also Survive, 7 Tul. L. Rev. 259 (1933), for a
history and criticism of Greenlaw.
163. Ignore for the moment the fact that the forced share is calculated upon an active
mass consisting of the value of the donations inter vivos as well as the property left at
death (minus the debts), whereas the ab intestato share applies only to property left at
death (minus the debts).
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or one-fifth of the undisposed property? Once the applicable fraction
is determined, a second question arises regarding the amount of the
forced heir's portion: Is the forced heir entitled to the fractional share
of the active mass according to Article 1505 or only of such property
that would have passed ab intestato? In terms of the example given
above, does the child under twenty-three receive a fraction of the prop-
erty before (as per 1505) or after (as per intestacy) deduction of the
particular legacy from the decedent's property?
Greenlaw's answer to the question of the applicable fraction was to
use the smaller intestacy fraction, the theory being that if the forced
heir receives at least what he would have gotten had there been no will,
he has not been prejudiced by the will and should not be allowed to
improve his position simply because the decedent made a will. However,
the court applied the fraction to the property before deduction of
legacies. If no inter vivos gifts had been made, that property-that is,
the property left at death minus the debts, but not the legacies-would
have been the active mass for reduction of excessive donations under
Article 1505. In this respect, the forced heir did improve his position
over the intestacy situation because in a partially testate succession an
heir's ab intestato share only applies to property undisposed of, that
is, to the residue after deduction of the debts and the legacies. If the
Greenlaw approach is followed to answer the hypothetical question above,
the forced heir would have the lower intestacy fraction because there
are four other children, but the active mass to which his fraction is
applied would be the same as for reduction of excessive donations under
Article 1505.
Critics of this solution, like the critics of Greenlaw, would no doubt
ask why the presence of other children should affect the size of the
forced share if those children do not inherit? For example, if the decedent
leaves all his property to a stranger, why should the child under twenty-
three receive one-fifth instead of one-fourth? 64 The Greenlaw solution
makes sense when the decedent attempts to leave all his property to the
other children, or attempts to leave one-fifth of his property to each
child. Then the Greenlaw solution insures that the testator can treat his
children equally as they would have been treated ab intestato. Without
the Greenlaw solution, a testator in the assumed situation of five children
would be prevented from treating his children equally because the young-
est child would be entitled to one-fourth. But when the other children
do not receive any property, the forced heir's share should not be scaled
back. 65 Furthermore, when the parent leaves everything to a stranger
164. See Justice Dawkins' concurring opinion, 148 La. at 286, 86 So. at 798.
165. See Justice Provosty's concurring opinion, suggesting that the forced heir should
receive the greater fraction in this situation. Id.
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the Greenlaw solution arbitrarily discriminates against large families: the
forced heir with no more than three brothers and sisters gets one-fourth,
whereas the forced heir with more than three brothers and sisters gets
one-fifth or less.
Intestate Succession in Light of Act 788
The Greenlaw solution assumes that the intestacy share is the meas-
uring stick for what a forced heir ought to receive, either because the
intestate order of succession represents the probable intention of the
decedent or because it is society's preference for the distribution of a
succession. At present the intestacy measuring stick registers equality
among children. Does Act 788 indicate that the intestacy measuring stick
should be altered to register inequality among children? Is it now the
probable intention of the decedent that his children under twenty-three
receive more than the older children? Does society now deem it desirable
for the child under twenty-three to receive more than his older brothers
and sisters? If so, the way to fix the Greenlaw problem is to amend
the intestate order of succession to favor children under twenty-three.
It is doubtful that such an amendment will follow in the wake of
Act 788. Act 788 was an attempt to come as close as the Louisiana
Constitution and the legislature would tolerate to affording "absolute"
freedom to a testator who has children and who perceives a need to
vary the distribution of his estate from the usual; it was not an attack
upon the usual situation as represented by the intestate order of suc-
cession. It is one thing for the law to allow a parent by testament or
inter vivos donation to discriminate in favor of his younger children;
it is another thing entirely for the law to presume that every parent
would want to do so, or that a parent ought to do so. No such
fundamental change in the law was suggested at any time during the
deliberations on Act 788.
The Effect of Act 788 on Collation
Forced heirs have not only the right to reduce excessive donations,
a right exercisable against any donee or legatee, they also have the right
to demand collation from each other of any donations that were not
intended as extra portions. Conversely, only forced heirs are obliged to
collate. Collation does not depend upon impingement of the legitime.
It is "founded on the equality which must be naturally observed between
children and other lawful descendants, who divide among them the
succession of their father, mother, and other ascendants; and also on
the presumption that what was given or bequeathed to children by their
ascendants was so disposed of in advance of what they might one day
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expect from their succession."'' 66 Significantly, Louisiana Civil Code
article 1236 imposes the obligation of collating only on those children
or descendants who have a right to a legitimate portion. Thus a gift
or legacy by a grandparent to a grandchild while the grandchild's parent
is still alive is not collatable because the grandchild is not a forced
heir. 167
Act 788 redefines forced heirs as only those children under twenty-
three or seriously incapacitated children, but it does not amend the
collation articles, which impose the obligation to collate only on forced
heirs. Thus, only children under twenty-three would have to collate and
would need to renounce the succession in order to avoid sharing equally
their donations that were not extra portions. 68 The interaction of the
new definition of forced heir with the unamended collation articles has
the effect of undermining the purpose of collation of achieving equality
among children in a way disfavorable to the younger children. For
example, assume a parent has three children, one of whom is under
twenty-three when the parent dies. The parent has made inter vivos gifts
totaling at least three quarters of the succession but that were not
designated extra portions to his two children who were over twenty-
three when the gifts were made. The children over twenty-three are not
obliged to collate those gifts because they are not forced heirs. The
same result may follow when the donees were under twenty-three when
the gifts were made, but are over twenty-three when the parent dies.
Thus even though the parent did not manifest an intention to treat his
children unequally, the child under twenty-three cannot demand collation
of his older siblings and thus is relegated to his forced share of one-
fourth, instead of an equal one-third share of all property donated to
the children.169
Because the two remedies of reduction and collation serve different
purposes, there is no reason why the obligation of collating should be
limited to the new forced heirs. 170 Reduction is the protection of certain
166. La. Civ. Code art. 1229.
167. La. Civ. Code art. 1239. See also La. Civ. Code arts. 1238, 1240, 1241.
168. La. Civ. Code art. 1237.
169. For another example of the inequality produced by the interaction of Act 788
and the unamended collation articles, assume the parent has five children, four of whom
are under twenty-three. The parent has made inter vivos gifts to his child over twenty-
three that total one-half of the active mass. These gifts were not designated extra portions.
The children under twenty-three, who have only their claim for the forced portion, will
split one-half of the active mass (one-eighth each of the total) while the child over twenty-
three keeps the disposable one-half of the active mass even though there is no evidence
of the parent's intent to create this inequality. Prior to Act 788, the donee-child would
at least have been forced to renounce the succession to avoid having to collate.
170. In France, for example, the obligation of collation exists among all co-heirs ab
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heirs from disinherison without cause, but collation is simply the evening
up between co-heirs who have inherited. Collation could have been made
available among all children and descendants coming to the succession
even though they are not all forced heirs. If that were the case, in the
example above the child under twenty-three would be entitled to one-
third of all the property donated to the children if the other children
accepted the succession. It would be necessary also to amend Articles
1238 through 1241 concerning the obligation of grandchildren and more
remote descendants to collate. The rules given in those articles turn on
whether the grandchild was a forced heir at the time of the gift. The
results given in these articles can be preserved if collation is extended
to all descendants, but the articles must be rewritten to remove reference
to the grandchild's status as forced heir.
IV. OTHER PROVISIONS OF ACT 788
Repeal of Louisiana Civil Code Article 1492-Captation or Undue
Influence
Although the legislature had originally "close[d] the temple of
justice' 7'1 l to allegations of captation or undue influence invalidating a
will, eighty-two years later the doors will be flung open, and that event
will have enormous impact on the law of this state. The motivations
of those who closed the doors become important in assessing the im-
plications of eliminating the prohibition against evidence of captation.
As early as Zerega v. Percival172 the court eloquently expressed the
motivations of those opposed to the admissibility of evidence of cap-
tation:
Their intention could not have been merely to declare what was
the jurisprudence in France or in Louisiana at the time; on the
intestato, whereas only descendants, ascendants, and sometimes the surviving spouse are
forced heirs. F. Terre and Y. Lequette, Droit Civil: Les Successions, Les Liberalities,
Nos. 623-34, 884 (1983).
171. Zerega v. Percival, 46 La. Ann. 590, 610, 15 So. 476, 482 (1894):
[Wihen our legislators embodied in the Old Code the provision that "proof is
not admitted of captation and suggestion," they must be held to have done
just what Tronchet and the other authors of the projet desired, and what the
French law-makers declined to do-i.e., close the temple of justice against all
suits of nullity for cause of captation, whether unaccompanied or coupled with
fraudulent practices.
See, for additional commentary, Cahn, Undue Influence and Captation: A Comparative
Study, 8 Tul. L. Rev. 507 (1934); Comment, Fraud, Undue Influence and Captation In
Wills: A Comparative Study, 34 Tul. L. Rev. 585 (1960); Note, Donations-Testaments-
Captation Under Article 1492, 24 La. L. Rev. 925 (1964).
172. 46 La. Ann. 590, 15 So. 475 (1894).
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contrary they must have meant to protest against it, to condemn
it and to forever banish from the courts a species of litigation
which, except in very rare instances, originates in disappointment,
rancor or covetousness; which offers a strong temptation for
perjury and subornation of perjury; which feeds on scandal and
calumny, and which penetrates within the charnel house to pour
obloquy upon the ashes of the departed.'73
Prohibiting evidence of captation to accomplish such desirable social
policies was part of a delicately balanced system, which offered con-
comitant protection by means of forced heirship to those not deserving
of disinherison.'7 The institution of forced heirship provided descendants
with some protection against total disinherison at the whim of the
parent,'"7 and the spouse was offered protection by community property,
the survivor's usufruct, and the marital portion.' 76 Predictably, the lit-
igation in Louisiana in which allegations were made of fraud and im-
proper influence principally involved collateral relations of the decedent
173. Id. at 610, 15 So. at 482. The quotation continues: "Our State reports, be it
said to the credit and honor of our people, and in proof of the wisdom of our law-
givers, are almost barren of cases of this description." Id.
See discussion of French experience in 3 M. Planiol, supra note 20, Nos. 2880-84, at
413-15; 10 Aubry et Rau, 3 Droit Civil Francais No. 654, at 82 (6th ed. La. St. L. Inst.
trans. 1969). The author of Note, supra note 171, at 926, explains the French history as
follows:
To end these abuses, the Commission for the French Civil Code recommended
an article to prohibit attacks on dispositions based on captation. Yet, the framers
of the French Civil Code, fearful lest the Code would be said to sanction fraud,
deleted the provision, leaving their Code silent on the subject. Nevertheless, the
redactors of the Louisiana Code of 1808 included it, and it now appears as
article 1492.
174. La. Civ. Code art. 1621 contains the 12 causes for disinherison of descendants.
See infra text at note 289 and following for a discussion of this topic.
175. La. Civ. Code art. 1493:
Donations inter vivos or mortis causa cannot exceed three-fourths of the
property of the disposer, if he leaves, at his decease, one child; and one-half,
if he leaves two or more children.
Under the name of children are included descendants of whatever degree they
be, it being understood that they are only counted for the child they represent.
The interrelationship of the protection afforded to descendants and the prohibition of
admitting evidence of captation was noted by the authors elsewhere. Spaht, Samuel, and
Shaw, Successions and Donations, supra note 42, at 607 n.175.
"As those to whom the testator owes a duty of support and maintenance are protected
by the Louisiana law of forced heirship, family protection does not normally justify
invalidation of a will on the basis of fraud or captation in the inducement." Comment,
supra note 171, at 597.
176. See La. Civ. Code arts. 890 (usufruct); 2432-2437 (marital portion); 2334-2369
(community property).
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for whom contesting the will was an "all or nothing" proposition.' 77
With the virtual elimination of the limited protection of forced
heirship in an undisguised effort to emulate our common law neighbors'
"freedom of testation," the legislature responded by repealing Louisiana
Civil Code article 1492. The repeal was an attempt to extend what the
legislators understood to be the corresponding protection offered by
common law jurisdictions which permit "free testation," that is, the
possibility of annulling a testament on the basis of undue influence.
The inquiry then must focus on whether that objective was accomplished.
The repeal of Article 1492 means only that evidence of a disposition 7
"having been made through hatred, anger, suggestion or captation"' 17 9
is not prohibited. To determine the impact of the repeal, it is necessary
first to explore the meaning of the four words contained in Article 1492
and then to suggest what effect the admissibility of such evidence will
have on a disposition.
Vices of Consent
What should be apparent is that "hatred, anger, suggestion or
captation" are words that convey a range of human motivations of less
177. See, e.g., Succession of Hamiter, 519 So. 2d 341 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied,
521 So. 2d 1170 (1988); Succession of Andrews, 153 So. 2d 470 (La. App. 4th Cir.),
writ refused, 244 La. 1005, 156 So. 2d 57 (1963); Succession of Willis, 149 So. 2d 218
(La. App. 2d Cir.), writ refused, 150 So. 2d 589 (1963); Succession of Franz, 232 La.
310, 94 So. 2d 270 (1957); Cormier v. Myers, 223 La. 259, 65 So. 2d 345 (1953);
Succession of Price, 172 La. 606, 134 So. 907 (1931); Texada v. Spence, 166 La. 1020,
118 So. 120 (1928); Succession of McDermott, 136 La. 80, 66 So. 546 (1914); Zerega v.
Percival, 46 La. Ann. 590, 15 So. 476 (1894); Chardon's Heirs v. Bongue, 9 La. 458
(1836).
One of the few cases involving allegations of undue influence or fraud by a descendant
was Succession of Hernandez, 138 La. 134, 70 So. 63 (1915), which involved a will
executed while the husband and wife (testatrix) were in New York. The argument by the
husband was that New York law governed disposition of the property, in particular,
movable property, which comprised the bulk of the value of her estate under the will.
Of course, since New York does not have forced heirship, the descendants were in the
same position as collaterals in this state-a will contest was an "all or nothing" proposition.
178. The disposition referred to in La. Civ. Code art. 1492 means not only donations
mortis causa but also donations inter vivos, because the article appears in Title II of
Book III of the Civil Code entitled Of Donations Inter Vivos and Mortis Causa. Article
1492 is contained in Chapter 2 entitled Of the Capacity Necessary for Disposing and
Receiving by Donation Inter Vivos or Mortis Causa. The placement of Article 1492 in
Chapter 2 suggests an interrelationship between such evidence and capacity to dispose
which will be explored in the text later. For an example of allegations of undue influence
as grounds for annulling a disposition other than a will, see State Mut. Life Assurance
Co. v. Castille, 487 So. 2d 455 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 488 So. 2d 1010 (1986).
A disposition need not be interpreted as the entire will, if the donation in question is
mortis causa. Borrowing from common law authorities, it is possible that the court could
invalidate only individual tainted dispositions, rather than the entire will. See I W. Page,
Page on Wills §§ 192-93, at 389-92 (1941) [hereinafter Page on Wills].
179. La. Civ. Code art. 1492.
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societal concern than the traditional vices of consent, "error, fraud or
violence."'' 0 Hatred or anger may be internal only and is highly sub-
jective by comparison to error.'' Suggestion or simple captation surely
connotes conduct by a third person less serious in nature than fraud,8 2
or duress. 83 The prohibition contained in Article 1492 was probably
never intended to exclude evidence of vices of consent.' 84 Yet, the
180. La. Civ. Code art. 1948.
181. La. Civ. Code art. 1949:
Error vitiates consent only when it concerns a cause without which the obligation
would not have been incurred and that cause was known or should have been
known to the other party.
There are greater similarities between unilateral error and anger or hatred than between
mutual error and anger or hatred. In the former instance both may occur internally;
however, proof of anger or hatred as an internal motivation is more subjective and thus
less trustworthy than error. See La. Civ. Code art. 1949 comment (d):
When only one party is in error, that is, when the error is unilateral, there is
theoretically no meeting of the minds, but granting relief to the party in error
will unjustly injure the interest of the other party if'he is innocent of the error.
Louisiana courts have often refused relief for unilateral error for this reason....
Under this revised Article, it is not necessary that the other party have known
of the mistake; it suffices that he knew or should have known that the matter
affected by the error was the reason that prompted the party in error to enter
the contract.
182. La. Civ. Code art. 1953:
Fraud is a misrepresentation or a suppression of the truth made with the intention
either to obtain an unjust advantage for one party or to cause a loss or
inconvenience to the other. Fraud may also result from silence or inaction.
See also La. Civ. Code arts. 1954-1958.
183. La. Civ. Code art. 1959:
Consent is vitiated when it has been obtained by duress of such a nature as
to cause a reasonable fear of unjust and considerable injury to a party's person,
property, or reputation.
Age, health, disposition, and other personal circumstances of a party must
be taken into account in determining reasonableness of the fear.
See also La. Civ. Code arts. 1960-1964.
184. The author of Note, supra note 171, at 927-28, distinguishes between duress and
fraud:
Thus it has been stated that the article prohibits proof of duress, force, violence,
and all acts, conduct or motives of the testator. Nevertheless these decisions
contain statements entirely consistent with the clear import of the article, and
the inconsistent pronouncements may be mere indiscreet choices of words. It
seems unthinkable that the court would not annul a disposition shown to be
made under fear of harm or other duress.
If captation means fraudulent inducements by someone to encourage the testator
to make a certain disposition to him, there seems no logical reason to predicate
admissibility vel non on the time of occurrence of the acts. It is submitted that
an inducement made at the execution of the will is no more grievous than one
made prior thereto. Of course, as a practical matter captation at the execution
of the will is more susceptible of linkage with the reason for the disposition.
Nevertheless, article 1492 and the policy behind it do not suggest such a dis-
tinction, and it is submitted that it is not justified.
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judiciary drew a distinction between such objectionable conduct at the
time of making of the will, and such conduct that occurred before the
making of the will.8 5 Evidence of the former was permissible, while
evidence of the latter was not, ostensibly because of the prohibition of
Article 1492.
As concerns error, the first vice of consent, the Louisiana Civil
Code of 1825 explicitly recognized that "[in contracts of beneficence
[donations inter vivos], the consideration of the person is presumed by
law to be the principal cause."'' 1 6 Thus, at least as to error, there should
have been no question that it was sufficient to annul a donation inter
vivos despite the prohibition of Article 1492. It logically follows that
the same rule should have been applied to donations mortis causa; s7
185. In Zerega v. Percival, 46 La. Ann. 590, 612, 15 So. 476, 483 (1894), the court
states: "Or, in the further language of the court, the object of the compilers of the code
was to preclude all evidence of acts, conduct or motives of the testator antecedent to the
making of the will, as exercising influence over the testamentary dispositions therein
contained; but same were not intended to prevent the admission of proof of what occurred
at the making of the testament." Subsequent decisions also cite Godden v. Executors of
Burke, 35 La. Ann. 160 (1883). See, e.g., Succession of Andrews, 153 So. 2d 470 (La.
App. 4th Cir.), writ refused, 244 La. 1005, 156 So. 2d 57 (1963); Succession of Willis,
149 So. 2d 218 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ refused, 244 La. 132, 150 So. 2d 589 (1963);
Succession of Franz, 232 La. 310, 94 So. 2d 270 (1957); Texada v. Spence, 166 La. 1020,
118 So. 120 (1928); Succession of Schlumbrecht, 138 La. 173, 70 So. 76 (1915); Succession
of McDermott, 136 La. 80, 66 So. 546 (1914).
Interestingly enough, in the Zerega case the first judge presiding in the trial court
stated:
"Undoubtedly, ... undue influence is sufficient to annul a will, when it is
proven that undue influences have operated; but undue influences must be
indicated in the proceedings by specific acts of malpractice or fraudulent practice,
and showing that the intention of the testator was thereby deceived, and that
the disposition is therefore tainted with fraud;" his theory being that the plaintiff
could overcome the prohibition of the code by making specific charges, or facts
of fraudulent practices, in the employment of the "undue influence" used; or,
in other words, the prohibition of the code is directed against simple, and not
against fraudulent captation.
Zerega, 46 La. Ann. at 607, 15 So. at 481. See also Succession of Franz, 232 La. 310,
322, 94 So. 2d 270, 274 (1957).
For a discussion of the judicial distinction between conduct at the time of the making
of the will and conduct that occurs before, see Note, supra note 171, at 928: "Nevertheless,
article 1492 and the policy behind it do not suggest such a distinction, and it is submitted
that it is not justified."
186. La. Civ. Code art. 1835 (1870) (repealed January 1, 1985).
187. The donation mortis causa is not a contract but a unilateral declaration of will
that is a source of obligations. La. Civ. Code art. 1917 now provides that the rules of
conventional obligations apply to all obligations regardless of their source, if not incon-
sistent. Comments (a) and (b) explain that although the article is new it does not change
the law, as the idea was clearly expressed in La. Civ. Code art. 1788(10) and (11) (1870)
(repealed January 1, 1985). See infra note 199.
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therefore, Article 1492 did not preclude the annulment of gratuitous
dispositions for error.
Even though there is no longer an explicit article directed to error
in a contract of beneficence, the official comment to Louisiana Civil
Code article 1950188 states: "If the contract is gratuitous, the presumption
obtains that the person of the intended obligee was the reason why the
obligor bound himself. 1 ' 89 To annul a contract for error, the party
seeking relief must also prove that the other party knew or should have
known the reason why the party in error bound himself.' 9° In the case
of a donation, the donee will know he was the reason why the gift
was made or he will be considered as having known by virtue of the
same presumption. Error may also exist as to the donee's "qualities."
The official comment explains: "Relief may be obtained when, intending
to contract with a certain person or a person of a certain quality or
character, a party has given his consent to a contract with a different
person, or with a person who lacks the intended quality or character."' 91
188. La. Civ. Code art. 1950:
Error may concern a cause when it bears on the nature of the contract, or the
thing that is the contractual object or a substantial quality of that thing, or
the person or the qualities of the other party, or the law, or any other cir-
cumstance that the parties regarded, or should in good faith have regarded, as
a cause of the obligation.
189. La. Civ. Code art. 1950 comment (d).
190. La. Civ. Code art. 1949:
Error vitiates consent only when it concerns a cause without which the obligation
would not have been incurred and that cause was known or should have been
known to the other party.
As comment (d) explains: "Under this revised Article, it is not necessary that the other
party have known of the mistake; it suffices that he knew or should have known that
the matter affected by the error was the reason that prompted the party in error to enter
the contract."
191. La. Civ. Code art. 1950 comment (d).
La. Civ. Code art. 1838 (1870) (repealed January 1, 1985), contained the following
example: "Thus, a compromise with one, who is supposed to be the heir of a deceased
creditor of the party contracting, is void, if he be not really the heir."
La. Civ. Code art. 1839 (1870) (repealed January 1, 1985):
But if the person, who is really entitled to the quality assumed by the one with
whom the contract is made, has contributed to the error by his neglect or by
design, it will not vitiate the agreement. And in the case above stated, a payment
to, or a compromise with one, whom the true heir suffered to remain in
possession of the inheritance, and to act as heir, without notice, would be valid.
La. Civ. Code art. 1840 (1870) (repealed January 1, 1985):
Contracts, which could only be made by persons possessing certain powers,
either delegated by contract, given by virtue of any private or public office, or
vested by the operation of law, are also void, when there is error as to the
character, quality or office under color of which such contract was made.
Contracts entered into under forged or void powers or assignments, or with
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In Texada v. Spence,192 among the allegations made by the opponents
of the will was that the legacy to "my dear husband, as I know him
to be"' 93 proceeded from error. The opponents argued that the testatrix
thought Walter Spence "was her lawful husband, whereas, in fact, he
was not."' 94 The court found that the testatrix was not in error, but
knew that the status of her marriage would depend upon the outcome
of pending litigation.' 95 Significantly, the court did not dispose of the
allegation on the basis that error did not vitiate the consent of the
testatrix.
Of course, there may be errors of fact or law other than that of
the person of the donee or legatee. However, it will be more difficult
to prove that such error was the cause without which the donor or
testator would not have made the disposition. 96 Under French law, error
vitiated a disposition contained in a testament if it related to the person
(donee or legatee) or "a simple quality assumed in the latter, provided
that in this case it is clearly shown that the legacy was made in view
of the quality of the person rather than in favor of the individual."'' 97
Naturally, the error had to affect the reason without which the donor
or testator would not have made the disposition. 98
persons without authority assuming to act as public or private officers, are
governed by this rule. Contracts, however, made in the name of another, under
void powers, will be valid, if ratified by the principal before the other contracting
party has signified his dissent to the agreement.
192. 166 La. 1020, 118 So. 120 (1928).
193. Id. at 1023, 118 So. at 121.
194. Id.
195. The court stated:
At the time her will was executed, she knew that the legality of her marriage
was hanging in the balance, depending upon the final action of this court on
the application for a rehearing in the suit for the annulment of the judgment
of divorce from Mrs. Sarilla 0. Spence. She had intervened in that suit, appealing
to the mercy of the court. When she referred in her will to the defendant as
"my dear husband, as I know him to be," she was in no error whatever
concerning his status. . . . It is plain from the mere reading of the provisions
of the will that the testatrix desired and intended to make the bequest under
attack herein to W. L. Spence, and to no other person.
Id.
196. La. Civ. Code art. 1950:
Error may concern a cause when it bears on the nature of the contract, or the
thing that is the contractual object or a substantial quality of that thing, or
the person or the qualities of the other party, or the law, or any other cir-
cumstance that the parties regarded, or should in good faith have regarded, as
a cause of the obligation.
197. 10 Aubry & Rau, supra note 173, No. 654, at 82.
198. The falsity of the motive which may have induced the testator to make a
bequest does not carry with it the nullity of the legacy, even if such motive
was stated in the testament, . . . unless it clearly results from the terms of the
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The repeal of Article 1492 should permit the annulment of testaments
for duress or fraud. Louisiana Civil Code article 1917 directs the ap-
plication of the rules governing conventional obligations to obligations
"that arise from sources other than contract to the extent that those
rules are compatible with the nature of those obligations."' 99 Thus,
Article 1917 permits the court to apply the principles of vices of consent
"to the extent that those rules are compatible with the nature of those
[i.e., unilateral] obligations." The repeal of Article 1492, which may
have been considered incompatible with the rules of vices of consent,
should permit the annulment of a will on the more serious grounds of
duress or fraud. 200 To annul a testament for duress, a heritable action, °2 0
testament or from the circumstances of the case that the testator intended the
effectiveness of the legacy to depend upon the existence of the motive.
Id. See also examples from the French jurisprudence, id. at 83 n.4.
199. La. Civ. Code art. 1917 comment (a) states:
This Article is new. It does not change the law, however. It articulates a basic
systematic idea underlying the Civil Code. It is clearly understood in French
doctrine that the general principles of the theory of obligations that the French
redactors incorporated into the French Civil Code are intended to govern ob-
ligations in general, regardless of their source.
(citation omitted).
Comment (b) states: "Under this Article, the general rules of contracts are applicable
to declarations of will contained in unilateral acts, an idea which is clearly expressed in
C.C. Art. 1788(10) and (11) (1870)." (citation omitted).
Under La. Civ. Code art. 1757, "[olbligations arise from contracts and other declarations
of will." A last will and testament is a unilateral declaration of will that is a source of
obligations.
In fact in 3 Planiol, supra note 20, No. 2878, at 413, observation is made that "[t]he
Code is silent on the various cases in which the volition of the disposing person is not
completely eliminated, but is simply vitiated for some reason. In the absence of specific
statutory provisions general rules apply, except for the necessary adjustment to the par-
ticular character of the gratuitous transactions."
200. Under French law, a testamentary disposition could be annulled if made through
error, or as a result of fraud or duress. 10 Aubry & Rau, supra note 173, No. 654, at
82.
La. Civ. Code art. 2031:
A contract is relatively null when it violates a rule intended for the protection
of private parties, as when a party lacked capacity or did not give free consent
at the time the contract was made. A contract that is only relatively null may
be confirmed.
Relative nullity may be invoked only by those persons for whose interest the
ground for nullity was established, and may not be declared by the court on
its own initiative.
The applicable prescriptive period is five years from the time the ground for nullity
ceased (duress) or was discovered (fraud). La. Civ. Code art. 2032.
The questions raised by the application of these rules to a donation mortis causa include:
1) are the intestate heirs of .the deceased, persons for whose interest the ground for nullity
was established? 2) can the testator confirm the will after duress ceases before it ever
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it will be sufficient to prove duress of the nature required by Louisiana
Civil Code article 1959.202 In fact, it may be sufficient to prove duress
less serious than that required by Article 1959. Under French law, "[als
a general rule ... to annul a testament on this ground [duress], the
violence need not be as grave as that required for the nullity of a
contract."20 The duress may be directed against the testator or a third
person 204 and need not be exercised by the beneficiary. 20 5 In Ambrose
Succession v. Ambrose,2°6 among the allegations made in support of a
disinherison clause in the decedent's will were coercion and violence
exercised by his daughter to make him execute a will. 20 7 The duress
takes effect? and 3) does the prescriptive period begin to run at the moment the duress
ceases even though the will is not yet effective simply because the testator is alive? The
answers should be 1) yes; 2) yes; and 3) probably, yes.
201. La. Civ. Code art. 1765 defines a heritable obligation as one whose "performance
may be enforced by a successor of the obligee."
La. Civ. Code art. 3556(28) defines successor:
There are in law two sorts of successors: the successor by universal title, such
as the heir, the universal legatee, and the legatee by universal title; and the
successor by particular title, such as the buyer, donee or legatee of particular
things, the transferee.
La. Civ. Code art. 1765 also contains the rule that "[elvery obligation is deemed
heritable as to all parties, except when the contrary results from the terms or from the
nature of the contract."
It is stated in 10 Aubry & Rau, supra note 173, No. 654, at 86, that under French
law:
The nullity of testamentary dispositions for vices of consent is a relative nullity.
It may invoked only by the heirs, or by the universal legatee or legatee by
universal title, as the case may be.
202. La. Civ. Code art. 1959:
Consent is vitiated when it has been obtained by duress of such a nature as
to cause a reasonable fear of unjust and considerable injury to a party's person,
property, or reputation.
Age, health, disposition and other personal circumstances of a party must be
taken into account in determining reasonableness of the fear.
203. 10 Aubry & Rau, supra note 173, No. 654, at 86 n.16.
204. La. Civ. Code art. 1960:
Duress vitiates consent also when the threatened injury is directed against the
spouse, an ascendant, or descendant of the contracting party.
If the threatened injury is directed against other persons, the granting of relief
is left to the discretion of the court.
In comment (c) to Article 1960 the second paragraph is explained as follows: "The
second paragraph of this Article merely expands C.C. Art. 1853 (1870) to cover situations
where the fear that is instilled is found upon close friendship or another relationship
either based on or productive of strong affection."
205. "Consent is vitiated even when duress has been exerted by a third person." La.
Civ. Code art. 1961.
206. 548 So. 2d 37 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1989).
207. The court considered such allegations and evidence as supportive of the grounds
for disinherison in La. Civ. Code art. 1621(8): "If the child used any act of violence or
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detailed in the will by the decedent included threats by the daughter to
make his "last years on this earth quite miserable, ' 20 cursing and insults,
and the statement by his daughter "that she would die and go to hell
before she would apologize to me or her mother. ' ' 209 The court considered
these acts of duress sufficient to constitute "violence or coercion" for
purposes of disinherison under Article 1621. Obviously, the daughter's
acts would not ordinarily be sufficient to constitute duress for purposes
of annulling a contract.
Regarding the annulment of a testament for fraud, it is important
to distinguish fraudulent captation from simple captation under French
law. Fraudulent captation was influence or suggestion "accompanied by
artifices or deceitful insinuations," and it resulted "from the circum-
stances ... that the testator would not have disposed had he known
the truth of the facts. ' 210 Simple captation, by contrast, was "the use
of means designed to ingratiate ourselves to others." ' 21' A will could be
annulled for fraudulent, but not simple, captation. The definition of
fraudulent captation is consistent with the principles of fraud under the
Louisiana Civil Code articles.
To annul a contract for fraud by captation or other deceitful prac-
tices there must be a misrepresentation or suppression of the truth "made
with the intention either to obtain an unjust advantage for one party
or to cause a loss or inconvenience to the other. ' 21 2 An exception to
fraud exists if the party [testator] could have "ascertained the truth
without difficulty." However, the exception does not apply "when a
relation of confidence has reasonably induced a party to rely on the
other's assertions or representations. '21 3 In many cases in which fraud
will be alleged, there will be a relation of confidence existing between
the testator and the party who practices the fraud.
It is unnecessary that the beneficiary be the party who makes the
misrepresentations or suppresses the truth because fraud may be practiced
by a third person. 214 However, under Louisiana Civil Code article 1956,
fraud vitiates a contract only when "the other party [beneficiary] knew
coercion to hinder a parent from making a will." In fact the daughter intended to
accomplish the opposite result-make him execute a will.
208. 548 So. 2d at 39.
209. Id.
210. 10 Aubry & Rau, supra note 173, No. 654, at 84.
211. Id. at 83.
212. La. Civ. Code art. 1953: "Fraud may also result from silence or inaction." See
also comment (b).
213. La. Civ. Code art. 1954.
214. La. Civ. Code art. 1956. See also 10 Aubry & Rau, supra note 173, No. 654,
at 85.
1990]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
or should have known of the fraud. ' ' 21 5 Interestingly, under French law
there is no requirement that the fraud practiced by one other than the
legatee "be imputable to him as having had knowledge. ' 2'6 The expla-
nation offered by doctrinal authors is that the requirement of imputation
of knowledge to the party who benefits applies only to contracts. 217 The
explanation is another example of less rigidity in applying the contractual
principles of vices of consent to testaments. The distinction is supportable
because, unlike a contract, a testament does not involve the strong
societal interest in. protecting the expectations of the other contracting
party, who has in most cases2"' given something in exchange for the
obligation.
21 9
In Ambrose Succession v. Ambrose, the daughters alleged that the
will disinheriting them was invalid because it "was part of a larger
scheme to prevent the daughters from obtaining their inheritances. '220
The children of decedent objected to the exclusion of evidence of a
simulated sale of succession property that was forged by decedent's
widow. The court of appeal responded:
It appears to us that appellants' attempt to demonstrate bias,
interest or corruption on the part of Mrs. Ambrose was an
attempt to question the motives of Mr. Ambrose in the making
of the will at issue. The grounds for disinherison exist inde-
pendently and have been sufficiently demonstrated irrespective
of motive. The finding of a valid disinherison moots the question
of the validity of the trial court evidentiary ruling. 2 '
Evidence of the motive of the decedent, allegedly resulting from fraud-
ulent captation by his widow, was inadmissible under the Louisiana
215. La. Civ. Code art. 1956. See comment (b). What constitutes "should have known
of the fraud" under La. Civ. Code art. 1956 is explained in comment (d). The comment
cites as an example George A. Broas Co., Inc. v. Hibernia Homestead and Sav. Ass'n,
134 So. 2d 356 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961).
Comment (c) to La. Civ. Code art. 1956 explains: "In the situation contemplated in
comment (b) relief may nevertheless be obtained on grounds of error if the requirements
of revised C.C. Arts. 1949 through 1952 . . . are met; and, in a proper case, the party
injured in his interest may recover damages from the third person who committed the
fraud." (citation omitted).
216. 10 Aubry & Rau, supra note 173, No. 654, at 85.
217. Id. at 85 n.10.
218. The donation is a contract; therefore, it requires an offer (La. Civ. Code arts.
1536-1539) and an acceptance (La. Civ. Code arts. 1540-1550). By definition, however,
it is a gratuitous contract, the donor obtaining no advantage in return. La. Civ. Code
art. 1910. The characterization of the donation as a gratuitous contract may be considered
qualified to the extent of the definitions of the three kinds of donations inter vivos (La.
Civ. Code arts. 1523-1525) and the formula contained in La. Civ. Code art. 1526.
219. La. Civ. Code art. 1909 (definition of onerous contract).
220. 548 So. 2d 37, 39 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1989).
221. Id. at 42-43.
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jurisprudence. 222 However, after July 1, 1990, when Act 788 becomes
effective, evidence offered of the motive of the decedent, if the result
is fraud, is admissible. Furthermore, if fraud is proved, it is grounds
for annulment of the testament.
223
Hatred, Anger, Suggestion, or Captation
With the repeal of Article 1492, evidence of hatred, anger, sugges-
tion, or captation is no longer prohibited. The question remains: what
do those four words mean and what effect should such evidence have
on the validity of a testament?
Hatred and anger are appropriately considered together and find
their origin in a Roman fiction "of 'fury or madness ' '2 24 invented to
nullify a testator's will if he failed to bequeath a minimum of his estate
to his dependents. According to one author, "[i]n this fiction of 'fury'
or insensate rage, there lies the germ of the modern doctrines of cap-
tation. ' ' 225 Under French customary law before the Code Napoleon, the
action ab irato226 could be instituted by legitimate relatives, even a forced
222. See supra text accompanying note 185.
223. Allegations of fraud were made in Zerega v. Percival, 46 La. Ann. 590, 15 So.
476 (1894), Texada v. Spence 166 La. 1020, 118 So. 120 (1928), and Succession of
McDermott, 136 La. 80, 66 So. 546 (1914).
In Succession of Hernandez, 138 La. 134, 136, 70 So. 63, 63 (1915), the allegations
of the opponents of the will detailed the following conduct by decedent's husband:
That the said Walter Hernandez, scheming to possess himself of the large and
valuable estate of his deceased wife, and to defraud his children of their interest
and share of the same, advised his wife, who was then and there ill and about
to undergo a dangerous operation, that in case of her death her estate would
pass to her collateral kinspeople, and it would be taken away from her children
unless she should make a will in favor of her said husband for the use and
benefit of her said children and to protect them and preserve for them the said
estate. Further advised her that, if she made a will in that manner, he would
receive the property in trust for the said children, and would see that they were
placed in possession of same. That he further advised his said wife that her
said children were unable to take care of said estate, and that the only possible
way for the children to receive the same was by and through the medium of
their father, the said husband of Mrs. Hernandez.
Ultimately, the opponents claimed that the husband by use of fear, fraud, and duress
forced his wife to sign the will.
224. Cahn, supra note 171, at 507.
225. Id.
226. The action is described in 3 Planiol, supra note 20, No. 2877, at 412. In Cahn,
supra note 171, at 509, the author summarized the three prerequisites for the action as
described by French commentators: "(a) an extraordinary or egregious hatred, (b) unjust
in its source and unwarranted by any conduct of its object, (c) proximately causing the
dispositions ordained."
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heir, 227 to invalidate a will. The action permitted proof that the provisions
of the will proceeded from a blind, unjust and extraordinary hatred
that affected the sanity of the testator. 228 Although the projet of the
Code Napoleon contained a proposed article to prohibit proof of hatred
and anger, it was rejected by the French legislative body.229 Despite the
fact that the action ab irato was not adopted by the Code Napoleon,
and thus arguably abolished, French courts recognized that "[hiatred
and anger, just or unjust ' 230 could nullify a will "only if of degree
sufficient to unbalance the mind of the testator. ' ' 23' Thus, the relationship
between hatred and anger and the testator's capacity was established.
Under French law the same relationship existed between simple
captation, or suggestion, and the testator's capacity. Simple captation
and suggestion were defined as the means to ingratiate one to the
testator 232 or to persuade him to dispose in favor of certain persons.
233
According to Aubry & Rau:
227. Actions ab irato became quite common, in view of the rule that they might
be instituted by heirs who were not lawfully entitled to a legitime. The com-
mentators agreed that the burden of proof was much heavier as to heirs of
this category. The distinction has been made that, as to such heirs (usually
collaterals), the motive of hatred must appear on the face of the will, whereas
heirs in the direct line might establish its dehors.
Cahn, supra note 171, at 508-09.
In 3 Planiol, supra note 20, No. 2877, at 412 n.ll, he explains:
The point of departure was the idea that gratuities should be inspired by a
spirit of affection, for they are benevolent acts. If they are inspired by hatred,
they should be set aside .... A series of decisions in the 17th Century set
aside wills because the testators were moved by unjust passions against one or
more of their children .... But decisions of 1643 and 1657 rejected such an
action to collateral relatives, because the natural affections toward them are less
strong and natural than toward lineal relatives .... The action ab irato had
also some unfortunate effects. Sons and sons-in-law, who foresaw that their
father or father-in-law will favor other children in his will, created on purpose
family conflicts and started all kinds of litigation so as to prepare for future
reference means of attacking the will as induced by hatred against them.
228. This was done with the help of a fiction that the anger has affected the
sanity of the testator .... But the old action does not exist any more; the
silence of the Code sufficed to have abolished it. Still if the rage was strong
enough to deprive the testator of the ordinary use of his mental faculties, it
would be identified with insanity and the will could be annulled despite the
fact that the action ab irato does not exist as a separate action.
3 Planiol, supra note 20, No. 2877, at 412 (emphasis added).
229. Id.; Cahn, supra note 171, at 509-10; Note, supra note 171, at 925. This article
was, of course, adopted by the Louisiana Legislature.
230. Cahn, supra note 171, at 511.
231. Id. See also supra emphasized quotation in note 228.
232. In 10 Aubry & Rau, supra note 173, No. 654, at 83, simple captation is defined
as follows:
[Tihe use of means designed to ingratiate ourselves to others, as for example,
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He [the judge] would also have good reason to declare the
nullity of the testament if it resulted from his findings that the
practice of captation and suggestion by the legatee, even if non-
fraudulent, was rendered easier by the naturally weak intelligence
of the disposer, so that the latter was unable to resist the
covetous influences. 234
The structure of Chapter 2 of the Louisiana Civil Code supports the
connection between proof of hatred, anger, suggestion or captation and
the testator's capacity. Both Article 1492 and Article 1475, which pro-
nounces that the testator must be of sound mind, appear in the chapter
entitled "Of the Capacity Necessary for Disposing and Receiving by
Donation Inter Vivos or Mortis Causa" (emphasis added). The logical
conclusion is that with the repeal of the prohibition, evidence of sug-
gestion or captation is admissible and relevant if it assists in establishing
demonstrations of simulated friendship, assiduous service, or presents, would
not be sufficient to annul a disposition made in favor of the person who, by
resorting to such means, has secured the benevolence of the testator, even though
he acted solely with the view of securing liberalities for himself.
3 Planiol, supra note 20, No. 2881, at 414, describes an annulment action for inducement
or suggestion under the old law before the Code Napoleon. "The Code has not reproduced
the provision of the Ordinance of 1735. Its disappearance has been construed as giving
the judges full freedom of appreciation." Id. at No. 2883.
233. "The same is true of suggestion, that is to say, means of persuasion used towards
the testator to induce him to dispose in favor of certain persons, although his dispositions
are in truth and in fact the result of these means." 10 Aubry & Rau, supra note 173,
No. 654, at 83. In a footnote, the commentators explain that suggestion had a different
meaning under ancient law. Id. at 83 n.6. A third meaning is ascribed to "suggestion"
in 3 Planiol, supra note 20, No. 2881, at 414: "A 'suggested' disposition was one made
so the testator would free himself from the annoying solicitation of persons around him."
234. (Emphasis added). 10 Aubry and Rau, supra note 173 No. 654, at 85.
In Cahn, supra note 171, at 511, after observing that to invalidate a will captation
and suggestion must be fraudulent, he describes fraud as:
The evidence often takes the form of isolation of an aged and mentally weakened
testatrix, false artifices and manoeuvres to create hatred of the natural objects
of her bounty, and the like. The important principle is that mere attentions,
gifts, pleadings and assiduities, even if designed for the sole purpose of inducing
the desired disposition, will not invalidate the will, in the absence of deception,
over-reaching or fraud.
A similar description appears in 3 Planiol, supra note 20, No. 2884, at 415:
By contrast, interception of correspondence, keeping the testator's old friends
away from him, dismissal of faithful servants, slanders against the family, and
constant interference of the legatee with the testator's affairs, were held to be
typical fraudulent maneuvers, especially when the testator was of weakened
mental capacity.
See also Green, Fraud, Undue Influence and Mental Incompetency, 43 Colum. L. Rev.
176 (1943) and In re Rekasis v. Hogan, 545 So. 2d 471 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
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that the testator is not of sound mind. 235
Louisiana jurisprudence recognizes that a testator is presumed sane, 23 6
and opponents of the will bear the burden of rebutting the presumption
by clear and convincing evidence. 237 However, the burden of persuasion
235. As a matter of fact, as grounds for nullity [of a contract], lack of capacity
and fraud are flexible enough to provide redress for the victims of abusive
persuasion, thereby eliminating the need for another category of vice of consent
such as undue influence. Indeed, as once stated, it is clear that the weak, the
timid, the anxious and the submissive are precisely those who receive the greatest
protection through the concept of undue influence at common law. Flexible
rules on contractual incapacity suffice to furnish efficient protection to such
persons in the Louisiana system as well.
Litvinoff, Vices of Consent, Error, Fraud, Duress and an Epilogue on Lesion, 50 La.
L. Rev. 1, 100 (1989). Although the author was discussing principles as applied to contracts,
Article 1917 applies the same rules to obligations that arise from different sources, such
as a last will and testament. Furthermore, if Article 1918 (contractual capacity) is compared
to Article 1475 (capacity to execute a donation or testament), the former pronounces
incapacity if a party is deprived of reason, whereas the latter pronounces incapacity if
the donor or testator is not of sound mind. The latter appears to be even more flexible
than the former. See also Green, supra note 234, at 176.
Two cases in which the connection between mental feebleness and undue influence was
made were Jeanis v. Jeanis, 202 La. 171, 12 So. 2d 691 (1943) and Pons v. Pons, 327
So. 2d 561 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976). The Jeanis case was a suit for interdiction of an
eighty-nine-year-old man alleged to be incapable of managing his person and his affairs.
Among the allegations made to prove his lack of capacity was that he had fallen under
the "influence" of his niece. In the Pons case a nephew sought an accounting from his
uncle for money received from his aunt and for a judicial determination "as to whether
or not Ms. Robinson [aunt] was coerced or unduly influenced" to make decisions she
did not desire. Id.
236. Succession of Lyons, 452 So. 2d 1161 (La. 1984). The authors commented on
the case in Spaht, Samuel, and Shaw, supra note 42. See also Johnson, Successions and
Donations, Developments in the Law, 1982-1983, 44 La. L. Rev. 553 (1983).
See also Succession of Riggio, 405 So. 2d 513 (La. 1981); Succession of Lambert, 185
La. 416, 169 So. 453 (1936); and Succession of Mithoff, 168 La. 624, 122 So. 886 (1929).
See generally L. Oppenheim, Successions and Donations §§ 115-16, in 10 Louisiana
Civil Law Treatise (1973).
237. Succession of Lyons, 452 So. 2d 1161 (La. 1984).
"The disputed fact is whether the testator understood the nature of the testamentary
acts and appreciated their effects." Spaht, Samuel, and Shaw, supra note 42, at 606. See
Succession of Moody, 227 La. 609, 80 So. 2d 93 (1955); Succession of Herson, 127 So.
2d 61 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961). "[T]he question concerns the mental and emotional
capacity of the testator to deliberate knowledgeably and to make an unconfused decision."
Spaht, Samuel, and Shaw, supra note 42, at 607. See 3 M. Planiol, supra note 20, Nos.
2874 and 2876.
Additional cases in which there have been allegations of lack of testamentary capacity
since Succession of Lyons include Succession of Landry, 545 So. 2d 1107 (La. App. 5th
Cir. 1989); Succession of Cahn, 522 So. 2d 1160 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 523
So. 2d 1339 (1988); Succession of Sauls, 510 So. 2d 715 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987);
Succession of Key, 502 So. 2d 199 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 503 So. 2d 497
(1987). For an example of a case in which the opponents were successful in proving lack
of testamentary capacity see Succession of Keel, 442 So. 2d 691 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983).
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was judicially imposed because "the court considers that the particular
type of claim should be disfavored on policy grounds. ' 238 By virtue of
the repeal of Article 1492, a strong argument can be made that the
policy that supported the intermediate level of persuasion has changed.
The legislature evidenced the shift in policy by permitting evidence of
captation to establish that the testator "was of weakened mental ca-
pacity. ' 23 9 Arguably, after July 1, 1990, the standard of persuasion
imposed upon opponents of a will to prove the testator was not of
sound mind should only be a preponderance of the evidence .2
Despite the prohibition against evidence of captation, Louisiana
decisions have permitted evidence of dominance by a person over the
238. Succession of Lyons, 452 So. 2d at 1165, quoting from McCormick on Evidence
§ 340(b), at 798 (2d ed. 1972).
Other examples of proceedings where the intermediate standard of persuasion is imposed
include attorney disciplinary proceedings, community property litigation where a person
is attempting to overcome the presumption that property acquired during the community
is community property (La. Civ. Code art. 2340), and a suit by a child to establish
filiation to a deceased parent (La. Civ. Code art. 209). "In all these situations, strong
policy considerations mitigate against use of the preponderance of the evidence test." Id.
at 1165. In the case of community property litigation and suits to establish filiation, "the
sanctity of the family is protected." Id.
Cf. 8 ULA, Uniform Probate Code § 3-407: "Contestants of a will have the burden
of establishing lack of testamentary intent or capacity, undue influence, fraud, duress,
mistake or revocation. Parties have the ultimate burden of persuasion as to matters with
respect to which they have the initial burden of proof .... For cases in a neighboring
state involving burden of persuasion in will contests where undue influence is alleged, see
Seigler v. Seigler, 391 S.W.2d 403 (Tex. 1965); Norton v. Clarks, 160 Tex. 466, 333
S.W.2d 108 (1960); Lipsey v. Lipsey, 660 S.W.2d 149 (Tex. App.-Waco 1983); Cravens
v. Chick, 524 S.W.2d 425 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Carpenter
v. Tinney, 420 S.W.2d 241 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1967); Schmidt v. Schmidt, 403
S.W.2d 531 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1966).
239. 3 M. Planiol, supra note 20, No. 2874, at 410.
The proof of testamentary incapacity is that "the brain or other physical organ ...
which is the medium through which the action of the mind is manifested, is so diseased
or impaired as to make it an untrustworthy vehicle for the conveyance of the true wish
or will of the testator, unbiased by any delusion which may be the result of disease."
Succession of Bey, 46 La. Ann. 773, 789, 15 So. 297, 302 (1894).
"Omitted from this definition appearing in Succession of Dixon, 269 So.2d at 325, is
reference to the testator's capacity to act independently. In that case there was evidence
that the testatrix had copied a will furnished by her daughter-in-law, named as universal
legatee in the testament. Proof of inability to act independently might include proof of
undue influence, which is prohibited by Civil Code article 1497." Spaht, Samuel, and
Shaw, supra note 42, at 607 n.175. The full citation of Succession of Dixon v. Guzik is
269 So. 2d 323 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1972).
240. In Texas, the burden of persuasion is a preponderance of the evidence: "Those
who seek in a new suit to set aside a will that has already been admitted to probate on
the grounds of testamentary incapacity or undue influence, or both, have the burden of
establishing such charges by a preponderance of the evidence." Jowers v. Smith, 237
S.W.2d 805, 807 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1950) (emphasis added). See also Reese v.
Brittian, 570 S.W.2d 528, 530 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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mind of a testator to establish lack of testamentary capacity. 24' As
recently as 1988, in Succession of Hamiter,242 the court concluded that
the testator's fourth will was invalid because he "could not appreciate
the nature or effect of his testament nor could he or did he employ
independent judgment in making decisions concerning . . .his estate.' 243
According to the court, he did not understand the nature and effect of
his testament because of his "susceptibility to undue influence and the
actual practice of such influence upon Hamiter [testator] by Cox [legatee
and sitter]." ' 2" The court was assisted in reaching this conclusion by
finding that the testator suffered from "a constant and continuing mental
incapacity. ' 245 The effect of the finding was to shift the burden of
persuasion to the proponents of the will who failed to prove the testator
executed his will during a lucid interval. The court observed:
The evidence ... shows that his will was executed by Hamiter
while under the overbearing influence of Mrs. Cox. The will
was read to Hamiter by Cox as she knelt beside his chair.
Though she left the room while the will was signed she waited
outside to take Hamiter home. She had directed the preparation
of the will. The will was as Mrs. Cox wanted it .... She made
her desire for him to sign it clear by leaving him in the room
for the purpose of doing so. He then did as she directed and
expected.
246
After July 1, 1990, there should be no question 1) that evidence of
influence and suggestion are admissible to question the testator's capacity
and 2) that the testator's lack of capacity may be established by a
preponderance of the evidence.
241. Succession of Hamiter, 519 So. 2d 341 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 521 So.
2d 1170 (1988). See also Succession of Franz, 232 La. 310, 94 So. 2d 270 (1957); Cormier
v. Myers, 223 La. 259, 65 So. 2d 345 (1953); Succession of Andrews, 153 So. 2d 470
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1963); Succession of Willis, 149 So. 2d 218 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ
refused, 150 So. 2d 589 (1963). See also Comment, supra note 171.
In Succession of Willis, 149 So. 2d at 222, the court observed:
The basic and fundamental contention is that he was under the domination of
Mrs. McKeithen. Much evidence was introduced on this point, and we pretermit
any further comment on same except to say it did not show mental incapacity
but at most tended to show "captation or suggestion" which is not permitted
under LSA-C.C. Art. 1492.
This series of cases was criticized in Note, supra note 171, at 929.
242. 519 So. 2d 341 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 521 So. 2d 1170 (1988).
243. Id. at 348.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 347. This finding was made on the basis of the testimony of both a
psychiatrist and lay witnesses as to his behavior.
246. Id. The court continued by saying that "[t]his extraordinary involvement of the
principal legatee in the formulation and execution of the will is very substantial evidence
of undue influence present at the making of this will." Id.
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Is Undue Influence Captation?
The extent to which there may be reliance upon decisions and
commentaries about undue influence depends upon whether the defi-
nitions of undue influence and captation are identical, or at least very
similar. In Louisiana judicial decisions, the terms ordinarily are used
interchangeably. 247 Yet, one author has described what he perceived to
be the historical difference between the two concepts. In systems derived
from Roman law, there was an emphasis upon the effect that influences
and artifices had upon "the testator's natural office of piety; ' 24 8 in
systems derived from the common law there was an emphasis upon "the
licit or illicit character of the means of influence." 2 4 9 An examination
247. In Zerega v. Percival, 46 La. Ann. 590, 595 (1894), the attorney for the defendant
opined: "The charge of suggestion and captation is tantamount to what is understood
elsewhere by undue influence. Fraud and undue influence are nearly synonymous." Later
the court, quoting from the district judge's opinion, makes the same observation: "Undue
influence is an expression unfamiliar to civilians. It is borrowed from a system of law
not prevalent in Louisiana, and it is there used in the same sense as captation and
suggestion in the civil law." Id. at 606. Ultimately, the district judge found it unnecessary
to decide if captation and undue influence were the same: "I am, therefore, clearly of
the opinion that whether undue influence be understood to mean simple captation and
suggestion, proof of neither being admitted under the textual provisions of Art. 1492."
Id. at 611. In the supreme court opinion, reviewing the decisions of Louisiana and other
states, the term undue influence was used. Id. at 612.
In Succession of McDermott, 136 La. 80, 87, 66 So. 546, 548 (1914), the court, relying
on Zerega stated that 'undue influence' is used in the same sense as 'captation and
suggestion'...." See also Cormier v. Myers, 223 La. 259, 65 So. 2d 345 (1953); Succession
of Price, 172 La. 606, 134 So. 907 (1931); Succession of Andrews, 153 So. 2d 470 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1963); Succession of Willis, 149 So. 2d 218 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied,
150 So. 2d 589 (1963).
In Succession of Hernandez, 138 La. 134, 142, 70 So. 63, 65-66 (1915), the Louisiana
Supreme Court identified undue influence as synonymous with fraudulent captation: "As
to the alleged fraudulent suggestions, or undue influence, proof is not admitted under
our law and jurisprudence." Furthermore, in Texada v. Spence, 166 La. 1020, 1024, 118
So. 120, 121 (1928) and Succession of Franz, 232 La. 310, 322, 94 So. 2d 270, 274
(1957), the court characterizes undue influence as "intimidation and fraud." Intimidation
suggests duress. See Litvinoff, supra note 235, at 99-100 for a comparison of duress
under contract law in Louisiana with undue influence at common law. See also Comment,
Duress and Undue Influence-A Comparative Analysis, 22 Baylor L. Rev. 572 (1970).
248. Cahn, supra note 171, at 508. Cahn further stated:
The Roman law . . . has postulated a norm of testamentary disposition in the
light of natural justice and the obligation of piety to family and society. Its
problem, therefore, is whether the testator has violated that norm, whether,
influenced or uninfluenced, he has ordained dispositions which the law and
natural justice decline to recognize as the expression of a socially responsible
will.
Id.
249. Id. at 508 (emphasis added). "Modern law, particularly the common law of
England and of the United States, has laid its emphasis upon the licit or illicit character
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of cases from common law jurisdictions and commentaries about undue
influence reveal that the dichotomy is not nearly so pronounced, if it
exists at all.
The theory underlying undue influence is that the "testator is induced
by various means, to execute an instrument which, although his, in
outward form, is in reality not his will, but the will of another person
which is substituted for that of testator. ' ' 250 Ultimately, the inquiry of
whether undue influence exists focuses on the influence and its power
over the mind of the testator.2 1' After the repeal of Article 1492, it is
accurate to describe Louisiana law as emphasizing the effect of captation,
simple or fraudulent, upon the condition of the testator's mind. Thus,
the two concepts are very similar, if not identical.
An examination of authorities on undue influence reveals some
confusion and uncertainty. One commentator has opined: "Undue in-
fluence is one of the most bothersome concepts in all the law. It cannot
be precisely defined. ' '25 2 By virtue of its nature as a factual question,
[iut's impossible to set forth all the various combinations of
facts and circumstances that are sufficient to make out a case
of undue influence because the possibilities are as limitless as
the imagination of the adroit and the cunning. The very nature
of undue influence makes it impossible for the law to lay down
tests to determine its existence with mathematical certainty. 253
of the means of influence. Having postulated the free and unrestrained exercise of
testamentary power, the gravamen of its inquiry is whether the testator has been influenced
to make a disposition other than he himself wills." Id.
See as illustrative examples of cases focusing on the character of the means of influence,
In re Reddaway's Estate, 214 Or. 410, 329 P.2d 886 (1958); In re Estate of Swenson,
617 P.2d 305 (1980).
250. Page on Wills, supra note 178, § 184, at 368-69.
251. Id. §§ 186-87, at 372-81. See also Green, supra note 234, which examines the
relationship of the traditional legal concepts.
252. J. Dukeminier & S. Johanson, Wills, Trusts, and Estates 477 (3d ed. 1984)
[hereinafter Dukeminier]. In deFuria, Testamentary Gifts from Client to the Attorney-
Draftsman: From Probate Presumption to Ethical Prohibition, 66 Neb. L. Rev. 695, 697
(1987), the author comments: "The concept of 'undue influence' in probate law resists
simplistic definition, primarily because it is an amorphous term used to characterize
particular acts or conduct by someone other than the testator which improperly influence
a testamentary disposition. The term is easier to recognize than to define."
In Comment, Undue Influence-Judicial Implementation of Social Policy, 1968 Wis.
L. Rev. 569, 569 (1968), the author opines: "Due to the circumstantial nature of the
evidence presented, the wide variety of factors considered, and the difficulty of evaluating
and weighing each factor, the doctrine suffers from confused and not easily applied
guidelines."
253. In re Will of Coley, 53 N.C. App. 318, 321, 280 S.E.2d 770, 772 (1981). See
also Rein-Francovich, An Ounce of Prevention: Grounds for Upsetting Wills and Will
Substitutes, 20 Gonz. L. Rev. 1 (1984-85).
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In many jurisdictions, the question of whether undue influence exists is
to be determined by a jury.2 54
Courts traditionally recite four elements of undue influence: "(1) a
testator susceptible to influence; (2) an opportunity to influence; (3) a
disposition to influence (meaning a willingness to use any means, fair
or foul, to obtain the coveted result); and (4) a result which appears
to be the product of undue influence. '255 As to the first element, there
is the logical connection between capacity and undue influence. Even
though undue influence presupposes the minimum capacity to execute
a will, the character and degree of mental capacity above the minimum
that the testator possesses is extremely important. 2 6 It is much easier
to influence a weakened mind, than a firm and sound one. The op-
portunity to influence may result from a confidential relationship that
254. In Louisiana under La. Code Civ. P. art. 1732(3), as amended by 1988 La. Acts
No. 147, § 1, there is no trial by jury in probate proceedings. Comment (c) to La. Code
Civ. P. art. 1733 (renumbered Art. 1732 in 1983) provided:
The probate provision of Art. 1733 (3) is the customary Louisiana practice....
Of course, if a direct action were brought against .. .the succession proceeding
itself [it] would not be governed by this limitation. On the other hand, a
succession creditor could assert his right by an opposition rather than a direct
action, and in such cases he would waive his right to a jury trial.
See also Fellows v. Fellows, 220 La. 407, 56 So. 2d 733 (1951).
According to Dukeminier, supra note 252, at 169: "The well-documented tendency of
juries to rewrite a will in accordance with their idea of what is a fair distribution, rather
than testing the will's validity according to the court's instructions, makes these cases
fertile ground for will contests." In deFuria, Testamentary Gifts Resulting from Mere-
tricious Relationships: Undue Influence or Natural Beneficence?, 64 Notre Dame L. Rev.
200, 201 n.7 (1989), Professor deFuria states: "According to one study done some years
ago, not only do juries find for the contestant in over 750o of will contests submitted
to them, but trial judges rarely withdraw cases from their consideration, or interfere with
jury verdicts. See Comment, Will Contests on Trial, 6 Stan. L. Rev. 91 (1953). See also
Jaworski, The Will Contest, 10 Baylor L. Rev. 87, 88 (1958)." See Hassell v. Pruner,
286 S.W. 2d 266 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1956). See also Sherman, Undue Influence
and the Homosexual Testator, 42 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 225, 228 (1981) and In re Huber's
Will, 103 Misc. 599, 170 N.Y.S. 901 (Sup. Ct. 1918), aff'd, 199 A.D. 882, 175 N.Y.S.
906 (App. Div. 1919).
As an alternative solution to the increasing complexity in will contests, one author
suggested eliminating juries in these disputes: "One alternative is to have will contests
tried to the court. The right to jury trials in will contests was created by statute, and is
mandated by neither the United States Constitution nor the Illinois Constitution." Mason
and Weisbard, 16 John Marshall L. Rev. 499, 521-22 (1983).
255. Rein-Francovich, supra note 253, at 35. These elements are called the four
categories approach. Note, Undue Influence in Wills-Evidence-Testators' Position Changes
After In re Will of Ferrill, 13 N.M.L. Rev. 753, 758 n.28 (1983). Page on Wills, supra
note 178, §§ 183-94, at 363-92; G. Thompson, The Law of Wills §§ 142-48, at 223-33
(3d ed. 1947).
256. Page on Wills, supra note 178, § 185, at 370. See also Green, supra note 234;
Rein-Francovich, supra note 253.
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exists between the testator and the person exercising the influence.257 In
fact in some jurisdictions, the confidential relationship combined with
suspicious circumstances gives rise to a presumption of undue influence. 218
The third element concentrates on the motivations of the party exercising
the influence. 2 9 In assessing proof of the fourth element, many com-
257. Examples of confidential relationships include doctor-patient, nurse-companion
and patient, and pastor-parishioner. Rein-Francovich, supra note 253, at 42.
Compare La. Civ. Code art. 1489 (doctors and ministers; relative incapacity to receive).
There is a question as to whether Article 1489 should be repealed. It in essence was a
statutory exception to La. Civ. Code art. 1492 as the law simply prohibited doctors and
ministers from receiving either donations inter vivos or mortis causa from the donor
during his last illness. The law recognized that the donor or testator might be vulnerable
to influence from one with whom he had such a confidential relationship. With the repeal
of Article 1492 there may no longer be a need for La. Civ. Code art. 1489.
Attorney-client relationships have also been considered confidential. See deFuria, supra
note 252; Blank, Problem Areas in Will Drafting under New York Law, 56 St. John's
L. Rev. 459 (1982). In Louisiana, see Gibson v. Succession of Gumbel, 333 So. 2d 340
(La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 338 So. 2d 111 (1976). Louisiana State Bar Association's
Model Rule 1.8(c) reads: "A lawyer shall not prepare an instrument giving the lawyer
or a person related to the lawyer as parent, child, sibling, or spouse any substantial gift
from a client, including a testamentary gift, except where the client is related to the
donee." DeFuria urges an even stricter rule such that under no circumstances may an
attorney draft a will for a client and be named a beneficiary.
Another relationship sometimes considered confidential is a meretricious one. See deFuria,
supra note 254. This relationship has, however, been distinguished from that of a spouse,
which has caused at least one commentator to ask why:
[Clourts often assert that a wife is allowed greater freedom than others in
urging the testator to make a will in accordance with her wishes-that conduct
which would amount to undue influence in the case of someone other than a
spouse is permissible in the case of a spouse. Why this should be so is not
immediately apparent.
Sherman, supra note 254, at 230.
258. Rein-Francovich, supra note 253, at 39. "Most courts require the substantial gift
and the existence of a confidential relationship coupled with evidence of the influencer's
participation in preparing or procuring the will." Id. at 40.
See also Blank, supra note 257, at 478 n.75; deFuria, supra note 252, at 695-96; Jarratt,
Estates, Trusts and Wills, 43 Mont. L. Rev. 295, 298 (1982); Note, supra note 255, at
756-58; Mason and Weisbard, supra note 254, at 515-22.
In deFuria, supra note 254, at 203 n.17, the author observes that confidential rela-
tionships usually include an element of unequal bargaining power between the parties and
such relationships may include those that are familial and intimate. Fiduciary or confidential
relationships include "any significant degree of practical domination and dependence
between the proponent and the testator." Mason and Weisbard, supra note 254, at 516;
Sherman, supra note 254.
See also In re Estate of Harris, 539 So. 2d 1040 (Miss. 1989), where the beneficiary
was required to overcome the presumption of undue influence by clear and convincing
evidence; Haynes v. First Nat'l State Bank, 87 N.J. 163, 432 A.2d 890 (1981).
259. "Some courts have downplayed the destruction of the testator's free agency and
focused instead on the impropriety of the influencer's conduct." Rein-Francovich, supra
note 253, at 33. The Oregon Supreme Court summarized this position in In re Reddaway's
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mentators admit that the fact-finder in many instances will be influenced
by the unnaturalness of the disposition. If a testator disposes of property
to other than the natural objects of his bounty, his spouse or children,
juries in particular tend "to rewrite a will in accordance with their idea
of what is a fair distribution. '260 "[Fireedom of testation has always
been tempered by notions of fairness, justice, and especially morality. 2 6
Estate, 214 Or. 410, 419, 329 P.2d 886, 890 (1958): "The question is, has the influencer
by his conduct gained an unfair advantage by devices which reasonable men regard as
improper?" See also In re Estate of Swenson, 617 P.2d 305, 306 (1980).
260. Dukeminier, supra note 252, at 169. The example of such unnatural dispositions
given in the text is a disposition in which the testator "cuts off heirs in favor of a friend
or a charity or gives some children a larger testate share than other children." Id.
Interestingly enough, another example of a scenario where there is likely to be a will
contest is "the 'divided family' situation in which there is a second spouse and children
by a former marriage." Id. at 168-69. According to the authors, "[i]f the testator leaves
the bulk of his estate to the spouse, this may produce a challenge by the embittered
children against the disposition in favor of the second wife." Id. at 169.
T. Atkinson, Law of Wills 139-40 (2d ed. 1953):
When juries pass upon these issues, they doubtless let the unnatural provisions
of the will influence their decision. Sympathy for the children may interfere
with an impartial verdict. Even trial judges may be somewhat influenced by
these considerations. Legislatures and appellate courts assert stoutly the principle
of testamentary freedom and text-writers repeat it in the clearest language, but
trial courts and particularly juries continue to deny it in their decisions. This
is a factor not capable of measurement but almost everyone is realist enough
to recognize its existence and importance.
For a practical example, see Hassell v. Pruner, 286 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1956).
Jaworski, The Will Contest, 10 Baylor L. Rev. 87, 88 (1958):
A fundamental truth to be borne in mind in writing a will is that the average
jury, upon reviewing a will, is visited with a strong temptation to rewrite it in
accordance with the jury's idea of what is fair and right rather than testing its
validity according to the instructions of the court. The juror, although quite
conscientious, has great difficulty refraining from substituting his own judgment
for that of the testator and at times, especially in cases involving distributions
considered prima facie unnatural, is inclined to show a marked sympathy for
the contestant.
See also Sherman, supra note 254, at 228 n.21.
261. Comment, supra note 252. DeFuria states: "It becomes more meaningful to
consider the notion of undue influence as a necessary judicial doctrine permitting courts
to implement social policy by making judgments as to what degree of influence is proper
or improper." DeFuria, supra note 254, at 200.
Essentially, pretermitted children statutes in some jurisdictions address the same problem.
See, e.g., Alcock, Estates and Trusts, 13 N.M.L. Rev. 395, 401 (1983). The New Mexico
statute provides:
If a testator fails to name or provide in his will for any of his children born
or adopted before or after the execution of his will, the omitted child or his
issue receives a share in the estate equal in value to that which he would have
received if the testator had died intestate unless: (1) it appears from the will
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Today, legal systems in the other forty-nine states consider directly or
indirectly the effect of such influences upon the ultimate disposition of
the testator, and Louisiana law should in the future at least draw
distinctions between the means of influence-i.e., fraudulent versus non-
fraudulent. Thus, the perceived historical difference in approach of
common law systems and that of Louisiana-one emphasizing the effect
of the influence, the other emphasizing the means of influence262-has
waned, if not disappeared.
Social Costs of the Repeal of Article 1492
Obviously, there will be an increased number of will contests in
Louisiana, if for no other reason than the repeal of the explicit pro-
hibition against offering proof of captation. Furthermore, the child who
is no longer a forced heir is faced with the prospect of receiving nothing
if a parent disinherits him by simply writing a will that does not include
him. Because this creates an all or nothing proposition, the excluded
relative has an incentive to litigate. The costs attendant to litigation
fomented by undue influence allegations has been described in the fol-
lowing terms:
As a result, such trials generally represent unrestricted fishing
expeditions into the life, the inner thoughts and the intimate
personal relations of the decedent . . . . The family's right of
privacy, the decent respect due to the dead do not avail. Estates
are consumed with fees and expenses, costs being but rarely
imposed upon unsuccessful contestants. Courts are congested
with fruitless litigation . . . . The delays in probate occasioned
by groundless contests often result in depreciation, waste or
complete disappearance of valuable assets of the estate.
2 63
In litigation in which the opponents of the will are successful, there is
the ultimate irony-the deceased, who wished to disinherit his children,
dies intestate. Hence, rather than receiving no more than one-half of
his estate under the laws of forced heirship, the children will take it
all. 264
Section 4 of Act 788: Effective Date and Transitional Provisions
Section 4 of Act 788 contains the effective date and transitional
provisions. The Act becomes effective July 1, 1990. Because it enacts
that the omission was intentional. ...
N. M. Stat. Ann. § 45-2-302 A(l) (1978). See discussion in Laflin and Eisenberg, Estates
and Trusts, 14 N.M.L. Rev. 153, 156 (1984). Cf. La. Civ. Code art. 1705. See generally,
T. Atkinson, supra note 260, at 138-45.
262. See supra notes 248-49.
263. Cahn, supra note 171, at 517-18.
264. La. Civ. Code art. 888.
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substantive law and the legislature did not express an intent to make
it retroactive, it applies prospectively only. 265 The new law is thus in-
applicable to the succession of a decedent who died prior to the effective
date of the Act. 266
For decedents dying on or after July 1, 1990, things become more
complicated. Section 4, rather than stating that the new law applies to
the successions of decedents who die on or after the effective date,
specifically makes the new law applicable to testaments written on or
after the effective date. What law is to be applied, then, when the
decedent has died after the effective date but has made donations inter
vivos or has made his will prior to the effective date? If Act 788 had
said nothing specific on this point, arguably the new law would apply
because courts tend to apply the law in effect at the decedent's death
to determine the validity of dispositions in his will. 267 However, with
respect to testaments written before the effective date, section 4 states:
The provisions of this Act shall not apply to, confirm, ratify,
validate or invalidate any provision of any testament executed
prior to July 1, 1990, regardless of the date of the testator's
death. Specifically the provisions of the Act does [sic] not change
the determination of the forced portion or disposable portion
of any testament executed prior to July 1, 1990.
This section, though broadly worded, is not an attempt to "grandfather"
all children who would have been forced heirs under the old law so
that they would remain forced heirs after the new law came into effect.
A proposed amendment to do so was rejected by the House of Rep-
resentatives. 26 Instead, the legislature was concerned specifically about
the effect of the new law on the interpretation of some testaments made
prior to the effective date of the new law. For example, a testator who
did not intend to disinherit his children over twenty-three and wanted
265. La. Civ. Code art. 6.
266. Only rarely does the legislature seek to make new law applicable to successions
of decedents who died before the new law became effective. Since an heir succeeds to
his inheritance immediately upon the death of the decedent, due process objections would
be raised were the legislature at a later date to try to rearrange or modify the already
acquired rights of inheritance. The usual way to satisfy the due process objection when
the legislature seeks to apply new law to old situations is to provide a statutory "grace
period" during which those whose rights would be adversely affected by the new law can
make their claims under the old law. E.g., La. R.S. 9:5630(B) (1983) (1981 amendment
shortened prescription on unrecognized heir's claim against third person who took title
from recognized heirs). The absence of any grace period in Act 788 is further evidence
that no retroactive effect was intended.
267. See Succession of Stewart, 301 So. 2d 872 (La. 1974) (validity of testament
establishing a trust determined by law in effect at time of settlor's death).
268. 42 Journal of the Louisiana House of Representatives (daily ed. June 27, 1989).
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them to have the amount of property that would have been their legitime
at the time the will was executed might have phrased the legacy he
intended them to have as "the legitime." Or he might simply have left
the "disposable portion" to a stranger, intending that the legitime as
he then knew it would go to his children no matter how old they were.
The legislature did not want these wills to be interpreted, once the new
law went into effect, as leaving nothing to the children over twenty-
three who would no longer have a legitime. Thus by means of section
4, the legislature made the old law apply to these "old" wills so that
the children over twenty-three would not be disinherited contrary to the
testator's intent.
Disinherison of children without cause is a most serious matter; if
it is going to be permitted, the legislature was right to provide a safeguard
against inadvertent or unintended disinherison at least for wills written
before July 1, 1990. To accomplish the safeguard against unintentional
disinherison in pre-July 1, 1990 wills, the legislature needed only to have
given a transitional rule of interpretation of these wills. The rule should
have specified that when the intention of the testator to disinherit his
children is not clear, as when he leaves them their "legitime" in a pre-
July 1, 1990 will, the old law would apply. If the legislature wished to
discourage litigation in these instances, it should also have declared that
extrinsic evidence of the testator's intent to disinherit the children over
twenty-three would not be allowed. 269 Had the legislature followed this
approach, the children over twenty-three would take according to the
old law unless the testator's pre-July 1, 1990 will clearly expressed his
intention to leave as little to his children as the law permitted, including
nothing.
Section 4, however, goes beyond a rule of interpretation for old
wills that do not express an intent to disinherit children over twenty-
three. It applies the old law to old wills regardless of the testator's
intent. Under section 4, the old law will be applicable to a pre-July 1,
1990 testament even though the testament does express an intent to
disinherit. For example, section 4 makes the old law applicable to a
will that disposes of all the decedent's property to his spouse or a
stranger, and even though the will expresses an intention to leave nothing
to the children. Furthermore, if after the enactment of Act 788 but
prior to July 1, 1990, a testator executes his will disinheriting his children
over twenty-three in anticipation of the Act's becoming effective, the
old law will apply to his will even though the testator dies after July
1, 1990. Thus section 4 means that if the testator does not execute or
269. The analogous situation in other states is that of the pretermitted child. Some
states permit no extrinsic evidence to be introduced to show that the omission of the
child was intentional, while others permit extrinsic evidence. Dukeminier, supra note 252.
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re-execute his will after July 1, 1990, he will not have effectively dis-
inherited his children over twenty-three despite his obvious intention to
leave them as little as the law required, including nothing. The way
section 4 is written, when there is a testament executed prior to July
1, 1990 the children over twenty-three are "grandfathered" as forced
heirs at least with respect to the property left at death. While it may
not be a problem for most testators who wish to disinherit their children
over twenty-three to execute or re-execute their wills after July 1, 1990,
some testators may lack capacity at that time. Others may think their
previous wills already address the issue by referring to an anticipated
change in the law or by making dispositions consistent with the change.
Common sense would not alert them to the fact that they must execute
new wills to effectuate exactly what their wills already say. The "in-
terpretation" approach, as opposed to the "grandfather" approach,
would have avoided this problem.
Applying Law Inconsistently to Donations Inter Vivos
When the old law is applicable because of a pre-July 1, 1990, will,
another problem arises due to section 4's silence with respect to inter
vivos donations. Section 4 is framed in terms of the forced portion "of
any testament," rather than "of any succession of a decedent who has
made a testament prior to July 1, 1990." The Louisiana Civil Code
provides only one way of calculating the legitime and disposable portion,
the rule of Article 1505, which provides that the legitime and disposable
portion are calculated upon an active mass consisting of the property
left at death plus the value of the inter vivos donations minus the
debts. 270 Furthermore, donations inter vivos are reducible after the prop-
erty included in the testamentary donations has been exhausted. 271 Both
kinds of donations are thus linked within the concept of forced heirship
as it exists in the Louisiana Civil Code, even as amended by Act 788.
But did the legislature intend, by speaking of the forced portion "of
any testament," that in transitional situations the forced portion would
be calculated only upon the property left at death?
Curious results will follow if the old law is not applied both to the
donations inter vivos as well as the testamentary donations when the
decedent has made a will prior to July 1, 1990. For example, suppose
that the decedent, who has made donations inter vivos, has a child
under twenty-three and a child over twenty-three. If the will, written
270. Succession of Gomez, 226 La. 1092, 78 So. 2d 411 (1955). Some inter vivos
donations and gratuities are, of course, excluded from the active mass by legislative
exception, e.g., La. Civ. Code arts. 1502, 1505(c) and (d); La. R.S. 9:2372 and 2354
(Supp. 1990). These continue to be excluded.
271. La. Civ. Code art. 1507.
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prior to July 1, 1990, disposes to a stranger all the property the decedent
has at death, the calculation of the forced portion of the child over
twenty-three would involve only the property left at death; however,
unless the transitional rule changes the normal calculation of the forced
portion also for the child whose status as forced heir is unaffected by
the new law, the calculation of the forced portion of the child under
twenty-three would be based on the active mass consisting of the value
of the inter vivos donations plus the property left at death. This in-
consistent application of donation inter vivos rules would in effect create
two active masses. Presumably, only the property included in each child's
active mass would be subject to reduction by that child.
On the other hand, if the old law applied without exception to pre-
July 1, 1990 donations inter vivos, when the decedent disposed of all
his property by will after that date, the inter vivos donations would be
subject to reduction by his children over twenty-three even though the
testamentary donations would not be. One solution for testate successions
would have been to make the old law applicable to inter vivos donations
only when the old law is applicable to testamentary donations. Thus,
when the old law is applicable to a will written prior to July 1, 1990,
the donations inter vivos should be included in the active mass and be
subject to reduction. This is probably how a court would interpret the
transitional provision to avoid using two active masses or restricting the
legitime of the child under twenty-three to testamentary assets in the
situation described above.
Should all donations inter vivos, regardless of when made, or only
those inter vivos donations made prior to July 1, 1990, be included in
the active mass whenever the old law is applicable to a will? If the
"interpretation" approach had been used in the statute, then all do-
nations would be included because presumably the testator would have
intended the children to receive the legitime as he knew it under Article
1505. Under the "grandfathering" approach actually used, arguably the
post-July 1, 1990 donations inter vivos should not be included because
if the decedent had made the same post-July 1, 1990 donations by will
instead of by donation inter vivos, the donations would not have been
subject to the claims of children over twenty-three. Once again, unless
all donations are included, there will be two different active masses
whenever a testator has both a child over and a child under twenty-
three: the former's active mass would only include donations inter vivos
made prior to July 1, 1990, while the latter's would include all donations
as per Article 1505.
Problematic Issues Resulting From Unanticipated Situations
Had the legislature been thorough in guarding against unintentional
disinherison it would have considered two other situations. The first is
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that of unintentional disinherison by inter vivos donation when the
succession is intestate. Under section 4, there must be a will in order
for the old law to be applicable. Suppose prior to July 1, 1990 a
decedent made inter vivos gifts to strangers on the assumption that his
children would either receive their legitime from the property he would
leave at death or be able to reduce the inter vivos donations. If the
decedent dies intestate after July 1, 1990 and leaves negligible property
at death, should the children over twenty-three be considered disinherited
with respect to the inter vivos gifts? Under section 4 they are disinherited
even though if the same donations had been made by a will executed
prior to July 1, 1990, they would not be disinherited because the do-
nations by a pre-July 1, 1990 will would be reducible. Perhaps the
legislature should have stated that for pre-July 1, 1990 inter vivos
donations, there is a presumption that the decedent did not intend to
disinherit his children over twenty-three; consequently, if he dies intestate,
these gifts would be reducible by them if there is no evidence to rebut
the presumption.
Second, some kind of safeguard against unintentional disinherison
should have been provided even for wills written after July 1, 1990.
After all, almost all the other states, even though they do not embrace
forced heirship, at least have pretermitted child statutes to guard against
unintentional disinherison. About half of the states protect children who
are alive when the will was written, not just children born after the
will was written, by giving them the share they would have received in
intestacy when they have not been mentioned in the will. 272 Louisiana
would thus not have been alone had it required a testator to express
his intention to disinherit his child over twenty-three, and the requirement
would have been consistent with the existing requirement of express
disinherison by a parent who has grounds to disinherit a forced heir. 273
V. SECTION 5 OF ACT 788
A Cryptic Provision
It is true that the Legislature is not lightly presumed to do vain
and useless things, but section 5 of Act 788 comes perilously close.
Notwithstanding the statement in section 4 that the effective date of
the Act is July 1, 1990, and its further admonition that the Act "shall
not apply to, confirm, ratify, validate or invalidate any provision of
any testament executed prior to July 1, 1990," section 5 provides:
272. Dukeminier, supra note 252, at 448.
273. When a parent has grounds to disinherit a child under twenty-three or a seriously
incapacitated child, the disinherison must nevertheless be express. La. Civ. Code art. 1624.
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The provisions of this Act shall not invalidate the terms or
conditions of any act of donation or assignment of rights,
including any rights of reversion contained therein with respect
to property acquired by children from a parent and donated or
transferred by them to a surviving parent prior to July 1, 1990.
One must wonder how the Act could "invalidate the terms or conditions"
of completed acts of donation and why the legislature felt the need to
express particular concern for "any rights of reversion contained therein."
Retroactivity
The legislature's apparent concern about the retroactive application
of Act 788 is misplaced. It is generally understood that laws are not
given retroactive effect. 274 There are, of course, exceptions to the rule;
specifically laws that are remedial or procedural in character are applied
retroactively.2 75 Act 788, however, is undoubtedly substantive in nature,
and thus falls squarely under the general rule. Even so, assuming ar-
guendo that Act 788 could be applied retroactively, it is unlikely that
it could adversely affect previously-made donations. Prior donations
could be affected if Act 788 diminished the portion available to donees
by increasing the forced portion or otherwise giving broader rights to
forced heirs; 276 but to the contrary, it limits the class of forced heirs
without increasing the forced portion. It seems unnecessary for the
legislature to protect previously acquired rights that are not threatened
by Act 788. The donees can only profit from its enactment.
Rights of Reversion
The unqualified reference in section 5 to "rights of reversion," as
though it is an established category of rights having well-defined inter-
relationships within the Codal scheme, is further evidence that section
274. La. Civ. Code art. 6 codifies the rule relative to retroactivity:
In the absence of contrary legislative expression, substantive laws apply pro-
spectively only. Procedural and interpretative laws apply both prospectively and
retroactively, unless there is a legislative expression to the contrary.
See also Anthony v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 480 So. 2d 440 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1985), writ denied, 482 So. 2d 628 (1986); Green v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 352 So. 2d
366 (La. App. 4th 1977), writ denied, 354 So. 2d 210 (1978).
275. For an illustration of the remedial rule given retrospective application see Savoie
v. Savoie, 482 So. 2d 23 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1986) (pension plan); for an illustration of
an interpreting or clarifying rule given retrospective effect see Brodnax v. Cappel, 425
So. 2d 232 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982) (overruled by Kahl v. Baudoin, 449 So. 2d 1334
(La. 1984)), see also Pounds v. Schori, 377 So. 2d 1195 (La. 1979).
276. The action for reduction of excessive donations would lie in favor of a forced
heir to recover the legitime. An increase in the forced portion would therefore increase
the possibility that an action for reduction would lie. La. Civ. Code arts. 1503-1518.
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5 is not a solemn, well-conceived, highly-consequential provision. There
are several such rights, each serving distinct purposes, none of which
implicates forced heirship. A quick scan will suffice here.
Louisiana Civil Code article 897 provides for the "legal return" of
property from the donee to the donor under certain circumstances. The
legal return is implicit in every donation of immovable property to a
descendant if the donee-descendant 1) dies without posterity, and 2) the
property is found in the succession. If the donee has disposed of the
property, either by onerous title or by gratuitous act inter vivos or
mortis causa, the return fails. 277 The legal return is traceable to early
Germanic law, which regarded a gratuitous transfer as conditional, that
is, the property passed from the donee to his heirs only if the donee
survived the donor. Thus, if the donor survived the donee, the thing
given was returned to the donor. 271
Article 1534 permits the donor explicitly to reserve the return of
the thing given in case the donee, or the donee and his descendants,
predeceases the donor. This right of return, called the "conventional
return" in contradistinction to the "legal return" discussed above, may
be stipulated in favor of the donor alone.2 79 The effect of this right of
return is to dissolve the donation retroactively so that the thing given
returns to the donor free of alienations or encumbrances.
Article 1560 permits revocation of donations inter vivos for ingrat-
itude. The Civil Code provides three causes for revocation, each involving
acts of the donee against the donor: 1) attempting to take the life of
the donor, 2) cruel treatment of the donor, and 3) refusing the donor
food if he is in distress. The action, which is said to be "punitive" in
nature, is personal to the donor and can only be invoked against the
donee, not his heirs. 210 If the donee has alienated the property, the
action will not lie against the transferee.
Article 1568 authorizes revocation in the instance of non-performance
of a charge imposed. Because the donor may impose any charge he
wishes, 28 ' a donation subject to a charge becomes revocable if the donee
277. The legal return applies when the object given is "found in the succession." A
disposition mortis causa vests the property in the legatee at the instant of the testator's
death, thus the property is no longer "found in the succession." La. Civ. Code art. 897;
Succession of Christensen, 248 So. 2d 45 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ refused, 252 So. 2d
451 (1971).
278. 3 J. Brissaud, History of French Private Law § 458, at 646-47 (1912).
279. A stipulation of the return in favor of one other than the donor has the earmarks
of a prohibited substitution, which is a nullity under La. Civ. Code art. 1520. See 11
Aubry & Rau, 3 Droit Civil Francais No. 700, at 364-65 (6th ed. La. St. L. Inst. trans.
1969).
280. See generally Perry v. Perry, 507 So. 2d 881 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied,
512 So. 2d 465 (1987); II Aubry & Rau, supra note 279, No. 708, at 403-15.
281. La. Civ. Code art. 1527; L. Oppenheim, supra note 236, § 199, at 301.
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fails to fulfill the condition.28 2 This action, brought by the donor or
his heirs, will lie against the donee, his heirs, and his donees. As with
revocation for ingratitude, if the donee has alienated the thing by onerous
title, it cannot be claimed in the hands of a third party transferee. 283
Article 1565, concerning the dissolution of a donation inter vivos
"of right" if it is made subject to a suspensive condition that can no
longer be accomplished, and Article 1740, providing for nullity of a
donation made in contemplation of a marriage that does not occur, are
not, strictly speaking, "rights of reversion." If the condition imposed
is suspensive and does not take place, the donation falls automatically-
no judicial declaration of dissolution is needed. But if the condition is
potestative, a judicial decree of non-fulfillment is required. 284
Relevance of Rights of Reversion to Forced Heirship
Some of these rights of reversion and the corresponding obligations
may exist in the patrimonies of persons who are coincidentally also
forced heirs, but those rights exist in the patrimonies of others as well.
Forced heirship is not the common theme of these various rights of
reversion. It is entirely conceivable that the legislature, in section 5,
wanted to single out one or more of these rights only insofar as forced
heirs are involved, and assure their survival after the forced-heirship
curtailment. But because none of the purposes of the rights of reversion
seem frustrated by the new approach, the effort to protect them from
an unintentional subversion seems quixotic.
Puzzled by the apparent irrelevance of section 5, the writer inves-
tigated and discovered a clue that is hardly legislative history, but
interesting nonetheless. The rescue of "rights of reversion" by section
5 was inspired by the prodding of a legislator whose sense of the
typicality in his own family situation was exquisite. 285 Consider the
following hypothetical.
282. Board of Trustees of Columbia Road Methodist Episcopal Church of Bogalusa
v. Richardson, 216 La. 633, 44 So. 2d 321 (1949); Orleans Parish School Board v. Manson,
241 La. 1029, 132 So. 2d 885 (1961); Hero v. City of New Orleans, 135 So. 2d 87 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1961).
283. La. Civ. Code art. 1568. It can be recovered from a third party transferee by
gratuitous title.
284. When the condition can no longer be accomplished the donation is dissolved "of
right." La. Civ. Code art. 1565. If, however, the fulfillment of the condition depends
solely on the will of the donee the dissolution must be "sued for and decreed judicially."
La. Civ. Code art. 1566.
285. Telephone interview of Representative John Travis, September 11, 1989 by Pro-
fessor Picou.
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Following the death of one parent, the children-all over age twenty-
three-donate their interest in the succession to the surviving parent. 28 6
The donor-children believe that the property thus donated will in due
course return to them via intestate or testate succession at the death of
the donee-parent. Although the legal return will not apply and the donor-
children do not stipulate the conventional return, they nonetheless er-
roneously believe that their status as forced heirs gives them a "right
of return," in effect, of at least a portion of the donated property
upon the death of the donee-parent in the form of the legitime. 2 7
It is apparently this "right of reversion" that the legislation sought
to protect. Section 5 does not, of course, afford such protection. In
the absence of the protection afforded by forced heirship, descendants
who have previously donated property in the circumstances described
above have no defacto "right of return" to any portion of the property
thus donated, as forced heirs.288 Thus Act 788 does have a flavor of
retroactivity in that the rights of donors who were formerly forced heirs
are altered by the redefinition of forced heirship; and the Act's concern
for "rights of reversion" makes a certain amount of common sense.
In sum, section 5 is probably useless because Act 788 has no direct
effect on acts of donation other than to protect them by eliminating
some actions for reduction. However, given the underlying motive for
section 5-admittedly not ascertainable without the aid of its author's
explanation-the section illustrates the existence of undebated, and per-
haps unsuspected, results of the legislation.
286. A donation might occur in the form of a renunciation made in favor of one
who was not otherwise entitled to take by accretion. La. Civ. Code arts. 1003, 1022.
287. With the elimination of the right of revindication of donated immovable property
in the hands of onerous third party transferees and the amendments to Civil Code article
1505, that excluded retirement benefits payable to named beneficiaries under governmental
plans and certain private plans from the active mass calculation, there were already serious
inroads on the forced heir's protection from gratuitous transfer of the legitime. Additional
methods available to divert the legitime are: life insurance, La. R.S. 22:645 and, perhaps
U.S. Saving Bonds. See Osterland v. Gates, 400 So. 2d 653 (La. 1981); Succession of
Guerre, 197 So. 2d 738 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 199 So. 2d 925 (1967) (U.S.
Saving Bonds, subject to reduction if excessive); see also Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663,
82 S. Ct. 1089 (1962) and Yiatchos v. Yiatchos, 376 U.S. 306, 84 S. Ct. 742 (1964).
288.. Although the hoped for return of the property thus donated is not a legally
enforceable right, it is certainly an expectancy entitled to some consideration in the
legislative undoing of forced heirship.
The term "right" in expectancy was one of art at early Germanic law referring to the
"collective right of the members of the household, . . . [which] made it impossible for
the head of the community, the house-lord ("Hausherr"), to dispose of the collective
estate by his individual act." 4 R. Huebner, History of Germanic Private Law § 42, at
305 (1918).
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VI. DISINHERISON AND RECONCILIATION
The principal means of mitigating, indirectly, some of the results
of forced heirship, which all would agree to be harsh-for example,
when a forced heir is entitled to receive a forced portion even though
he engages in flagrant misconduct, thus forfeiting any morally merito-
rious claim he might otherwise have advanced-has been the testator's
power of disinherison. Thus it is to be expected that when those dis-
favoring forced heirship in general, finding harshness in its very existence,
hold sway in legislative halls, the power of disinherison, i.e., "freedom
of testation," will be correspondingly augmented. To achieve this goal,
the Louisiana Legislature amended Article 1624 in 1989.289 The 1989
legislation understandably amended Article 1624 as follows:
The testator shall express in the will for what reasons he dis-
inherited his forced heirs or any of them, and the forced heir
so disinherited is obligated to prove that the cause stipulated
for disinherison did not exist or that he was reconciled with the
testator after the act of circumstance alleged to constitute the
cause for disinherison.
Proof that he was reconciled with the testator after the act or
circumstance alleged to constitute the cause for disinherison must
be clear and unequivocal, evidenced in writing and signed by
the testator.
Section 2.
This act shall become effective upon signature by the governor
or upon lapse of time for bills to become law without signature
by the governor, but shall apply to all testaments executed before
and after the effective date hereof, provided that the death of
the testator occurs after the effective date hereof.
Historical Perspective
Although it seems that opponents of forced heirship held sway across
the board in the 1989 legislative session, the recent amendments to the
Civil Code, when viewed in historical perspective, are less fearsome to
the devotees of forced heirship than at first appear. Though most of
what follows relevant to the history of the institution of forced heirship
has been portrayed elsewhere it is hoped that viewing the history from
the focus of disinherison may furnish insight, gained from the experiences
of other peoples in other times, on this most recent legislative movement.
What has been touted as a modernization and liberalization of Louisiana
289. 1989 La. Acts Nos. 82 and 367. The acts are identical except for an additional
comma in Act No. 82.
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law may in reality be little more than a retrogression from the family-
oriented society of earlier times. For this seems to be but another turn
in what has even been "an oscillation between the owner's complete
freedom to dispose of his own by last will, and the family's claims
upon the property of its member. ' ' 29° This account is thus little more
than an account of forced heirship told from the perspective of disin-
herison.
Roman Law
The concept of disposing of property by will dates back to the
earliest period of reliably recorded Roman history. 29' Indeed, it has been
said that "at Rome no honorable citizen dies without having made his
will. '292 Although children were first in line in intestate rules, freedom
of testation was virtually absolute: other than satisfying requirements
of form, the testator needed only to express in testamentary form his
desire to exclude his children. 293 No mention of the reason for the
disinheritance was required.
By the beginning of the Early Roman Empire, limitation on dis-
inherison had arisen in the form of the action querela inofficiosi tes-
tamenti. This action was founded on the premise that one who chose
to totally exclude descendants presumptively did not have the capacity
to make a will because such an act was contrary to natural paternal
sentiments. Technically, a successful claimant could have the will voided
as being the product of an unsound mind, although this was not always
the case. Some wills were left partly effective. 294
The querela could be dismissed if there were just cause for the
exclusion of the child, but the claimant had the burden of proving that
the cause was unjust. A determination of the legal sufficiency of the
cause shown was then somewhat within the discretion of the judge, as
there were no prescribed grounds for disinherison. 29 The querela was
290. Id. § 112, at 752.
291. Professor Radin writes: "Now, we must assume that at Rome, also, there was
a period that preceded the existence of wills, when all decedents were necessarily intestate.
All over the Mediterranean, wills are known to have been introduced at a definite time.
But, at Rome, that time lies before any period of reliably recorded history." M. Radin,
supra note 18, at 399.
292. 3 J. Brissaud, supra note 278, § 445, at 621. Professor Dainow attributes the
Roman predeliction to testation to a desire to perpetuate the family cult, the "sacra"
rather than to the desire for disposition of property. See Dainow, The Early Sources of
Forced Heirship; Its History in Texas and Louisiana, 4 La. L. Rev. 42, 44-45 (1941).
293. L. Oppenheim, supra note 236, at 141.
294. W. Buckland, A Text-book of Roman Law From Augustus to Justinian, at 327
(1921). Dainow, supra note 292, at 49.
295. R. Sohm, Institutes of Roman Law § 113, at 558 (1901).
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barred after only five years from the date of death, because it "implied
a slur on the personal character of the testator. ' '2
96
The querela was limited by Justinian. The action was available
thereafter only to those claimants who had received nothing under the
will; if a claimant had been given anything, however small, the querela
would not lie. Instead, an action to increase the legacy to the statutory
amount, the action ad supplendam legitiman,2 97 was the appropriate
remedy.
While curtailing the power of an heir to void the will, Justinian,
in the late Empire, also limited the power of testation by further in-
creasing the statutory amount-the legitime or legal share-to one-third
if three or fewer children survived, and one-half if four or more.
Moreover, disinherison, although still permitted, was limited to statutorily
defined causes, which the testator was required to specify in the will. 29
Once stipulated, the disinherison could only be revoked by a subsequent
testamentary provision.
Early Germanic Law
Unlike under Roman law, disposition by will was unknown in Early
Germanic law, where it was viewed as both unnatural and unwise-
unnatural to take orders from a dead man, and unwise to substitute
"the wish" or even
the caprice, of the individual for the traditional usage, and the
shortsightedness of a man for the wisdom of generations. By
choosing his successor to please his fancy the head of the family
runs the risk of upsetting the formation of this group. 299
Freedom of testamentary disposition of property was incompatible with
the venerated notion of family ownership of property and with the
296. Id.
297. L. Oppenheim, supra note 236, § 63, at 142.
298. Id. Radin enumerates the grounds as follows:
(a) Wrongs against the testator: A child who (1) assaulted his father; (2) held
him up to public disgrace; (3) prosecuted him for any crime but treason; (4)
informed against him to his damage; (5) attempted his life; (6) committed adultery
with his father's wife; (7) prevented him from making a will; (8) refused to be
his bail; (9) or to redeem him from captivity; (10) neglected him, if he became
insane. (b) Personal unworthiness: A son was justly passed over if (11) he
engaged in witchcraft; (12) became an actor or gladiator, unless his parents
were of that class; (13) became a heretic. A daughter might be disinherited (14)
if she became a prostitute or married a freedman without her parents' consent,
unless they had themselves neglected to provide for her marriage.
M. Radin, supra note 18, § 165, at 444.
299. 3 J. Brissaud, supra note 278, § 445, at 621, 622.
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nature of the Germanic law of inheritance as the "law of kinship based
exclusively upon blood relationship."3"
It was only gradually that any freedom of gratuitous disposition to
the disadvantage of the family was permitted; however, it was not
technically testamentary in nature.3 10 From the custom of burying or
cremating with the dead a portion of his belongings-to aid him on his
journey to the kingdom of the dead and to live upon once there-
developed the concept of the "dead man's portion," a fraction, one-
third of the movables, of his own estate due to the decedent himself.
Under the influence of the Christian Church, the dead man's portion
ceased to be interred with the dead, but was given instead to the Church,
so that it might do good service for his soul. The death-portion thus
became the "soul portion" and, with the passage of time, the "free
portion." 302
The balance of the estate was reserved for the children and the
wife. The "reserve" was based on the perceived need to preserve the
family property, unlike the Roman "legal share," which was apparently
founded on recognized alimentary obligations between persons of the
direct line.30 3 It was this evolution of the "free portion" and the Church's
interest in and influence upon its disposition that, historians speculate,
led to the evolution of the medieval will.3 °4 Freedom of alienation under
the Germanic medieval will was in fact limited to that "free portion."
Again, with the encouragement of the Church, this portion gradually
increased, but a "Pflichttheil, or compulsory portion," was reserved for
the "children and other close relatives."3 5
Over a period of three or four hundred years, Roman law achieved
acceptance in medieval Germany. By the end of the fifteenth century,
"the Imperial Chamber of Justice was established [and] its judges were
instructed to recognize Roman law as the common law of the Empire. 30 6
The "Roman substantive law of the compulsory portion was adopted,
though to be sure with important changes, especially the abrogation of
the formal requisites of the Roman succession by necessity. Thenceforth
all kinsmen were obliged to submit to a restriction of their statutory
right of inheritance; but descendants and ascendants, to some extent
300. 4 R. Huebner, supra note 288, § 110, at 740.
301. For a detailed description of the mode of transmission of the dead-man's portion
see id. at 740-52.
302. Dainow, supra note 292, at 53; 4 R. Huebner, supra note 288, § 110, at 742-
43; 3 J. Brissaud, supra note 278, § 490, at 691.
303. 3 J. Brissaud, supra note 278, § 449, at 624.
304. 4 R. Huebner, supra note 288, at 751.
305. Dainow, supra note 292, at 53-54.
306. Id. at 54.
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brothers and sisters, and also a surviving spouse, received in exchange
an absolute right to a certain share of their statutory portions. "307
The eventual Germanic solution has been to recognize freedom of
testation, but limited by the portion the family can claim, apparently
as creditors of the legatees. The family portion was in turn limited by
the power of disinherison for specified causes. Such a broad description
must suffice for the present purpose. 0
Pre-Code French Law
Pre-revolutionary France was governed by different systems of law:
Customary Law, greatly influenced by Germanic law,30 9 governed in the
North of France, whereas Written Law, based on Roman Law, prevailed
in the South. Hence it is difficult to state precisely the dominant "rules"
that were relevant to forced heirship and disinherison.
While the rules regarding forced heirship were not uniform, one
author has noted that disinherison was permitted in all parts of France,
and further, that there were three methods of revocation of the disin-
herison: 1) expressly, by a legal instrument; 2) tacitly, by the recall of
a codicil or subsequent testament; and 3) by reconciliation. 10
Revocation by reconciliation, the subject of the most recent amend-
ment to Louisiana Civil Code Article 1624, was the most unsettled of
the pre-Civil Code French methods of revocation of disinherison. As
was the case in Louisiana prior to 1985, written law in pre-revolutionary
France made no mention of reconciliation as a means of negating the
effect of disinherison. The commentators treated the subject in different
fashions. Those who favored reconciliation viewed disinherison as pu-
nitive in nature, so that once the parent had forgiven the child the
offense, it could no longer be used as a subsequent basis for disin-
herison.31 ' Proof of reconciliation was equally troublesome because the
French commentators differed on the question of whether parol testimony
could be used. By the late Eighteenth Century there was jurisprudence
to the effect that proof of reconciliation could not be made by parol
evidence unless a foundation of written evidence had first been laid. 312
307. 4 R. Huebner, supra note 288, at 753.
308. For general reference see C. Beecher, Wills and Estates Under German Law, A
Comparative Treatise of Civil and Common Law (1958) (an elementary review of German
Law of Wills). See also A. Yiannopoulos, Civil Law in the Modern World (1965); 4 R.
Huebner, supra note 288, at 752-53.
309. 4 R. Huebner, supra note 288, § 112, at 753.
310. L. Oppenheim, supra note 236, § 65, at 144.
311. Id. at 145.
312. Id. at 146.
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The Code Napoleon
In the Code Napoleon, the law relative to the forced portion is
found under the chapter entitled Of Donations During Life, and of
Wills.3"3 It provides for freedom of disposition of the "disposable por-
tion," a fraction determined by the number of children, or in the absence
of children, by the number of surviving parents. There is no provision
for disinherison, although any heir can be excluded for unworthiness,
of which there are three types. 31 4 Professor Dainow reports that, in the
discussions on the limitation of disposition, "not a single opinion was
expressed against the limitation of a parent's power of disposition;" 3 5
the debate was instead over the extent of the limitation. "Far from
contemplating the proclamation of the freedom to make a will . . . the
Revolutionary Assemblies came almost to suppress the will-the theo-
retical lawfulness of which they contested and the effects of which they
feared in practice. '31 6
As a perceived consequence of Rousseau's "social contract, ' 317 own-
ership expired with the person; the right to make a will was contrary
to nature. It was also considered injurious to the state, allowing the
formation of great domains of wealth and encouraging "the despotism
of the father over his children, and ... [giving] rise to jealousy and
hatred between the latter as a consequence of the unequality of for-
tune.' 318
Those who favored greater freedom of testation viewed the right of
disposition as a natural concomitant of ownership. "One only works
and economizes and acquires wealth in order to be able to dispose freely
of the possessions which one has acquired, ' 3 9 a theme familiar to the
present-day Louisiana reader.
The Spanish Law
The history of Spanish law has been referred to as "long and
involved and reflects the Roman, Visigothic, Mohammedan and Christian
313. Code Napoleon arts. 893-930.
314. Code Napoleon art. 727. The causes are virtually identical with those found in
La. Civ. Code art. 966: 1) attempting to kill or killing the deceased, 2) bringing against
the deceased a capital charge, adjudged calumnious, and 3) knowing the identity of the
murder, failing to bring him to justice.
315. Dainow, Forced Heirship in French Law, 2 La. L. Rev. 669, 679 (1940).
316. 3 J. Brissaud, supra note 278, § 518, at 745.
317. Id. at 746. Brissaud quotes Robespierie: "He who only respects his father because
he hopes for a greater share of his succession comes pretty near to awaiting with impatience
the time when he shall take it, and pretty near to hating his father." Id. at n.5.
318. Id. at 746.
319. Id.
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influences. 3 20 There were several codes before the 1889 code, which is
basically intact to this day, among which Las Siete Partidas was described
as "the most perfect system of Spanish laws." '3 2' This "code" contained
provision for the legal share, for the action querela inoffisosi as in
Roman Law, and for disinherison.
The multiplicity of Codes gave impetus to the movement toward a
unified code. Interestingly, the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 was greatly
influenced by the Louisiana Civil Code.322
The Spanish Civil Code of 1889 provides for forced heirship, dis-
inherison, and reconciliation.3 3 Disinheritance must be made in the form
of a will and can only be founded on the grounds enumerated in the
Code. Article 856 of the Code provides for reconciliation. Under that
article, reconciliation has the effect of 1) revoking a previously executed
disinherison clause, or 2) removing the forgiven cause for disinherison
so that a subsequent testamentary disinherison clause based on that
clause will be ineffective.
The Spanish Civil Code of 1889 further permits exclusion of heirs
for unworthiness, for which Article 756 provides seven grounds. Grounds
for unworthiness have no effect if the testator has "condoned them in
a public instrument.
324
The Louisiana Civil Code and Jurisprudence
The successive Louisiana Civil Codes of 1808, 1825, and 1870 contain
provisions for forced heirship tempered by articles allowing both dis-
inherison and unworthiness. The unworthiness grounds are identical to
those found in the Code Napoleon; the grounds for disinherison are
remarkably similar to those found in Roman Law.
Under all the codes, disinherison must be made in the form of a
will, and the testator is required to express the cause for the disinherison.
Prior to 1985, the burden of proving that the cause in fact existed was
placed on the other heirs who sought to enforce the disinherison. In
1985, Article 1624 was amended to provide that "the forced heir so
320. Dainow, supra note 292, at 54.
321. 1 The Laws of Las Siete Partidas, at vii (L. Moreau & H. Carleton trans. 1820)
(Preface).
322. Herman, Louisiana's Contribution to the 1852 Projet of the Spanish Civil Code,
42 La. L. Rev. 1509 (1982); Vazquez, Reciprocal Influences Between the Laws of Spain
and Louisiana, 42 La. L. Rev. 1473 (1982).
323. Forced heirship: Spanish Civ. Code, arts. 806-822; Disinherison: Spanish Civ.
Code arts. 848-857; Reconciliation: Spanish Civ. Code art. 856. Sanchez Roman, Estudios
de Derecho Civil el Codigo Civil 2 Historia General de la Legislation Espanola, Tomo
Sexto, Vol. 2.
324. Spanish Civil Code art. 757.
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disinherited is obligated to prove that the cause stipulated for disinherison
did not exist."
Reconciliation in Louisiana
One means of protecting against unjust disinherison was the rec-
onciliation doctrine. Although none of the codes made express provision
for reconciliation as a means of revoking or of "cancelling" the cause
for disinherison, a provision of that kind is Article 975, involving
unworthiness. Under Article 975, the action for unworthiness does not
lie if the decedent, knowing of the cause for unworthiness and having
had the opportunity to do so, did not disinherit; the failure to disinherit
thus constitutes "reconciliation or pardon."
In 1941, the Louisiana Supreme Court, in Succession of Lissa,25
reviewed the history of forced heirship and disinherison, noted the above
mentioned article on unworthiness, and concluded that a reconciliation
in fact would have the effect of erasing a previously existing cause for
disinherison and of revoking an earlier disinherison based on the cause.
The Lissa case involved disinherison clauses in wills of both parents.
On the one hand, the mother's will, disinheriting her daughter for
marrying as a minor without parental consent, was executed shortly
after the daughter's marriage. Some twenty-odd years later the mother
died, never having altered her will. There was ample evidence that both
parents had reestablished amicable relations with their daughter and
maintained the relationship for many years before their deaths. On the
other hand, the father's will, disinheriting the daughter for the same
grounds, was executed just before his death many years after the rec-
onciliation had occurred. The court found that the cause for disinherison
existed at one time but that it had been forgiven by each parent-
"whenever the injury which gives rise to the disinherison is forgiven by
the injured person, the cause for the disinherison is defeated or stricken
down, and such forgiveness may be established by parol testimony.."32 6
Thus neither of the testamentary provisions relative to disinherison were
given effect-the first, because of revocation based on reconciliation;
the second, because the cause no longer existed when the will was written.
In 1985, the Legislature amended Article 1624 to place the burden
of proving that the cause did not exist upon the disinherited forced
heir. At that time, the words "or that he was reconciled with the
testator," as an alternate means of avoiding disinherison, were also
added, apparently to codify the jurisprudentially recognized doctrine of
reconciliation set forth in Lissa.
325. Succession of Lissa, 198 La. 129, 3 So. 2d 534 (1941).
326. Id. at 147, 3 So. 2d at 540.
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The 1989 Amendment to Article 1624
Against this historical backdrop we now consider the 1989 amend-
ment to Article 1624, the scope of its application, and the problems of
interpretation it may present. Moreover, some attention must be given
to its possible retroactive applications and to the prescriptive period
under which the disinherited forced heir must prove "the cause did not
exist."
Act 82 amended Article 1624 to provide:
Proof that he was reconciled with the testator after the act or
circumstance alleged to constitute the cause for disinherison must
be clear and unequivocal, evidenced in writing, and signed by
the testator.
The new requirement of a writing to prove reconciliation and to revoke
the. disinherison provision previously made does not ipso facto alter the
rule enunciated by the court in Lissa with regard to non-existence of
the cause for disinherison because the parties reconciled prior to the
attempted disinheritance. Under the first paragraph of Article 1624, the
forced heir is bound to "prove that the cause stipulated did not exist
or that he was reconciled with the testator after the act or circumstance."
No requirement as to mode of proof that the cause did not exist is
made by Article 1624 before or after the amendment. Thus it should
not overrule Lissa's holding that allows parol evidence to prove that
the cause no longer existed because of reconciliation before the attempted
disinherison. A simple hypothetical, based on the Lissa facts, will il-
lustrate the difference between reconciliation as revocation of a disin-
herison clause and reconciliation as eliminating the cause for disinherison.
A minor marries without the consent of the parent. The parent
disinherits the child. If the "reconciliation" occurs only after the exe-
cution, or writing, of the will, then the proof under the new legislation
must be "clear and unequivocal, in writing, signed by the testator"-
for this is proof of reconciliation as revocation of a disinherison clause.
If, however, the reconciliation occurred before the writing of the will
that cited the marriage of the minor without consent as cause for
disinherison, then proof may be made by parol evidence-for this is
proof of reconciliation to show the cause did not exist at the time of
execution of the attempted disinherison.
Confining the effects of the amendment to post-disinheritance rec-
onciliation no more strains the language of the amendment that refers
to being "reconciled ... after the act or circumstance" than it is strained
by limiting it to pre-disinheritance reconciliation, and thereby giving a
cause for disinherison a perpetual effect unless there is written contrary
proof. This latter view is at odds with the approach to unworthiness,3 27
327. La. Civ. Code art. 975:
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obstructive of easy restoration of family harmony, and productive of
an enormous power to forever hold a cause over a child's head.
Such an interpretation of the 1989 amendment is similar to the
treatment of reconciliation in family law under Louisiana Civil Code
article 152: "A ground for separation once forgiven, cannot be the basis
of a subsequent suit." Similarly, as noted earlier, pre-code French law
and Article 856 of the Spanish Civil Code recognize the "erasure" effect
of a reconciliation. On the other hand, the new requirement of a writing
to show proof of reconciliation-when it serves as revocation of a
disinherison clause-is consistent with the previously mentioned juris-
prudence of France of the late eighteenth century that required a foun-
dation in writing of proof of reconciliation before parol evidence could
be introduced.
Is a will the kind of writing required? If so, it would seem that
the legislature would have made specific provision for the problem as
it did in the case of disinherison . 2s Furthermore, while there is reason
for solemnity in the form of a disinherison, the same reason does not
exist in proof of reconciliation. Disinherison is at odds with the natural
affection that a parent feels for a child, while reconciliation comports
with normal parental care and concern for a child. 29
Finally, the revocation of a will-the means required for a disin-
herison-is either by a subsequent will (express revocation) or a sub-
sequent act of the testator that manifests a change of intent (tacit
revocation). It would therefore be untenable to read into the "writing"
requirement the additional necessity of the formality of a will as the
sole method of revocation of the disinheritance. As an example of tacit
revocation of a bequest in a will, Article 1695 furnishes the illustration
of an attempt after execution of the will to donate inter vivos the
previously bequeathed property. The donation, even if null, amounts to
a revocation of the testamentary disposition. By analogy, any writing
that reflects a change in attitude from one of condemnation to one of
forgiveness should suffice to prove the reconciliation.
Suits to establish the unworthiness of heirs can not be sustained, if there has
been a reconciliation or pardon on the part of him to whom the injury was
done.
If, therefore, a father has full knowledge of an injury done to him by br1e
of his children, and dies without disinheriting him, though he has sufficient
time to make his will since he has had this knowledge, he will be considered
as having forgiven the injury, and the child can not be deprived of the successi6n
of his father on account of unworthiness.
328. "A disinherison, to be valid, must be made in one of the forms prescribed for
testaments." La. Civ. Code art. 1618.
329. Samuel, Shaw, and Spaht, supra note 42, at 603.
1990]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
One can envision the situation of a letter from parent to child,
evidencing an affirmative intent to forgive the child.3 0 This kind of
writing should suffice to fulfill the writing requirement of proof. If the
substantive content is clear and unequivocal as to change of attitude,
it should be effective as a revocation of this disinherison.
Scope of Application
The new legislation will be effective on July 1, 1990. It applies to
successions thatare "opened" by the death of the testator33" ' after the
effective date, regardless of when the testament was executed and re-
gardless of when the events constituting reconciliation occurred.332 Be-
cause the rights of heirs do not vest until death, the provision should
not apply retroactively. This was the approach of the third circuit in
Succession of Vincent v. Vincent. 3 The case involved the applicability
of the then new presumption, under Article 1621, that the facts set
forth by the testator as grounds for disinherison are correct. The will
was written in 1984; the amendment to Article 1621, providing the
presumption, became effective in 1985; and the testator died in 1986.
Rejecting the disinherited forced heir's argument that the presumption
created by the amendment could not apply because at the time the will
was written the favored heirs enjoyed no such rebuttable presumption,
the court simply stated: "We disagree. Rights in a succession do not
vest until death. 33 4 The fifth circuit has taken the same approach in
a converse factual situation. Where the testator died before the effective
date of an amendment adding a new cause for disinherison, the court
did not apply the subsequently enacted legislation, observing, "All sub-
stantive rights to the succession are fixed as of that time and cannot
be affected by subsequent legislation. ' 335
The approach of both circuits is in harmony with that taken by
Planiol, who draws a distinction between the vesting of the property
and the writing of the will. As to the former, the law in force on the
330. "Affirmative" acts flowing from the testator to the disinherited heir as opposed
to "passive" acceptance, by the testator, of acts of kindness by the disinherited heir were
required by the first circuit in Succession of Chaney, 413 So. 2d 936 (La. App. 1st Cir.),
writ denied, 420 So. 2d 449 (1982).
331. "The succession, either testamentary or legal, or irregular, becomes open by death
or by presumption of death caused by long absence, in the cases established by law."
La. Civ. Code art. 934.
332. "This Act . . . shall apply to all testaments executed before and after the effective
date hereof, provided that the death of the testator occurs after the effective date hereof."
La. Civ. Code art. 1624, as amended by 1989 La. Acts No. 367, § 2.
333. Succession of Vincent, 527 So. 2d 23 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988).
334. Id. at 26.
335. Succession of Hymel, 546 So. 2d 816 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1989).
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date of death should apply; as to the latter: "The making of a testament
and the regularity of its form are tested solely in the light of the law
in force when it was made." 3 6
Disinherison, which of necessity involves a transfer of property rights
to one other than the disinherited heirs, should be governed by the law
in effect at the time the transfer takes effect, the date of opening of
the succession-that is, the death of the decedent.
Prescription
The question of prescription seems to have been answered by the
Louisiana Supreme Court insofar as the characterization of the forced
heir's attack on the disinherison clause is concerned. The court in In
re Andrus33 7 described the challenge as one for reduction of an excessive
donation, prescribing in five years. It should be noted that Succession
of Smith,33 s cited as authority in In re Andrus, was a case that in fact
dealt with reduction. In Smith, the ground for disinherison urged was
not one permitted by the Code; thus, the court did not consider dis-
inherison at all.
The characterization of the forced heir's remedy as one for reduction
of an excessive donation mortis causa seems correct, at least in instances
where the testator disinherits and expressly disposes of the disinherited
forced heir's share. As an action for reduction of a donation mortis
causa, it should prescribe in five years, running from the date of probate
of the testament. On the other hand, if the testator merely disinherits,
with no disposition made, perhaps the action would more properly be
described as one to annul a testament. But, even so, the prescriptive
question seems unimportant because the prescriptive period of five years
also applies to the action to annul testaments, and likewise runs from
the date of probate.33 9
A final observation. The disinherited forced heir might pursue an-
other approach to restitution of "his" part by attacking the validity of
the disinherison itself on the ground of its having been made, not out
of a desire to disinherit, but rather out of "hatred, anger, suggestion
or captation." The former Article 1492 of the Louisiana Civil Code
prohibited this type of proof, but it was repealed in 1989.
Discussion of the repeal of Article 1492 appears elsewhere in this
article and is beyond the scope of this section.3 40 One has a sense of
336. 1 M. Planiol, Treatise on the Civil Law No. 247, at 177 (12th ed. La. St. L.
Inst. 1959).
337. In re Andrus, 221 La. 996, 60 So. 2d 899 (1952).
338. Succession of Smith, 182 La. 389, 162 So. 21 (1935).
339. La. R.S. 9:5643 (Supp. 1990) provides a five year period, running from judicial
opening of the succession, within which to probate a testament.
340. See supra text accompanying notes 153-262.
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deja vu, however, when its repeal is viewed in connection with the
increased power of disinherison, or "freedom of testation." For in
sixteenth century France, when disinherison of the entire succession
became legally possible, the courts found means to protect the interest
of the family, even as to the disposable portion, by annulling legacies
as having been made, not by a desire to gratify the legatee, but by
hatred or anger against an heir-the action "ab irato. ' '3 4'
In conclusion, the amendment to Article 1624, placed in historical
and current legislative perspective, seems to be a typical example of the
"oscillation" between the interest of the individual, the interest of the
family, and the larger interest of society. If, as predicted by adherents
of forced heirship, the result is a threat to familial and societal interests
the pendulum will undoubtedly swing back from whence it came.
VII. THE LEGISLATURE, THE LAW INSTITUTE, AND THE CIVIL CODE
Section 3 of 1989 Louisiana Acts No. 788 directs the Louisiana
State Law Institute to prepare amendments to the Louisiana Civil Code,
Revised Statutes, and Code of Civil Procedure "to correlate" the pro-
visions of those laws with Act 788. If this section is taken literally, the
legislature envisioned no change to the provisions of Act 788, only to
other provisions affected by it. No thoughtful consideration of alter-
natives to Act 788 is desired; the Law Institute's task would be a purely
mechanical one of adjusting old law to fit new law.
Behind this ostensibly uncontroversial section lies an issue of crucial
significance regarding the legislative process of Louisiana: who is man-
aging the ongoing process of Civil Code revision, the legislature or the
Law Institute? Of course, the legislature alone has the power to enact
proposed provisions into law; therefore, in that sense, the legislature is
always in charge. Yet the legislature seems to be altering the role it had
wisely ordained for the Louisiana State Law Institute in the lawmaking
process.
In 1938, the legislature realized it was not able to devote to its
enactments the in-depth consideration needed to achieve comprehensive
law revision and codification. It chartered the Louisiana State Law
Institute as the body to perform this careful study and to prepare
legislation to be submitted to the legislature. This two step process,
whereby the institute proposes and the legislature disposes, would afford
Louisiana the most mature and well-considered system of laws possible.3 42
341. - 3 J. Brissaud, supra note 278, at 661.
342. La. R.S. 24:201-208, enacted by 1938 La. Acts No. 166.
When it was created in 1938, the Institute presumably was intended to become
a major factor in the development of legislation, legal culture and legal schol-
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In 1948, the legislature gave the Law Institute a specific mandate to
prepare a comprehensive revision of the Civil Code,3 43 and began fi-
nancially supporting the project in 1975.144 Thus, the legislature itself
put the Law Institute in charge of the initiation and preparation of
Civil Code revision.
The division of labor between the Law Institute and the legislature
is essential to an orderly process of Code revision. If Louisiana is to
have the most thoughtful and well-considered codification possible, both
as to substance and form, the legislature must have the benefit of
scholarly research,3 4' expert drafting,' 46 and careful article-by-article de-
liberation by knowledgeable people.3 47 If the Code is to endure, its
substance must not merely facilitate the desires of those who have the
political power of the day, but must contain principles worthy of respect
in the future as well. The Code "must seek to strike a delicate balance
arship in the state, and was potentially the most significant step in Louisiana
legal history-a step fraught with national implications as well.
Morrow, The Proposed Louisiana Criminal Code-An Opportunity and a Challenge, 15
Tul. L. Rev. 415, 416 (1941).
343. 1948 La. Acts No. 335.
344. The Twenty-Fifth Biennial Report of the Louisiana State Law Institute to the
Legislature of Louisiana, at 11 (1988).
345. The heart of intelligent law improvement and reform is research. It guards
against immature decision based on incomplete consideration resulting from
insufficient knowledge of the total factual atmosphere affecting a given problem.
It provides a constant challenge to provincialism. It uncovers benefits that may
be gained from the experience of others and from the mistakes of the past.
Smith, Law Revision in Louisiana in Retrospect, 19 La. L. Rev. 34, 41 (1958).
346. What is a "code in the civilian sense?" This means at least that the code
must exist as an organically harmonious unit, reflecting the same consistent
point of view throughout, and that its provisions shall be formulated at the
same time, and with reference to each other, by the same person or group of
persons. It means also that the language of the code must be simple, clear,
and as non-technical as possible.
Morrow, supra note 342, at 417-18.
347. Any proposed new Code could not be debated article by article in the
Legislature, or even in legislative committee. No new Code will ever be passed
unless the work of the Institute is accepted largely on faith, including major
policy decisions .... The draftsmen cannot be expected to be mere mechanics
who assemble neatly the product of others' policy decisions. Of course, the
fullest possible expert advice, discussion, publicity, opportunity to be heard and
debate must accompany both the drafting process and the deliberations of the
Council for a prolonged period of time. But in the last analysis we must rely
upon the good faith, the objectivity, the sound judgment and the skill of a
relatively small group of persons.
Morrow, Current Prospects for Revision of the Louisiana Civil Code, 33 Tul. L. Rev.
143, 151 (1958). 1989 La. Acts No. 788 seems to confirm Professor Morrow's fear that
reliance on the small group of experts would not occur.
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between reflecting and molding the prevailing climate of opinion. 3 48
Individual legislators and their staffs cannot provide the necessary time
and expertise, nor do they always have the objectivity to strike this
delicate balance. By contrast the Law Institute brings to bear upon a
project the full range of expertise within the legal profession-practi-
tioners, judges, academics, and deliberates in an atmosphere detached
from political pressure.149 One need only observe the above described
difficulties created by the 1989 legislature's haphazard attempt to change
forced heirship to see that the legislature needs the Law Institute.
The Law Institute committee on successions, with Max Nathan as
reporter, is currently at work drafting a revision of the law in this area,
and eventually would have dealt with forced heirship. The committee,
in this revision effort, would have considered all of the possible variations
and alternatives in drafting a coherent revision of present law. The Law
Institute Council would then have debated the revision article by article,
a process that often exposes problems requiring further attention from
the committee. Finally, the Institute would have handed the legislature
a recommendation that had been drafted, reviewed, and approved as
to substance and form by many of the most experienced jurists in
Louisiana. Unfortunately, the legislature circumvented this sensible proc-
ess of deliberation by presenting the state with a fait accompli.
The reaction of the Law Institute to the legislature's preemption of
its role in Civil Code revision is critical to the ultimate success of the
project of Code revision. As the Institute's first director, Professor J.
Denson Smith, cautioned, "Since the provisions of a true code are very
carefully interrelated, the effect of particular amendments on related
provisions must be thoroughly studied. Great mischief can come from
hastily considered amendments designed to achieve some particular pur-
pose."350 He hoped the Institute would be a watchdog over codification
projects "in order to foster and protect the unity of design of the new
codes against the inevitable inroads that would come from their judicial
construction and from statutes hastily passed by the Legislature."35 The
Institute's protective function that he described must also include parts
of the Code presently under revision as well as completed revisions, lest
progress toward completion be constantly impeded.
348. Morrow, Louisiana Blueprint: Civilian Codification and Legal Method for State
and Nation, 17 Tul. L. Rev. 537, 558 (1943).
349. Professor J. Denson Smith; the first director of the Louisiana State Law Institute,
emphasized that no other state agency, including the old Legislative Council whose functions
have now devolved upon the staff attorneys for the various legislative committees, "answers
the need for a permanent organization charged with the responsibility of maintaining a
continuing program-of basic law revision and reform." Smith, The Role of the Louisiana
State Law Institute in Law Improvement and Reform, 16 La. L. Rev. 689, 692 (1956).
350. Id. at 697.
351. Smith, supra note 345, at 38 (emphasis added).
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Thus, the Institute has a duty to protest legislative attempts to
disrupt the existing articles before a considered Institute recommendation
is ready. It should resist circumvention of the procedure established to
ensure the quality of its recommendations-especially the attempt to
preclude the study of policy alternatives. If, instead, for political reasons
the Institute believes it must obediently do the legislature's bidding no
matter how destructive to the orderly process of Code revision, it will
put at risk the goal of producing the best Code possible. The legislature,
knowing that the Institute stands ready to clean up any ill-prepared and
ill-considered legislation, will be encouraged to continue using the In-
stitute as a mere mechanic, forfeiting the Institute's role as the intellectual
workhorse of Code revision and eventually thwarting the Institute's
mission of facilitating conceptual consistency throughout the Code.
In the end, the most the Institute can realistically do to stop hap-
hazard amendments is to update the legislators regarding the progress
of the Institute's current projects and to suggest respectfully that leg-
islators refer any ideas for improvements in these and other areas to
the appropriate Institute official.35 2 If the legislature wishes to emphasize
the need for improvement, it should adopt a concurrent resolution
directing the Institute to study a particular matter. 53 The legislature
should, however, avoid imposing deadlines on the Institute unless there
is an emergency. Code revision is a long term undertaking, even in
jurisdictions that devote much more resources to the project than Louis-
iana.354 Only if the legislature restrains itself while the Institute does its
job will Louisiana have a satisfactorily revised Civil Code.
352. In the 1950s, legislators submitted their proposals for amendments to the Civil
Code to the Institute prior to adoption. Smith, supra note 349, at 697.
353. E.g., La. H.R. 6, Reg. Sess. (1989) (requests Institute to study community property
reimbursement rules).
354. Morrow, An Approach to the Revision of the Louisiana Civil Code, 23 Tul. L.
Rev. 478, 483 (1949), noting that it took Germany twenty years to draft its civil code.
See also Pascal, A Report on the French Civil Code Revision Project, 25 Tul. L. Rev.
205 (1951). The French began their revision in June, 1945 and have yet to complete it.
The projet for the central articles on successions (opening of successions, capacity to
succeed, acceptance, renunciation, acceptance with benefit of inventory, and partition)
was only recently unveiled in January, 1989. If the French revision is a standard by which
to judge, the pace of the Louisiana State Law Institute in revising the Louisiana Civil
Code is commendable.
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